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My professional journey began in 2000 as a media advertising executive in the most 
culturally eclectic and unique city in the world: my native New Orleans.  Almost nine years later, 
I ventured back into campus life at Louisiana State University, which served as a second home to 
me for so many years, on a changed course I never thought I would have the great fortune to 
follow.  Mine is a story that overflows with so many irreplaceable individuals, who never once 
waivered in their support for my desire to fulfill a professional goal that demanded so much of 
both my time and theirs. 
The decision to pursue my doctoral degree at LSU began in earnest while obtaining my 
Master’s Degree in Liberal Arts and Humanities at Louisiana State University in Shreveport.  
While working as a writing instructor at LSUS, I obtained an invaluable background in European 
History, and particularly in the areas of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, from one 
of the foremost experts in his field.  Dr. Michael Leggiere, who now serves as the Deputy 
Director of Military Studies at the University of North Texas, offered resolute encouragement, 
and expressed a staunch confidence in my abilities while I initially attempted to navigate the 
unchartered waters of academia.  Within his lectures and counsel, he provided a solid and 
objective historical background upon which I would build my knowledge of global events, and 
put forth a substantial, comprehensive context for my scholarly drive to effectively evaluate the 
world and America’s role in it.  I will always be grateful to Dr. Leggiere for his blunt approach 
and honest direction. 
Prior to my return to LSU, I made an incredibly beneficial decision which, at the time, 
seemed to be a road block.  Though my initial goal was to enter into a doctoral program 
immediately after acquiring my Master’s Degree, I instead enrolled in the Graduate Program at 
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the University of New Orleans to prevent any break in scholarship after an unexpected transfer 
back home.  Here, I had the benefit of studying for one year under Dr. Gűnter Bischof, the 
University Research Professor of History, Marshall Plan Professor, and Director of Center 
Austria at UNO.  “Dr. B,” as I like to call him, further enhanced my scholarship in the areas of 
Cold War research and post-World War II global developments.  He always gave me 
constructive criticism, and though we often approached subjects from opposite points of view, he 
consistently fostered healthy and informative debate, and was instrumental in expanding my 
understanding of the academic world.  I am so appreciative of him for his support in my 
application process to LSU, and consider him a treasure to students who are fortunate enough to 
gain from his tutelage, as I certainly did. 
My entry into the Doctoral Program in the LSU Department of Humanities and Social 
Sciences was largely determined by my incredible advisor and Committee Chair, Dr. David 
Culbert.  For almost seven years, Dr. Culbert trusted my judgement and allowed me the freedom 
to pursue a topic that has overwhelmed yet excited me at almost every turn.  Even during the 
most stressful of times, he provided an objective, insightful voice, which was always followed by 
an ingenious piece of wit.  While he appreciated my legendary stubbornness and often rebellious 
attitude towards the institution of higher learning, he also taught me to respect the process, and 
practice what I preached when it came to objectivity in analysis.  His sage advice ultimately 
made me a better student.  He and his wonderful wife, Lubna, often welcomed me into their 
home for impromptu advising sessions, graciously attended my very own “Big Fat Greek 
Wedding,” and supported me during my time away when I gave birth to my daughter five weeks 
early.  Dr. Culbert’s dedication to my success never faltered, and at every turn, he effortlessly 
fulfilled my idea of what an educator should be.  Shortly following my dissertation defense, in 
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which he once again proved to be my greatest champion in the world of academia, I tragically 
lost my mentor and friend when he suddenly passed away while vacationing in Italy.  He was a 
brilliant, warm, eccentric person who I am incredibly blessed to have known.  Dr. David Culbert 
will always be the standard to which I will fight to hold myself.  I truly hope, as one of the many 
graduate students to benefit from his expertise, I serve him well in my future academic 
endeavors.  My heart remains heavy in the wake of this immense loss.   
I also want to offer sincere thanks to an LSU History Department legend, who I first 
encountered as an undergrad, and had the subsequent privilege to work under as a graduate 
student.  Dr. Stanley Hilton, who is now enjoying his retirement and spending much-deserved 
time with his cherished granddaughters, remains one of the most enthralling, passionate, and 
wise lecturers I have ever had the privilege to hear.  Even as a twenty-year-old Mass 
Communications major, whose only priority was to earn my Humanities credit and embark on 
whatever exciting adventures awaited me in the “real world,” Dr. Hilton planted the seed of 
intrigue with regards to historical analysis and presentation that always tugged at me.  Although 
it would not fully blossom for almost a decade, it was his riveting portrait of the US in the 
Twentieth Century, and especially during the Second World War, that eventually convinced me 
to alter my career path and undertake this daunting new challenge.  It has been an unexpected 
and unequaled honor to study at the right hand of the man who first inspired my true love for 
historical scholarship.  And his gentility and patience towards his pregnant Teaching Assistant, 
who was usually starving and exhausted, earns him an additional star in my book. 
I would not be at this point in my academic career without the early friendship and 
loyalty of Emily Meyer Hall.  From our simultaneous entry into the LSU Ph.D. program, through 
the serendipitous timing of both our marriages and pregnancies, and up to the present, she 
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remains a sharp, authentic sounding-board for me; not only as a colleague, but also as a fellow 
mother.  Her ingenious sarcasm and steady hand always provide me with perspective and 
encouragement, and I am so fortunate to have connected with her immediately upon boarding 
this formidable train.  I also want to thank my fellow 2017 History Ph.D. graduate, Lauren 
Doughty Poche, and LSU Graduate School icon Erin Halloran, for always entertaining my 
unexpected office drive-bys, and for keeping me updated on department events when I left my 
Graduate Assistantship to finally slay this dragon.   
I could not have made it through the final weeks of this work without the advice and 
knowledge of J.B. White.  His input was always incredibly constructive, and his experience in 
dealing with official government source usage and documentation immensely aided my research 
and final presentation.  J.B. is on his way to becoming a fine addition to the field of US historical 
scholarship.     
While my gratitude for those within the academic field is certainly immense, I would 
never have gotten to this point without my family and friends.  Most of my closest friends work 
outside of academia, and have thus suffered through countless hours of my relentless need to 
pontificate, particularly during social occasions.  I hit the jackpot of kinship when I met Donna 
Breakfield Clark, who could not care less about the Solidarity Movement in Poland, yet listened 
intently when I discussed my research and writing challenges during our weekly phone calls or 
weekend visits.  Her overwhelming success in her profession, as a mother, and as a friend, 
provides me with a shining goal to which I continue to aspire.  As I see the clichéd light at the 
end of the tunnel, I am reminded of just how much her humor and companionship have sustained 
me through these years.  I also want to thank Vincent Tortorich and Kevin Krause, who, for all 
intents and purposes, are my brothers-in-arms. They have picked me up from some of the more 
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challenging times life has offered, and helped me to overcome many obstacles with laughter and 
a healthy dose of surrender.  I cherish the relationship that we have nourished over so many wild 
and wonderful years.  Someday, there will be a screen play.   
I have never met anyone who rivals my great fortune when it comes to family.  I have six 
hilarious brothers-in-law…yes, six…who have always offered me lighthearted advice, and 
helped me to keep things in perspective throughout this process, even though they did not always 
understand it.  I am quite positive that at this point, my wonderfully unique Greek in-laws 
believe that attending school as a student is my actual job.  Hopefully, the party we hold and the 
plates we break in celebration of the completion of this project convince them otherwise.  I also 
want to thank my aunts, uncles, and cousins, who always understood when I had to miss a 
special event or family gathering due to paper or project deadlines. 
During the process of writing this dissertation, I lost my dear grandfather, John 
LeGuluche, who passed away at the age of 87.  He always told my mother, his only daughter, 
“they can take so many things away from you…you can lose so much…but no one can ever take 
away your education.” My mother relayed this information through tears at his funeral, and it is 
something that has sustained me during this tireless pursuit.  My PawPaw John, along with his 
beloved widow, my spunky and sassy Nana June, always provided comfort, adoration, and 
laughter to my cousins, to my siblings, and to me.  My grandparents are a huge part of each of 
us.  They always demanded that we seek out the warmth and authenticity of life, and follow our 
individual paths, regardless of the status or paycheck.  I truly hope that I have made them proud. 
To my sisters, Amanda Perrett Keller and Julie Perrett Vitrano:  You are my holiday.  
You are my church.  You are my home.  You are my touchstone.  You are my treasured past.  
You are my comforting present.  You walk on each side of me as we venture towards our bright 
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futures, with our precious babies (Brody, Anthony, Lyla, and Evelyn) in tow.  We are a forever 
team, as are they.  We are unbreakable.  We are the Perrett Girls.  I would never be here, 
achieving something that has proven so arduous yet satisfying, without you both.  I may provide 
the middle, but Amanda, you are the unbending foundation, and Julie, you are the bloom.  
I will never be able to adequately express what is owed to my parents, but I can assure 
you it cannot ever be repaid.  Growing up, my mother and father provided my sisters and me 
with all they had to give.  But the most important gift they bestowed upon us was not in anything 
they bought, or even advised.  It is what they exhibited.  They led by example.  They taught their 
girls that we should never settle.  They taught us about hard work, discipline, and independence.  
And above all, they gave us the blueprints for a lasting partnership, and shared with us a daily 
love story filled with true respect, steadfast loyalty, and an unyielding friendship. 
My father, Bill Perrett, served his country as a US Marine in Vietnam, and arrived home 
to find a country that did not remotely resemble the one that greeted those who returned from 
Europe or the Pacific mere decades earlier.  His sacrifices, and his continued fight to right 
historical wrongs through his charity, the Black Hawk Flight Foundation, inspire me daily to 
present the past comprehensively, with my eyes wide open and an unbridled truth in my 
instruction.  My Dad has always challenged me, supported me, and engrained in me that I am 
capable of anything I choose.  At times, I feel undeserving of his pride.  He is, and will always 
be, my hero.   
Where my father fills the role of the brave soldier with silent strength, my mother is the 
lionhearted, persistent, compassionate heroine.  She found immense joy in raising her three girls, 
and never missed a ball game, dance competition, or school event.  And yet, the memory I 
cherish most is when I was fortunate enough to witness her fulfill a personal vow she made to 
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herself to earn her college diploma later in life.  As our eyes locked upon her exit from the 
graduation stage at Southeastern Louisiana University, my pride and exuberance in all that she 
achieved left me overwhelmed.  It remains one of the most precious moments of my life.  My 
mother’s aptitude for shrewd and witty analyses of events both past and present provides me 
with an irreplaceable source of information and lively discussion during our daily phone calls 
and weekly dinners. Throughout this process, she always gave me room to vent.  She never let 
me quit.  She demanded that I understood the magnitude of what I was about to accomplish.  
And she always knew exactly what to say to keep me focused, and above all, to keep me bold.  It 
is no coincidence, nor is it unfitting in any way, that her name is Jewel. 
I must also give special thanks to my Golden Retriever, and first “baby girl,” Miss Lillie, 
who spent many late nights snoring next to me as I diligently worked to finish a paper or project.  
I remain unsure if her peaceful slumber atop my research materials was to encourage me to 
complete my task and join her, or if she was just taunting me.  My guess is the latter.    
As my research for this project began, my life changed in a way that I never expected.  I 
heard the heartbeat of a precious gift I was due to receive.  I felt her move.  I saw her fuzzy 
picture on a screen.  But it was not until the day she arrived that I realized my life was missing 
something.  It was as though I always knew her, and loved her; she just had yet to be with me. 
Lyla June:  You are a beautiful, spirited force, and my greatest hope is that, throughout your life, 
I continue to deserve the honor and privilege of being your mother.  Whenever I faltered in this 
process, I thought of you.  I reminded myself that I must be your example.  I had to ensure you 
will grow to understand that when you find a passion, you must work tirelessly to hold onto it.  
You must persevere.  In this hard-fought triumph of my own, I hope I show you the unlimited 
ix 
 
possibilities awaiting you in the future.  You are going to rule the world someday, my fearless, 
formidable girl. 
Finally, this work is above all dedicated to the amazingly selfless, contagiously 
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In modern US history, the 1990s are often regarded as “The Decade of Peace and 
Prosperity.”  Though the liberalization of markets and a technology boom fueled American 
prosperity, expectations of post-Cold War peace remained elusive. The purpose of this study is to 
observe how, in the moment when the US became the world’s superpower, it also began to 
retreat from a position of active leadership.  Elected in 1992, President Bill Clinton looked 
towards the United Nations as the answer to keeping peace around the globe.  His 
administration’s policies of democratic enlargement and aggressive multilateralism aimed to 
combine the spread of free market democracy and collective security as concepts upon which to 
contain foreign conflict. While noble in its idealism, Clinton was absent any clear objectives 
when faced with international crises.  His focus on domestic issues, and lack of attention to cases 
where US leadership was necessary, hurt America’s credibility as a force for humanity and 
justice in the eyes of many around the globe.  With a focus on five serious foreign entanglements 
that erupted during Clinton’s two terms—Somalia, the Bosnian War, the Rwandan Genocide, 
Haiti, and the rise of Al Qaeda—this work illuminates a distrust of resolute American leadership 
among Clinton and his primary advisors. His hesitancy to wield American power, actively 
persuade allies, and use US influence to direct international policy reflected a nation unwilling to 
confront either friend or foe to advance its own interests.  The rise of Al Qaeda during his 
presidency gives additional weight to this study’s findings regarding the administration’s dearth 
of focus and willpower involving direct national security threats.  As Clinton increasingly looked 
to international bodies for direction, even at the height of US power, he allowed the nation to 
become mired in incompetent peacekeeping missions that too often yielded disastrous 
consequences, both for US forces and those they were sent to protect.    
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Chapter 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s.  Many Americans reminisce about this period in recent history as the “Decade 
of Peace and Prosperity.”1  Its commencement features the abrupt, and to most, quite surprising 
end to almost a half of a century of bilateral conflict between two allies-turned-adversaries after 
the Second World War.  The quiet dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the rise of the 
United States as the world’s lone, undisputed superpower.2  People worldwide cheered the 
demolition of borders, both literal and figurative, which once fenced in millions from their 
families, from their freedom, and from their hopeful dreams of unfettered economic prosperity.   
Although the 1990s also began with renewed tensions in the Middle East, and a 
subsequent war to halt and reverse the violent invasion of the Persian Gulf state of Kuwait by 
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, this military conflict was short and decisive.  Executed by a US-led 
coalition of thirty-five nations, with the support of the United Nations (UN) and the backing of 
most Americans, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm blurred the painful memories of 
Vietnam and, at least symbolically, placed the nation and its military back atop its perch as the 
most noble and powerful on the globe.3  Optimism for a new epoch of goodwill and a cessation 
of hostilities spread out from the US worldwide.   
The 1990s also introduced the world to a boom in technology that remains unsurpassed in 
terms of global interconnectedness and access to information.  Increasingly common ownership 
of the home computer, coupled with the massive transformation of international communications 
brought about by the Internet, led to a steadying of the US economy, and eventually, to a 
balanced federal budget.4  Much of this prosperity, particularly in Silicon Valley, nicknamed for 
its housing of the high-tech enterprises that defined the decade, developed out of American 
ingenuity and entrepreneurship coupled with the liberalization of global markets during the 
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Reagan Administration.5  However, politically speaking, and whether right or wrong, credit is 
often given to one man.  And it is not Ronald Reagan. 
    On November 3, 1992, Americans elected a young governor from Arkansas to the office 
of the presidency.  This unlikely underdog, nicknamed the “Comeback Kid”6 due to his 
resiliency throughout the 1992 primary campaign, electorally outperformed a well-liked 
Republican incumbent in George H.W. Bush, whose foreign policy credentials were nothing if 
not impressive.  But as with most US elections, William Jefferson Clinton used a simple, direct 
message about America’s financial instability to win over voters.  The Clinton Campaign’s 
concise answer to the then-present recession was simply “[It’s] The Economy, Stupid.”7 Coined 
by one of Clinton’s chief strategists, James Carville, this cutting yet candid line resonated with 
an economically frustrated electorate, and thus secured the Oval for the smooth-talking 
southerner and self-proclaimed "New Democrat."8   
Loosely defined, the “New Democrat” moniker arose in reaction to the overwhelming 
political success of President Reagan, and the national move to the right that defined the 1980s.  
Both Clinton and his Vice-Presidential pick, Senator Al Gore of Tennessee, offered a more 
centrist, moderate image of the Democratic Party as economically conservative yet still 
dedicated to the pursuit of social justice.  For example, one of Clinton’s most popular policy 
proposals with the majority of Americans was rooted in “ending welfare as we know it,”9 which 
he, with the aid of a Republican House and Senate, eventually turned into successful welfare 
reform legislation.   
As a candidate, Clinton somewhat eschewed the Left’s slavish devotion to the Keynesian 
tactics of deficit spending and strongly advocated for a balanced budget.  In doing so, he actively 
sought out the Reagan Democrats who had previously abandoned the party of Franklin Delano 
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Roosevelt in reaction to the increasingly liberal policies of candidates like Michael Dukakis, 
George McGovern, Walter Mondale, and Ted Kennedy.  Clinton never did win over a majority 
of voters, mostly due to a quite successful run by a quirky third party candidate in Ross Perot, 
who received almost nineteen percent of American support.  However, Clinton’s efforts to 
provide voters with a “Third Way,”10 where capitalism and a widened social safety net could co-
exist, proved successful against Bush, whose broken pledge on tax increases served as the neck-
strangling albatross from which the incumbent could not escape.   
Many voters questioned the dedication of candidate Clinton to this more centrist, 
moderate path, primarily due to his image as a draft-dodging, pot-smoking Baby Boomer with a 
wife who lacked his inescapable charm, but certainly not his ambition for power.11  However, he 
eventually overcame these obstacles and sold a majority with his promise to usher in a “New 
Covenant”12 with America.  Clinton’s New Covenant featured a laser-like focus on domestic 
issues, such as balancing the federal budget, decreasing government bureaucracy, and nurturing 
free trade and American entrepreneurship.  This vision was certainly different from those put 
forth by his more liberal colleagues and predecessors.  However, Clinton also spoke of 
environmental concerns, a woman’s right to abortion, and universal access to healthcare.  The 
idea behind the New Covenant was a renewed social compact between Americans and the 
political class, and centered around “a solemn agreement between the people and their 
government based not simply on what each of us can take but what all of us must give to our 
nation.”13  
Bush’s popularity, which stood at an eighty-nine percent approval rating after the Gulf 
War, began to decline due to his backtracking on an infamous “Read My Lips”14 pledge in 
opposition to tax increases.  It hovered in the forties during the 1992 election season.  However, 
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one must look further into the attitudes of the American people, and those in leadership during 
this time, to see the changing dynamic that catapulted Clinton, whose personal reputation and 
character were under constant assault, to victory in the three-man race.   
Compared to Bush, Clinton’s resumé on the international stage was thin.  Bush’s service 
in World War II is well-documented.  Bush also served as the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), as well as Vice-President for two full terms under President Reagan.  He oversaw 
and guided the peaceful break-up of the Soviet Union, and is rightly credited with orchestrating 
the quick and almost total destruction of Hussein’s Iraqi Army on the pretext of saving the oil-
rich state of Kuwait.  Though he criticized President Bush in certain areas of foreign policy 
during the campaign,15 once elected, Clinton mostly stayed in his lane when it came to 
challenging the global actions of the elder statesman.  He instead concentrated intently on his 
domestic legislation proposals.  This circumvention inevitably resulted from the realities of the 
many global crises staring him down once inaugurated.  Clinton essentially continued Bush’s 
policies, particularly with regards to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the escalating war in 
Bosnia.  Even given the US role as de facto leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), which had yet to be called upon in the Balkans despite its enhanced position in the 
wake of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Clinton still lacked any cohesive, clear policies of 
his own.   
Perhaps an additional reason for this hesitancy to plunge into the world of international 
conflict is due to Clinton being the first Baby Boomer to secure the top spot on a major party 
ticket and win.  His past actions with regards to Americans fighting overseas and vocal disdain 
for American policies in war were discomforting to many voters,16 especially those of the Silent 
Majority, seen as vital to Republican control of the Executive Branch for twenty out of the 
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previous twenty-four years.  In fact, prior to Clinton, no Democrat since FDR was ever elected to 
a second term.  Only Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson served longer terms, due to their 
positions as Vice President upon the deaths of FDR and John Kennedy, respectively.   
Clinton would be the first president to have actively protested against American military 
endeavors overseas, specifically those in Vietnam, and he did so most conspicuously on foreign 
soil while studying at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.17  He also went to great lengths to avoid 
serving in the military at the height of the draft,18 and misled Americans regarding his actions to 
evade his fate as a lottery pick.  These suspicious activities were made public during the 
campaign, and the Bush team suggested he was a “draft dodger.”19 This label provoked deep-
seated animosity from many veterans’ groups and those who supported them.   
Clinton’s triumph offers a student of the era an interesting perspective.  For the first time 
since Truman’s 1948 election, the Cold War and anti-Communism were largely ignored, if not 
absent, from the list of priorities Americans held dear.  In terms of foreign policy, Bush fell 
victim to his own success. Clinton would capitalize on this seismic shift in what Americans felt 
were more urgent concerns, which, fortunately for him, sat uncomfortably in their pocketbooks.  
It was a changed world.   
The following examination into the Clinton Administration’s reaction to such change 
provides an example of how the US initially took on its role as the global leader, and analyzes 
the results yielded both at home and abroad under the direction of the forty-second president.  As 
noted in The Art of Intelligence by former CIA operations officer Henry Crumpton, who served 
as US coordinator for counterterrorism with the rank of Ambassador at Large, “the world was 
transforming rapidly, not least in terms of the nature of conflict, risk, competition, and 
cooperation.”20  With an emphasis on espionage and the activities of the US clandestine service, 
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Crumpton decries the doubts held by many respected political leaders as to the continued need 
for “robust intelligence”21 after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union.  In the 
1990s, and at the urging of the political class, including the much-admired Senator Daniel 
Moynihan, Congress “cashed in the [so called] ‘peace dividend’ and slashed intelligence budgets 
to the bone.”22  In a time when international affairs were becoming progressively unstable, 
removed from the, however ignoble, stability of the Soviet-American feud, these budgetary 
decisions would have a devastating effect on worldwide covert operations and networks.  Many 
agents and leaders quit outright, stations closed, and confidence in intelligence agencies 
plummeted.  The illumination of traitorous actions within intelligence and law-enforcement 
agencies, such as those of the CIA’s Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), added to this decrease in morality and confidence, both within the 
community and outside of it.23  Crumpton refers to the early 1990s particularly as a “prosperous 
calm” after the Cold War, when America was enjoying a “delusional respite, in an imaginary 
world without serious threats and deadly enemies.”24  America was wrong.  Nothing proved this 
mistake more vividly and painfully than the attacks of September 11, 2001, which occurred not 
even one year after Clinton left office.   
What Crumpton illuminates, along with many others who were active participants in high 
level government positions during this period, is a dubious state of comfort that permeated the 
US and many of its allies, particularly those in Europe and other democratized, First World 
nations.  What actually occurred was a rise in decades and even centuries' old conflicts, mostly of 
a tribal or ethnic nature, and previously checked by the rigid stand-off between the two rival 
superpowers either by use of force or even the mere threat of force.  The breakup of Yugoslavia 
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in 1991, and the subsequent chaos and horror that followed, provides an excellent example of the 
power wielded by the Cold War leash.   
Many exceptions to this bifurcated deterrent exist.  Vietnam is a glaring example, and the 
one with the most powerful legacy with regards to the use of American military might.  The 
Korean War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the decolonization and independence 
movements in Africa are also prime indicators that outbreaks of violence forged on despite the 
threat of nuclear war, as did continued tensions in the Middle East and civil unrest in Latin 
America.  But what makes the post-Cold War violence unique is that it was, in most cases, 
unexpected, and even downplayed.  The 1993 comprehensive review of the nation’s defense 
strategy conducted by Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, and known as the Bottom 
Up Review (BUR), illuminated the possibility of “new dangers,”25 but lacked clarity with 
regards to the circumstances in which military deployment may be necessary.  Many of the 
foreign entanglements which would call for the use of US forces, even with regards to 
peacekeeping and intelligence, were vague.  In the context of the Clinton Administration, and the 
manner by which it approached foreign conflict and threats to American security, it is brutally 
ironic that the so-called “Decade of Peace [and Prosperity]" would usher in the most destructive 
and pivotal attack to ever occur on American soil.  
The purpose of this study is to highlight the paradox in and consequences of the fact that 
at the same moment when America achieved its status as the world’s superpower, it also began 
the process of retreating from a position of active leadership, and looked more towards 
international bodies, specifically the UN, as the answer to keeping peace around the globe.26  
This shift began under Bush, but accelerated under Clinton. Several examples found in this work 
emphasize how supplanting the efficiency and speed of clearly-defined American action with 
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slow-moving, intensely bureaucratic leadership can yield unthinkable results.  Ethnic cleansing 
in Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, and the increased threat arising from rogue states in Africa 
and the Middle East provide the strongest illustrations of what can occur when the US hesitates 
to lead or challenge international bodies, and even allies.   
The following cases under examination clarify the unintended results generated from the 
lack of a clear American foreign policy or objectives, particularly when the nation is asked to 
carry the brunt of the financial and military burden in UN peacekeeping efforts or NATO-
directed missions.  The country’s detachment from crises where decisive foreign intervention 
was greatly necessary, yet avoided, such as those in Africa, came to hurt America’s credibility as 
an unbridled force for humanity and justice in the eyes of those who suffered around the globe.  
It also gave the green light to a man determined to attack Americans whenever, and wherever, 
they could be found; a man who would view the Battle of Mogadishu, and the subsequent retreat 
of US forces, as proof that his nemesis was a “paper tiger.”27 
To be fair, and as noted by Samantha Power in her analysis of global genocide,28 as much 
as American leaders swore to prevent horrors such as the Holocaust from ever occurring again, a 
policy of non-intervention in Third World feuds during the Cold War years, particularly when 
speaking of direct military intervention, carried the day with virtually every US president since 
FDR.  Additionally, the UN often failed to embark on missions of peacekeeping if the region in 
need aligned itself with either the US or the USSR.  Power refers to the years between 1956 and 
1987, when the UN launched a total of only eleven interventions for the purpose of maintaining 
ceasefires or preventing further conflict in certain regions.  However, from 1988 to 1994, as the 
USSR succumbed to its mortal injuries, the UN Security Council launched sixteen missions, with 
many more to follow.29 The Soviet-American threat of nuclear confrontation and Mutually 
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Assured Destruction (MAD) served as a powerful deterrent for administrations from both 
political parties in the US, and for UN member nations.  For this reason, Hungary was on its own 
in 1956, the Prague Spring succumbed in 1968, and a blind eye was turned to a multitude of 
murderous rampages by Third World dictatorial rulers, many of whom filled the power vacuum 
left specifically by the absence or withdrawal of US power or policing.  One of the most obvious 
cases is the Cambodian genocide in the post-Vietnam War era, which unfortunately grew out of 
the abandonment of the American pledge “Never Again” in relation to the Jewish Holocaust.30 
American policy makers opted to avoid further negative political consequences, and left their 
South Vietnamese allies and millions of Cambodians alone to meet their tragic fate.  
History is currently repeating itself, as it often does.  Regardless of what one may feel 
about the 2003 Iraq invasion, or Vietnam for that matter, even the most war-weary Americans do 
not wish to doom a region to chaos and carnage as a result of a premature exit, particularly after 
military successes on the ground.  It shows a consistent lack of political will when, in the post-
Vietnam era, and now, in Iraq, those abandoned in the wake of an American war, or even a US 
humanitarian or diplomatic presence, are left in the most precarious of positions.  Additionally, it 
is this same absence of principled decision-making, sacrificed at the altar of the public poll, that 
often prevents most American presidents, Clinton among them, from intervening in conflicts 
outside of their borders; even if these conflicts include unspeakable atrocities committed against 
civilians.   
What makes this study unique is that the Clinton Administration’s calculations with 
regard to the use of American force, or even strong-armed US leadership, falls in between the 
two most controversial military interventions in US history:  Vietnam and Iraq.  Therefore, those 
in charge during this time period had both something to learn, and something to teach.  But with 
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a president whose foreign policy experience was limited, and whose focus and strengths 
remained heavily on domestic affairs, anything resembling a “Clinton Doctrine” simply does not 
exist.  A scholar can easily look to the Truman Doctrine, and the policy of containment, to 
analyze the American-led effort, in concert with a UN force, in the Korean War.  The 
Eisenhower Doctrine, and its vow to protect the independence of regimes threatened by 
communist influence, even to the dismay of French, British and Israeli allies during the Suez 
Crisis of 1957, offers a direct line to understanding US primacy in the Middle East.  The Reagan 
Doctrine provided a significant change in Cold War policy, as his administration issued a 
Presidential National Security Directive to not only contain, but reverse the advances made by 
communism in the Third World; this move forced the USSR to keep up with an arms race 
Reagan understood his adversaries could never win.31   
However, when examining President Clinton, it is up to the historian to examine the most 
challenging, and urgent, foreign policy questions faced by his administration, and determine 
what motives drove the president and his team towards the decisions made and the actions either 
taken or deferred.  As this work highlights, Clinton’s policy proposals, or calls for the use of 
force, were consistently born out of reaction.  Outside of occasions of tough rhetoric, his record 
presents neither an ideological nor policy-driven “doctrine” with a coherent and distinct agenda 
for foreign affairs.  Instead, it was a constant battle between national interests and humanitarian 
ones, often with no discernible, concrete basis for US involvement, with the exception of direct 
terrorist attacks on US interests.  For this reason, his foreign policy can be viewed as lacking 
cohesion and direction, which may account for his vacillation when the world, and American 
allies, refused to cooperate.  A Washington Post article that appeared during Clinton’s search to 
replace his first Defense Secretary after merely one year, quoted an unnamed advisor who 
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asserted, “[the Administration] really just wanted to get the Pentagon off the screen.  Every time 
it was on, it was trouble that interfered with the President’s agenda.  Their attitude was, if they 
could subcontract out the Pentagon, they would.”32   
 For the purpose of concision, as well as the supremacy of an issue faced in relation to 
other foreign policy exploits during the president’s eight-year term, this study focuses on five 
main areas of international testing for the Clinton Administration:  UN Peacekeeping efforts in 
Somalia; UN Peacekeeping operations and NATO intervention in Bosnia; the Rwandan 
Genocide; Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti; and the rise of Osama Bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda.  With the exception of the uptick in both the frequency and destruction of Islamic 
extremist attacks under the direction of Osama Bin Laden, the bulk of these challenges arose 
during the president’s first four years in office, and almost led to the public’s denial of his second 
chance.   
The starting point for this endeavor relies heavily on both Clinton’s personal views on 
American leadership and intervention, and, just as valuable, on the outlook of those who held the 
most influence during his presidency.  Especially during Clinton’s first term, his national 
security and diplomatic apparatus fell into two categories:  those revealing a “Vietnam 
Syndrome,” and those revealing a “Munich Syndrome.”33  Vietnam Syndrome involves the fear 
of committing forces to an open-ended conflict, or in the context of a civil war, due to the legacy 
of the controversial conflict in Vietnam.  Politics play heavily into decisions made with this 
anxiety in mind.  Munich Syndrome afflicts those who look to the Munich Conference in 1938 as 
the worst diplomatic decision made by world powers in modern history.  Infamously, at Munich, 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler by allowing him to annex the 
German-speaking portion of Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, after a mere promise from the 
12 
 
dictator for no further territorial advancement.  Hitler quickly reneged on the agreement, and in 
the face of British and French passivity, continued his devastating march through Europe. 
 Clinton himself is a product of “Vietnam Syndrome,” as was his first National Security 
Advisor, Anthony Lake, and his first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher.  Lake served in 
Vietnam, but as a Foreign Service Officer with the State Department, and not with the military.  
In 1970, Lake resigned in protest when President Richard Nixon began bombing Cambodian 
strongholds, which housed ammunition to be used against American forces and protected North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers.34  Lake deemed this action to be an escalation of the 
unpopular war, and wanted out.  He also worked within the Carter Administration’s State 
Department.  When Clinton chose him to be his National Security Advisor, Lake quickly 
determined that the new president would not risk political capital on foreign matters, and at least 
for the first few months of the administration, yielded most of his influence to Christopher.35  
Clinton’s new Secretary of State, Christopher, who also served under President Carter, had a 
reputation of being “obsessed with negotiations…[and had a] fear of the use of force, and lack of 
intellectual firepower.”36 As illustrated in this author’s analysis of Bosnia, Christopher’s 
weaknesses with regards to the power of influence and persuasion, specifically when it came to 
relations with allies, often led to further indecision within the Clinton national security apparatus.  
One could argue that Colin Powell, a holdover from the Bush Administration as Clinton’s 
first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also fits the category of those with “Vietnam 
Syndrome,” but for very different reasons.  Where Clinton and many of his advisors feared 
committing troops thanks to a distrust of military intervention and the possibility of escalation, 
which could lead to political fall-out, Powell revealed his own personal experience as a Vietnam 
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Veteran.  He consistently refused to commit his troops to an ill-defined mission with no clear 
political or military objective. 
        The most influential advisor to exhibit “Munich Syndrome” was Madeleine Albright.  As 
a Czechoslovakian refugee herself, forced out of her home with her family as a child during 
World War II, with her father declared a dissenter once the nation fell under communist control, 
Albright viewed the appeasement of the West during the Munich Conference as the most 
devastating diplomatic failure of the twentieth century.37  For this reason, she often favored 
multilateral action and the confrontation of authoritarian dictators initially in her role as 
Clinton’s UN Ambassador, and then as the first female Secretary of State during the president’s 
second term.  Although she was a vocal opponent of using force to remove Saddam Hussein’s 
troops out of Kuwait, Albright earned a hawkish reputation while at the UN, as she eagerly 
pushed for the use of American military power in world affairs, and particular in areas of 
humanitarian crises.38  
In her autobiography, Albright explains how the increased number of peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions accepted by the UN greatly enhanced her position.  According to 
Albright, “Because the UN was embroiled in so many issues, I was involved in shaping and 
implementing U.S. foreign policy to a greater extent than any of my predecessors.”39  Due to this 
unparalleled new status, she adds, “I knew not only how the [UN] Security Council worked, but 
how to work it.”40  Albright’s statement becomes especially important when one examines her 
vocal support of humanitarian intervention.  She often spoke and acted in a manner that reflected 
her personal history with regards to WWII atrocities and genocide.  Her stance during the 1994 
Rwandan Genocide is therefore quite surprising.  As the leading international representative of 
the US, and given her weight at the UN, one would assume she would be the foremost proponent 
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of putting a stop to the systematic slaughter that occurred.  But Albright towed the line for the 
Clinton Administration.  Instead of using her voice to advise the president on what she 
increasingly felt was the wrong move, she parroted Clinton’s position, and essentially betrayed 
her own instincts.  Albright would not be the champion for the security and safety of the 
Rwandan people as she was for those in Eastern Europe.      
 The first national security team put together by Clinton was not hindered by their lack of 
experience, but rather, by the manner in which their experiences led to unrealistic proposals and 
goals.  Again, Powell is an exception, due to his position as one who designed the military 
response to political objectives, should they exist.  Most of Clinton’s foreign policy advisors 
believed strongly in the pursuit of more humanitarian aims, the expansion of democracies, 
advancement of human rights, and the use of collective security, even if US interests were not 
directly at risk.41 They advocated for the idea of moral principles, instead of self-interest, and 
believed that a policy worked only if both the international community and American public 
agreed upon its implementation.   
An examination into the mindset of Clinton with regards to military action supports the 
assertion that foreign policy and, particularly, the use of American force, were rarely at the top of 
his list.  Many of the examples which paint Clinton as a disengaged, or at least reluctant, 
Commander-In-Chief on the international stage come from critics who are either former or 
current members of the Armed Forces.  However, even an analysis of Clinton supporters and 
staff yields evidence of the low prioritization given to the question of American involvement in 
crises such as the break-up of Yugoslavia and initial European apathy; the Rwandan genocide; 
and the build-up of radical Islamic terror groups and their attacks during the 1990s and 2000.  
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It is quite understandable that many veterans of the Vietnam War, and a majority of the 
military serving at the time of his campaign and subsequent win, viewed Clinton in a negative 
light due to his draft deferment and history as a vocal critic of forceful American intervention.  
However, one account of Clinton's alleged detachment from his responsibility in global conflicts 
involving American power abroad serves as a credible and persuasive source for anyone 
interested in the Clinton Administration's circumspect approach to military engagement.  In 
Dereliction of Duty, Lieutenant Colonel Robert "Buzz" Patterson, who served Clinton as a 
military aide from May of 1996 to May of 1998, describes the rare honor he held of carrying the 
"nuclear football," a briefcase whose contents include, most importantly, the country's nuclear 
launch codes.42  This proximity to power gave Patterson a unique insight into the workings of the 
Clinton Administration, as well as Clinton the man.  Patterson not only holds a distinguished 
record of service in the Air Force, participating in endeavors from Grenada to Desert Storm, and 
Somalia to Bosnia; he also provides an honest yet almost hesitant critique of Clinton, whom he 
believes often shirked his primary responsibility of keeping Americans safe and protecting 
American interests abroad.   
In Patterson's own words, his book "is not a personal attack on President Bill Clinton,"43 
as he often describes the president as someone who treated him well and was personally quite 
likable.  Patterson also does his best not to delve into Clinton's well-publicized personal failures, 
unless the scandal in question affected Clinton's decision-making or distracted the administration 
from immediate issues of national security.  However, the book does criticize the president for 
what its author describes as "his [Clinton's]...failure to lead our country with responsibility and 
honor."44 Speaking mostly of American impotence towards the rise of Radical Islam in its 
formative years, Patterson suggests that Clinton "left huge areas of vulnerability" in the nation's 
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security apparatus, and treated foreign policy "as an afterthought...a distraction that was 
important only insofar as it impinged on domestic politics and the media."45   
The author's justification for his ultimate condemnation of Clinton will be further 
illuminated throughout this work, but his main point should be mentioned now.  Patterson 
accepted his position with a military officer's commitment to his mission, and a "professional 
devotion" to both his beloved country and the president he would serve.46 As he states in his 
preface, upon his final days as Clinton's military aide-de-camp, feelings of disillusionment and 
dejection replaced his original sentiments of dignity in his assignment, and devotion to and 
admiration for the man who held the highest office in the world.  It is for this reason that 
Patterson chose to write about his experiences, stressing his motivation as non-political. 
While Patterson's account of the Clinton Administration's lack of focus on foreign affairs 
comes from someone with first-hand knowledge of military intervention, another source provides 
a relatively similar admission, though not by design.  In a memoir of his years working with the 
Clinton campaign and consequently, as one of the president’s most trusted Senior Advisors 
during his first term, George Stephanopoulas describes the strengths and weaknesses of his boss 
with a strong, and almost cynical foundation of political intrigue.  All Too Human is a first-hand 
telling of a young, idealistic aide from the liberal northeast whose hunger for power and success 
led him to an unlikely, serendipitous encounter with the Arkansas Governor; an encounter that 
would make the young Stephanopoulas notorious in his own right. 
The value of Stephanopoulas's work to this particular historical analysis lies more in what 
is left either unsaid, or said in passing.  Stephanopoulas recounts with neurotic zeal his role in the 
1992 election, the passing of Clinton's tax and deficit reduction plan during his first term, and the 
various scandals that plagued the administration even prior to the Monica Lewinsky affair.47  
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What is notable about Stephanopoulas's record is what is either missing, thrown in as an 
afterthought, or presented as just one more thing he had to spin.  Events such as the bombing of 
the World Trade Center in 1993, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the systematic 
murder of almost one million people in Rwanda, are largely presented as an aggravation, or 
unwelcomed obstacle, to an administration where domestic policy was the key to polling success 
and an eventual second term. Issues of global conflict were often considered solely the purview 
of the United Nations, regardless of the impotence of the international body when dealing with 
urgent and horrific occurrences that required decisive US leadership and a quick, powerful, 
resolute answer.   
Some of Clinton’s more notable foreign policy achievements, or at least, his attempts at 
improving the global landscape, are not included in depth within this study.  For example, one of 
the most marked actions during his presidency is the passage of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico.  NAFTA did not come without 
controversy, and received criticism from one of Clinton’s main constituencies, labor unions, 
which is most certainly why he did not commit to supporting the proposed deal during the 1992 
campaign.48  At the time it passed, the legislation achieved bipartisan support.  Since NAFTA is 
primarily an economic agreement between peaceful neighbors, it does fall not into the category 
of foreign conflict or involve debate over the use of American military might.   
 Another foreign policy challenge not under significant scrutiny within this work is the 
continuing problem of North Korea, which did not escape the attention of the Clinton 
Administration.  Nor did continued diplomatic efforts in Russia.  Clinton often met with Boris 
Yeltsin.  He supported the Russian president during attempted coups, and listened to Russia’s 
concerns over the proposed expansion of NATO to include certain former Soviet-puppet states of 
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Eastern Europe.  In point of fact, when coupled with his intense supervision over negotiations 
between Yasser Arafat and the Israelis, it appears as though Clinton almost preferred to dedicate 
his time to colossal, historically insurmountable challenges, to the detriment of immediate 
problems which required quick, steadfast decisions and the gamble of political capital.  While 
this undertaking is noble, and quite necessary, diplomacy is often a slow, painstaking process, 
and neither the situation in North Korea, nor the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, presented the 
administration with the demand for immediate decision-making, particularly with regards to the 
use of US military force.   
One vital point to be made concerning this analysis of Clinton’s foreign policy is the 
absence of any detailed coverage of some of the domestic scandals surrounding his presidency.  
Whitewater, the White House FBI files controversy, Travelgate, and the suicide of Deputy White 
House Counsel Vince Foster receive no significant attention.49  The only relevance of these 
scandals to this work is how they too often diverted attention away from the multitude of 
pressing challenges facing the president and his staff.  As stated by Clinton’s FBI Director Louis 
Freeh, “I spent most of the almost eight years as director investigating the man who appointed 
me.”50  In a time when Islamic terrorism was not only intensifying, but also classified as an issue 
for law enforcement, this admission by Freeh is noteworthy.  Another exception is the Lewinsky 
Affair, but its notability within this study is merely due to its serving as a precursor to a 
suspiciously-timed and ineffective retaliatory strike against Al Qaeda targets for the August 1998 
American Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.  Since virtually 
every comprehensive history of the Clinton presidency includes intense coverage of his personal 
escapades, there is no need to belabor them here.  
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The ebbs and flows of a constantly changing foreign policy, from administration to 
administration, specifically upon the relegation of the Cold War-era containment policy to the 
annals of history, requires that historians seek out motives, expose a cohesive worldview (or lack 
of one), and evaluate action.  Because a look at each successive administration’s approach to 
international conflict mirrors a pendulum swinging from one side to the other in post-Cold War 
foreign policy, it is vital to provide context for future endeavors, or simply, to analyze what 
worked, what did not work, and why.  The Clinton Administration looked to the international 
community in a period of increasing globalization, and engaged in a primary strategy of 
multilateral intervention, with American policy largely based on decisions made at the UN.  
After 9/11, the George W. Bush Administration, even with its multinational coalition for the Iraq 
War, embarked on a more unilateral route.  With a defiant, self-determined voice, the younger 
Bush declared to the world, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.  Either 
you are with us, or you’re with the terrorists.”51 The Bush Doctrine evolved from the preemptive 
use of force against foreign terrorists and those who shielded or funded them; it then expanded to 
include the spread of American democratic values through nation-building.  Many analysts claim 
this alteration compromised the positive gains Bush made in using the full power of the US and 
its international allies to dismantle terror networks.52 
President Barack Obama withdrew from this heavily-criticized position of heavy-handed 
American leadership, and, like Clinton did early on, relinquished most issues of international 
conflict, many which demanded strong US power, to the global community, and the UN in 
particular.  With the exception of NATO’s mission to remove Muhammar Qaddafi from Libya, 
Obama’s adherence to his campaign promise to end the Iraq War, along with his anti-imperialist 
ideology, led to many unintended, often disastrous consequences. The rise and spread of the 
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Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which recently made its way into Libya amid the power 
struggle that followed Qaddafi’s ousting and subsequent death at the hands of his own people, is 
the most notable.  ISIS maintains a comfortable presence in the chaotic, broken nation, as well as 
others throughout the Middle East.53 Its success in Libya was preceded by the controversial 
deaths of four brave Americans during a terror attack on the US Diplomatic Compound and CIA 
Annex in the city of Benghazi by the hands of Islamic extremists. The attack went essentially 
unanswered by the administration, with only one suspect currently in custody.   
Obama retreated from what is viewed by many critics to be an overly aggressive Bush-
era foreign policy, which both Americans and international affairs experts deem to be primarily 
comprised of a nation-building concept.  The Bush Doctrine is seen as an attempt to disseminate 
the much-debated ideal of American exceptionalism by means of an occupying force.  However, 
whether one agrees with the Iraq War or not, which now surpasses Vietnam in terms of 
unpopularity, Obama’s hasty removal of troops against the advice of his Joint Chiefs and 
generals on the ground undoubtedly led to a power vacuum.  The ruthless and barbaric remnants 
of a previously struggling Al Qaeda in Iraq filled that vacuum as the newly-formed Islamic State, 
whose goal is to create an Islamic caliphate in the wake of the American exodus.54  On paper, 
President Obama kept his campaign promise to end the war, but the fighting continues.  Violence 
has intensified and spread, much like what occurred in Cambodia following the fall of Saigon in 
1975; only on a larger scale and with far greater consequences for the security of both US 
interests abroad and Americans at home.   
So, what happens next?  President Donald Trump was elected in November of 2016, after 
defeating President Clinton’s wife and President Obama’s former Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, in a surprising upset.  Trump campaigned with an amalgamation of foreign policy 
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positions put forth by previous administrations.  Many talking heads assert he has proposed an 
unclear vision developed out of a promise to both avoid committing troops in overseas 
operations, but also defeat enemies, ISIS chief among them, quickly and decisively.55  His ideas 
on foreign affairs include both a verbal denunciation of Bush and the Iraq War, as well as a 
continued assault on Obama’s fecklessness against the violence committed by Islamic extremists. 
Trump’s wild card status in the realm of foreign policy comes from his statements regarding how 
he would utilize American forces effectively if a decision to intervene in some way is made.  He 
campaigned on eradicating Radical Islamic Terror, yet also focused heavily on internal security, 
and not wasting American blood and treasure overseas.  His “America First” promises hearken 
back to the days of American isolationism prior to World War II,56 though he also vows to 
dedicate substantial funds to the rebuilding and modernization of the military, solidifying an 
unrivaled readiness of US troops should the need for war arise.57  Trump has also been critical of 
the UN, and he has demanded more support, both financial and in terms of forces, from NATO 
members, which some criticized as his threat to pull out of the alliance altogether.58  With 
humanitarian issues such as the Syrian refugee crisis, and the emboldened stature of enemies in 
Iran, Russia, and many terror-dominated regions in the Middle East and Africa, it is incumbent 
upon the new president to understand the policies of success and failure over the past twenty-five 
years, and present a coherent vision for America’s role in an increasingly dangerous world.   
The following examination into Clinton, and the cases under consideration, provide an 
overarching view of foreign policy decisions made during a period when US leaders believed 
America could achieve physical security through economic security, and thus turned inward, 
punting its leadership role to the notoriously bureaucratic UN.  Currently, the UN Security 
Council consists of five permanent members:  Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and the US.  
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It also includes ten other nations elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms.  Its 
resolutions require a three-fifths majority, but can be vetoed by one of any of the five permanent 
members.59  
For reasons of social justice and a more equal means of representation, many UN 
member nations have advocated for the addition of permanent members from Third World 
countries to serve on the Security Council.  The Clinton Administration supported this move, but 
it was never undertaken.  More permanent members mean more opportunities for vetoes, and 
thus, gridlock.60 It would also dilute American influence.  It was not in the best interests of the 
US to supplant its authority to the UN when its global role was virtually unchallenged in the 
1990s.  In the increasingly anti-American climate emanating from the body’s headquarters in 
New York today, many national security analysts view this proposal as a detriment to US power.  
Though this study illuminates the often sluggish and contentious nature of the UN when 
it comes to taking action, it is not the author’s intention to demonize the organization altogether.  
Nor is it the goal to maintain that Clinton’s aim of engaging in multilateral rather than unilateral 
pursuits involving aggression is wrongheaded.  George H.W. Bush himself encouraged the 
notion of collective security to combat aggression, though he envisioned this development as 
emerging under American leadership.  This idea served as the foundation for confronting the 
crisis in Kuwait.  After the success of the coalition war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein, Bush 
noted:   
We can see a new world coming into view, a world in which there is a very real 
prospect of a new world order…a world where the United Nations—freed from 
Cold War stalemate—is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders; a 









The main point is whether Clinton’s consistent dependence on UN mandates, as well as the 
varied stances of US allies, in his decision-making served the nation and its interests well during 
his two terms.  The UN acts in the guise of neutrality when it intervenes.  As a result, acts of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing often pass without interruption unless troops, not aid workers, are 
specifically deployed under a mandate to use force.  As one can easily assume, the construction 
of a multilateral force by a body comprised of individual nations, each acting in their own self-
interest, does not generate the most efficient means of quick intervention and protective action.    
In order to adequately support the conclusions drawn in this work, and present a 
comprehensive portrait of each area under examination, the following compilation of research 
features a combination of both traditional and non-traditional references, including online 
government documents, media publications, and personal memoirs.  When an historian 
investigates more recent events, particularly those involving issues of national security and 
foreign policy, a traditional dependence on archival sources is insufficient.   Matters of 
declassification and limited access steer the research process in a direction that warrants the use 
of materials outside of those official documentary records which remain largely out of reach.  
The application of these findings helped to construct a persuasive and accurate historical 
description of what occurred during the time period under consideration.   Though the use of 
online sources includes some opinion pieces, mostly derived from newspapers or research 
institutions, the majority are primary records from the digital collections of government 
institutions, such as the CIA, the US State Department, and the UN.   These materials provided 
much of the credible evidence necessary to strengthen the legitimacy of the overarching 
argument.  Given the advancements made by several of these entities with regards to digitizing 
their records, as well as the challenges involved with investigating contemporary subjects, past 
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methods of gathering historical records had to be manipulated in order to achieve a 
comprehensive, insightful evaluation.    
Often, an analysis of foreign policy within a particular administration leads the historian 
to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which offers a beneficial 
compilation of significant documents relating to decision-making and activities centered on 
foreign affairs.  Since the subject of this work is President Clinton, and the most current FRUS 
records are those of the George H.W. Bush Administration, the FRUS series was not utilized.   
Presidential libraries can also serve as a valuable resource for those who seek to unlock the inner 
workings of a particular administration.   However, due to Clinton’s emphasis on domestic 
policy, as well as the availability of evidence regarding his foreign policy from alternative 
reserves, little research from the William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Library and Museum is 
included in this analysis.  For information not included in its archived records, the Clinton 
Library directs the researcher to supplementary sites, including The American Presidency Project 
at the University of California-Santa Barbara, the CIA’s Freedom of Information Act Reading 
Room, and the United Nations’ released documents, all of which were heavily consulted for this 
analysis. When merged with personal accounts offered by those closest to the president, in 
addition to news coverage and historical context, the motives and considerations fundamental to 
decisions made by Clinton and many key officials within his administration achieve greater 
clarity.   
The significance of this work is the challenge it presents to past comprehensive analyses 
of Clinton’s foreign policy approach, which cover both of his presidential terms.  While similar 
in historical record and in some cases, interpretation, particularly for those overseas conflicts 
which arose during his first four years, the difference between this study and more prominent, 
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past accounts published on the subject is in the suggestion that an evolution occurred.  Two 
books which specifically put forth this narrative are Clinton’s World, written by former Foreign 
Affairs editor William Hyland, and journalist Richard Sale’s Clinton’s Secret Wars.62  Both are 
excellent sources of information regarding the president’s challenges in international affairs, and 
are often referred to throughout this work.  However, each draws a conclusion that Clinton 
lessened his focus on domestic issues as he became better acclimated to his position as 
Commander-in-Chief in the global arena after learning from some initial mistakes.  Sale, for 
example, argues in Clinton’s Secret Wars that after a series of unsuccessful foreign policy 
ventures in the early 1990s, Clinton became a “tough-as-nails world leader” who “narrowly 
missed getting Osama bin Laden” during his second term.63  He also maintains that Clinton was 
guided by “exceptional moral strength, tactical dexterity, and strategic skill,” and displayed an 
“inner steel” when and where it counted.64  Sale points to Clinton’s handling of the Balkans as 
one example of the president’s resolute, steadfast leadership, but by most accounts, this 
characterization is simply not supported by sufficient evidence.  It took Clinton two years and 
numerous missteps in devising and selling a plan to his European allies before he was finally 
willing to exert US influence and power to stop the ethnic cleansing occurring in Bosnia.  
While Clinton exhibited some aspects of growth and confidence in his decision-making 
on foreign affairs, such as his 1998 bombing of Iraq in retaliation for Saddam Hussein’s failure 
to comply with UN weapons inspectors, as well as his decision to intervene in Kosovo, the 
president’s unwillingness to go on the offensive against direct threats to US security interests 
complicate the evolution narrative.  This hesitancy is best illustrated by his reluctance to engage 
in any significant action against the Taliban-protected Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.  
As the radical terror group increased in size and scope, and its attacks became more frequent and 
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destructive, Clinton either launched symbolic and ultimately ineffective air strikes, or neglected 
to act whatsoever, as in the case of the bombing of the USS Cole.   
With the exception of working tirelessly with the Israelis and Palestinians throughout his 
entire presidency on an ultimately thwarted peace settlement, which reached its demise at the 
Camp David Summit in 2000, Clinton faltered in many areas where concrete US leadership, even 
if unilateral, could have halted actions and even stopped them before they began.  Leadership, as 
described in this work, does not automatically imply that the introduction of US troops was the 
guaranteed solution to a particular problem.  In fact, in many cases, even when military action 
was taken, it was not done so effectively, and more importantly, it was not timely.  It is up to the 
historian to determine whether or not Clinton’s well-documented tendency to delay was more the 
result of a changing worldview after the end of the Cold War, a simple lack of experience, an 
innate distrust of American military intervention abroad, or too much trust in international 
coalitions.  Evidence suggests it was a combination of these factors.  The post-Cold War 
hesitancy for strong US intervention and the commitment of troops is the most persuasive, 
especially in terms of political calculations.  But the other obstacles to Clinton’s lack of decisive 
action in foreign policy rival one another in a close race for second place. 
In 1992, Francis Fukuyama wrote a book entitled The End of History and the Last Man, 
which argued for the emergence of a new era of peace and security brought about by the triumph 
of liberal democracies over rival forms of governance.  Loosely based on an article written by 
Fukuyama in 1989, and published in the wake of the collapse of Soviet communism, its premise 
offers a unique assessment of the trajectory of competing ideologies regarding the role of the 
state in society.  Fukuyama suggests that the superiority achieved through the foundation of 
liberty and equality in a modern liberal democracy, regardless of whatever social ills and 
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instabilities may result from imperfect implementation in certain regions, serves as proof of its 
achievement as the “final form of human government.”65 His work cites the beliefs of 
philosophers GWF Hegel and Karl Marx that the evolution of human society was not without an 
end.  Fukuyama notes that for Hegel, the “liberal state” would bring about “a form of society that 
satisfied [mankind’s] deepest and most fundamental longings.”66 For Marx, of course, it was 
communism.  But for both Hegel and Marx, the winning form of governance would bring about a 
halt to further development, because the question of which institutions and ideas best serve 
society would be answered.  In the early 1990s, communism lost this battle.  Also, the inherent 
weaknesses and failures of totalitarian regimes with varying ideologies at their base enhanced the 
stature of Western, democratic political systems as the premier form of government. 
At the time of the book’s release, Fukuyama did not assert that the dominance of liberal 
democratic institutions meant a stop to all political violence afflicting the world.  However, he 
suggested a victory belonged to democratic, capitalistic societies, and argued in part for a 
possible cessation to the wartime horrors of the twentieth century due to the unrivaled military 
prowess and technological advancement held by free nations.67  Though it received a healthy 
dose of criticism, and regardless of whether one accepts it as accurate or not, Fukuyama’s thesis 
reflects a far-reaching, common sentiment permeating the globe after the end of the Cold War.  
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and conversely, the strengthening of NATO, initiated a 
widespread state of enthusiasm for a break in hostilities and a chance for global peace.  It is in 
this context that President Clinton assumed the office of the presidency in 1992.   This pervasive 
outlook cannot be overstated when it comes to analyzing Clinton’s outlook on international 
affairs within its proper historical framework.  As described by historian Carole Fink: 
The remarkably peaceful demise of the Soviet Union touched the entire world:  in 
Eastern Europe the former satellite states gravitated towards the West, and 
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Moscow’s previous clients Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and the Palestinians—
already living on reduced subsidies—were set adrift.  China, the world’s last 
remaining major Marxist state, pressed forward with economic liberalization 
under the direction of its Communist Party (which Vietnam would emulate), and 
in the Third World India and other socialist-leaning countries also moved toward 
a market economy.  Moreover, the removal of the Soviet threat dealt a blow to the 
right-wing governments in Africa and Latin America that had gained US support 
based on their anticommunism.68   
 
It appeared as though the world were entering a new age of peace and prosperity through 
interconnectedness, particularly due to technological advances and open markets.  Fink 
succinctly sums up the 1990s by stating “’Globalization’ became the catchword of the post-Cold 
War decade.”  However, as President Clinton would discover, history marched forward with no 
concern for the positive aspirations held by so many leaders worldwide, he being the most 
prominent among them.  The spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism, the re-emergence of 
violent nationalism, and warring ethnic rivalries ultimately damned the “peace” portion of the 
“Decade of Peace and Prosperity” to its status as a rather elusive ideal.  
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Chapter 2. OUT OF THE COLD:  THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND 
THE PROPOSED FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE 
“NEW DEMOCRAT” 
Beginning in the 1980s, in the midst of intense financial hardship in the USSR, 
exacerbated by an ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan, a number of occurrences of civil unrest and 
reform movements arose in Eastern Europe in response to harsh Soviet repression and economic 
strangulation.1 Starting with the Solidarity Movement in Poland, which garnered both overt and 
covert support from President Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and the 
Polish Pope John Paul II, the mostly peaceful revolutions of 1989 in the Eastern Bloc began a 
process that reduced the Berlin Wall to a pile of rubble.  By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union 
was peacefully dissolved.2 
The US president who oversaw this climactic world event was George H.W. Bush.  
Instead of punishing this long-time adversary, Bush delicately controlled the disintegration 
process to dissuade hard-liners within the USSR from launching a last-minute assault against the 
agreements being arranged by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.  The two leaders finalized a 
treaty reducing nuclear stockpiles and the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 
in both nations.  Known as START I (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of July 1991),3 this 
agreement was the culmination of almost a decade of ardent diplomatic work.  Bush then 
continued this approach with the democratically-elected leader of the new Russian Federation 
(Russia), Boris Yeltsin.  Overall, under Bush’s direction, the fall of the Soviet empire became the 
triumphant removal of a foreign policy adversary that menaced Americans and their Western 
allies since the end of World War II. 
President Ronald Reagan is rightly credited with financially crippling the Soviet Union 




delivered the fatal wound.4  However, supporters and critics alike recognize the steady hand of 
diplomacy brought to the tenuous situation by his successor, President Bush.  The US opened 
embassies in the new Russia and former Soviet puppet-states, and focused its energy on 
upholding the legitimacy of Yeltsin in Moscow.5 The Cold War was finally over.   
With this immense foreign policy win in his opponent’s corner, Democratic Presidential 
Candidate Bill Clinton had to delicately choose which world crisis he could utilize to land the 
most punches during the 1992 campaign.  Clinton suffered from his lack of support for another 
successful foreign intervention by President Bush:  the Gulf War.  During the 1992 Vice-
Presidential Debate between Al Gore, Vice-President Dan Quayle, and Perot’s running mate, 
retired Admiral James Stockdale, Quayle attacked Gore by repeating statements made by Clinton 
against the war, which were viewed either as an example of equivocation, or a significant lack of 
perspective.6   
As Bush obtained congressional approval for the Gulf War resolution, then-Governor 
Clinton was asked by the press how he would have voted if he stood in their positions.  He now 
maintains that he supported the resolution, but his public statements on the matter at the time 
conflict with this sentiment.  He answered, “I guess I would have voted with the majority if it 
were a close vote.”7 This reply motivated Clinton’s campaign critics, who maintained that the 
governor was nothing more than a slick, poll-driven politician.  In his autobiography, Clinton 
attempts to explain his awkward response by stating, “At the time, I hadn’t thought I would be 
running for President in 1992.”8 This excuse does little to mollify Clinton opponents, who 
continue to promote the narrative that he is a purely political animal.  Clinton made matters 




voted against the war’s authorization.  This appeared to Bush surrogates as a clear example of 
political pandering.   
After Clinton delivered four campaign speeches laying out a more “internationalist 
vision” for US foreign policy, which blended “idealism and pragmatism, internationalism and 
protectionism, [and] use of force and reliance on multinational institutions,” the Bush campaign 
and many in the media judged his muddled foreign policy as trying to be all things to all people.9  
The Bush White House decried the governor as “a closet dove masquerading as a hawk,” and 
sarcastically charged that his “experience in world affairs is limited to the breakfast at the 
International House of  Pancakes.”10 Indeed, Clinton had no foreign affairs record of his own on 
which to run; his vision was disjointed.  Idealism in foreign affairs can be quickly shattered; one 
is better armed with a realistic outlook and ability to problem-solve.  Helping Clinton, foreign 
policy remained a footnote in the campaign.  The economy was the key issue.   
Once elected, Clinton held a reception for diplomatic representatives following his 
inauguration where he laid out a broad, somewhat vague conceptual framework for his approach 
to world affairs.  He included “three pillars” upon which his vision rested: “economic security at 
home, restructuring the armed forces to meet new challenges of the post-Cold War globe, and 
support for democratic values across the globe.”11 As an overarching thematic presentation, these 
ideas sounded credible.  Pressing challenges, however, demanded greater specificity. 
The most significant foreign policy issue confronting the candidates during the 1992 
election was the situation in the Balkans region of Eastern Europe, which the Bush 
Administration had yet to adequately confront.  Clinton criticized Bush for not taking decisive 
action in Bosnia.12 He advocated lifting an arms embargo put in place by the United Nations, and 




by NATO.13 The Democratic nominee stated “I specifically would not foreclose the option of the 
use of force on that issue [Bosnian conflict], because I’m horrified by what I’ve seen.”14 Once in 
office, his rhetoric softened.  At one point during a televised town hall meeting, Clinton 
answered a question on his administration’s immobility on the Bosnia dilemma with a rather 
weak explanation.  He stated, “I’m doing the best I can.”15 Clinton realized that so far, his 
European allies were not willing to send their own forces to secure a ceasefire.  They preferred 
diplomacy and sanctions.  Clinton had yet to fully understand that US commitment, historically 
comprised of money and firepower, often served as the carrot to lure and secure faltering allies.  
Once the American media began to bombard its viewers with images reminiscent of Nazi 
concentration camps, Clinton began to feel the pressure.16 It is always easy to make foreign 
policy decisions on a campaign tour bus to New Hampshire or South Carolina.  It is entirely 
different when one sits in the Oval Office, faced with daily intelligence briefings, uncooperative 
allies, and an adversarial press, all waiting for a definitive, workable solution.     
A typical Clintonian address exhibited little in terms of foreign policy.  A look at his 
acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in New York provides context, and 
highlights Clinton’s initial outlook as to what he expected to face on the world’s stage.  He 
noted: 
We meet at a special moment in history, you and I.  The Cold War is over.  Soviet 
communism has collapsed and our values—freedom, democracy, individual 
rights, free enterprise—they have triumphed all around the world.  And yet, just 
as we have won the Cold War abroad, we are losing battles for economic 
opportunity and social justice at home.  Now that we have changed the world, it’s 
time to change America.17 
Clinton’s proposed foreign policy approach centered on fostering economic strength, and 
achieving peace through the spread of free trade and democratic values.  For this reason, he 




creating jobs at home.  He delivered this promise along with a commitment to keep the military 
strong, “ready and willing to use force if necessary.”18 Once president, this pledge proved rather 
difficult to keep. 
Two telling illustrations of Clinton’s inexperience in military affairs, and with military 
leaders, occurred immediately after his inauguration.  One concerned heavily-debated budget 
decreases; the other resulted from a campaign promise to lift the ban on homosexuals openly 
serving in the armed forces.  On January 25,1993, the Joint Chiefs demanded a meeting with the 
new president to discuss their strong opposition to what that they viewed as encouraging social 
experimentation within the military.19 Then-Chairman Colin Powell relayed the objections of his 
fellow officers.  Powell also offered Clinton, who felt discrimination against gays and lesbians in 
the armed forces was akin to the segregation of African-American soldiers decades earlier, a way 
to temper the situation and temporarily please both advocates and critics.  Powell suggested that 
the president wait until he appointed his Secretary of Defense, and offer the public a six-month 
timeline for a full assessment of whether the ban should be lifted, and how.  The general stressed, 
“Don’t make the gay issue the first horse out of the gate with the armed forces.”20 While Powell 
acknowledged the bravery of homosexuals who undoubtedly had served in the military since its 
inception, it was an entirely different, and much more controversial, step to allow them to serve 
openly.  The officers making these decisions claimed they were not so much concerned with 
their own personal views, but more “with maintaining morale and good order.”21  
Clinton respected Powell, and decided against pursuing the issue with real vigor until he 
earned some credibility as Commander-in-Chief.  But the president’s agreement with Powell did 
not sit well with staff members who believed his campaign promise to solve the issue in favor of 




and dedicated,” but also admits “most of them came out of Arkansas, and had no experience in 
working in the White House or dealing with Washington’s political culture.”22 After initially 
agreeing to Powell’s advice on how to address the ban with military leaders, Clinton held several 
more meetings on the issue, including one with the Senate Armed Services Committee, which 
eventually accepted the six-month timeline.  This proposal upset many Clinton staffers.  The 
negotiations leaked to the media, and the House passed a resolution against lifting the ban, 
followed by the Senate.  As the chief executive, Clinton could veto any legislation introduced, 
but Congress held enough votes to override it.   
To military officials, the issue was a frivolous one, especially when the Pentagon faced 
daunting questions over existing, and escalating, foreign conflicts.  It did not even attract much 
attention during the campaign, as all Democratic primary candidates supported lifting the ban, 
and Republicans did not significantly address or exploit it for political gain.  Several old-school 
Democrats, such as Robert Byrd of West Virginia, whose own history towards civil rights was 
not always one of tolerance, were very much against Clinton.  Ironically, the president gained 
some Republican support; most notably, from Barry Goldwater.  Nevertheless, Clinton’s first 
interaction with the Armed Services was the exact one Powell urged him to put off.   
A struggle developed between civil rights advocates and military personnel.  Military 
leaders felt that lifting the ban threatened unit cohesion and combat readiness.  Gay and lesbian 
activists saw the ban as blatant discrimination.  The conflict provided rich subject matter for 
journalists and pundits alike.  Finally, after six months of collaboration between the new 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the Joint Chiefs, an unpopular compromise appeared which 
neither satisfied civilian activists nor military detractors: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell [DADT].”23 




their private lives, and sexual orientation, were kept secret.  DADT also prohibited military 
personnel from investigating the sexuality of a service member without sufficient evidence of an 
open violation of the policy.  Powell was disappointed in the new president when he lost control 
of the objective, and allowed what was essentially a social issue to become the administration’s 
first priority with regards to working with the Armed Services.  President Obama officially 
overturned the unpopular policy in September 2011, and issued a Defense Department Directive 
to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly.  By this time, it occasioned little controversy.24 
Clinton’s second misstep with regards to principal military policy and interaction with 
members of the Armed Services was the Bottom-Up Review (BUR).  According to its author, 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the BUR’s purpose was to “provide a comprehensive review of 
the nation’s defense spending, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.”25 
The BUR was the second assessment of defense requirements conducted within a two-year 
period.  The first, known as the Base Force assessment, was completed by the Bush 
Administration in January 1992.  Widespread agreement existed on both sides of the aisle to 
reduce the size and budget of the military after a massive build-up during the Reagan 
Administration.  The aim was to do so without sacrificing military readiness or modernization.26  
Problems with Aspin’s BUR arose immediately due to the release of Clinton’s proposed 
defense cuts in February 1993,27 prior to the completion of the review and recommendations.  As 
a result, many in the military and Congress viewed the exercise as one in which Aspin outlined 
defense requirements within the confinements of his boss’s budget.  Though budget 
considerations certainly provide a range within which national security policy makers work, they 
should never infringe upon an honest evaluation of what is militarily necessary to protect the 




cut for Fiscal Year 1994, which would begin on October 1st.   Aspin multiplied these cuts by 
four, which the military feared would lead to “faster cuts in troops, less training time, and fewer 
ships than President Bush had envisioned.”28 Military leaders also feared a drastic reduction in 
American military personnel stationed in Europe.  The Cold War had ended, but American forces 
on the European continent were vital both to the nation and the world.  Ultimately, Aspin 
delivered an assessment that challenged Clinton’s proposed cuts, which would later create a huge 
spending discrepancy.29  The damage Clinton inflicted with regards to optics deepened the 
suspicion among military leaders regarding the president’s goal of reducing force capabilities to 
bare bones. 
The BUR also included several other deficiencies.  Even with recommendations for 
drastic cuts in each branch of service, it was full of overly ambitious claims of the new role 
American forces would play in the post-Cold War world.  The three most notable points for 
criticism arising from the BUR were:   
A.)  The assumptions underlying the strategy of planning to fight and win two 
nearly simultaneous regional conflicts; 
B.) The force levels recommended to carry out that strategy; and  
C.) The funding proposed for such recommended force levels.30 
 
Basically, Aspin vastly overstated the capabilities of his proposed BUR force.  Under his troop 
level reductions, if one major regional war broke out, the US would not have enough reserves 
should another conflict emerge.  The largely unforeseen, massive growth in UN peacekeeping 
operations and limited military interventions also threatened this readiness.  The uptick in the 
frequency of deployments for these lesser operations cut into regional contingency forces, which 
were already stretched thin.31 By his own account, Aspin needed a military with the ability to 
fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously.  But the BUR challenged the traditional 




and opportunities for deployment due to greater participation in multilateral peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations.32  
Clinton’s defense budget fell around $70 billion short of the requirements for the BUR 
force, which projected funding through 1997.33 He refused to provide the funds for his own 
defense secretary’s proposal.  Every American president faces the problem of meeting the basic 
needs of the military amid budget restraints.  However, Clinton launched too early, and too 
aggressively, in order to fulfill his campaign promises to elevate spending at home.  By 1998, 
Clinton increased domestic spending by $300 billion, while cutting defense by $100 billion.34  
He made the right move in directing Aspin’s review, but the BUR had virtually no effect on the 
defense budget.  This action angered the rank and file within the Armed Services.  The BUR also 
reduced much of its spending on modernization programs and technology, including satellites 
and imagery, which would prove burdensome for his successor.35 The messages sent by Aspin’s 
BUR, Clinton’s massive budget reductions, and the focus on social issues heightened fears 
among military leaders regarding the president’s readiness to lead them into battle.36 
A major concept behind Aspin’s military assessment was Clinton’s emphasis on 
international cooperation and faith in the UN.  This proposed course relied upon the idea of 
“aggressive multilateralism.”37 The concept behind this strategy is a combination of multi-
national forces aimed at providing collective security and humanitarian intervention during 
world crises.  Aggressive multilateralism was the brainchild of UN Ambassador Madeleine 
Albright.  During the confirmation hearings for her ambassadorship, Albright advocated for a 
“new beginning”38 for the United Nations, presumably with American leadership and power at 
the forefront of the venture.  Barely six months into her position, she expanded her views on the 




minds to broader strategies in multilateral forums.’”39 In Albright’s mind, humanitarian aid and 
the sponsorship of UN peacekeeping, combined with collective security entities like NATO, 
were not only vital to the internal safety of US citizens, but to American interests overseas.40 
Aggressive multilateralism, combined with the concept of “democratic enlargement,”41 which 
sought to use American democracy and market economics as a means of diplomatic influence, 
formed the basis for the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy during his first term.  Events, 
however, dictated that the president change course, especially in the realm of UN peacekeeping 
operations. 
The few pronouncements introduced by Clinton regarding a more internationalist foreign 
policy initially did not provoke criticism.  Similarly, the inclusion of the idea of a UN Rapid 
Deployment Force, which would involve “a standing UN army and…permitting putting U.S. 
forces under various UN commands,”42 also met little resistance while in its conceptual stage.  
After the crises faced by the administration within its first year, and what most Americans 
viewed as the failure of the UN to serve as a competent force for humanitarian or peacekeeping 
purposes, these proposals took some well-deserved hits.   
In his study of the changing world Clinton encountered, and the manner by which the 
new president attempted to “remake” American foreign policy, former Foreign Affairs editor 
William Hyland notes: “the era of multilateral foreign policy and collective security, centered on 
the United Nations, had finally dawned.”43 But the challenges stemming from the Clinton 
Administration’s approach to foreign entanglements looked more like crisis management.  
Hyland’s view of Clinton’s responses to foreign conflict during his first term is succinct and fair.  
Some of his findings are referenced in this work.  Hyland gives an accurate portrayal of Clinton 




affairs.44 He also describes the president’s national security advisors as idealists, whose utopian 
proposals of global cooperation and America leading merely by principle did not match the 
problems they faced.  According to Hyland, when these concepts “clashed with the real world, 
they needed the support of their president.”45 Clinton often found it difficult to support, or sell, 
these grandiose goals of multilateral peacekeeping, collective security, and humanitarian 
intervention, and rarely expended the political capital to do so.   
Hyland also claims an evolution in took place as Clinton gained more experience on the 
world stage.  Clinton showed some signs of maturation.  He was far more willing to mobilize 
NATO forces in Kosovo when in 1998, Slobodan Milošević made his second attempt at ethnic 
cleansing.  But evidence of overall growth is not apparent.  With regards to collective security 
and multilateral cooperation, particularly within the UN, Clinton failed to use American 
leadership in a manner that gave credibility to his own original aims.  When one examines 
Clinton’s response to terror attacks, his approach to foreign affairs remained a reactive one 
throughout his eight-year term.  Examples of an absence of foresight for pre-emptive decision-
making in areas such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and later, in Afghanistan, seem to indicate the primary 
driver of the president’s call to action resided in the old journalistic mantra of “If it bleeds, it 
leads.”  In the new age of global communications and the widespread, almost instantaneous 
dissemination of news stories and powerful images, Clinton often followed in the media’s 
footsteps. 
Kathryn Olson echoes this idea of improvisation by Clinton when it came to the eruption 
of foreign conflict, and especially when the military option was on the table.  Olson suggests that 
the Clinton Administration’s early vision of democratic enlargement, which used the expansion 




actors, essentially “named chaos as the global enemy to an ideal order.”46 In her review of 
Clinton’s rhetoric on foreign affairs, Olson argues that chaos gave the president not only an 
enemy, but the opportunity to avoid confining himself to a specific agenda.  By combining 
“economic, environmental, security, and social issues”47 and presenting them ambiguously 
during eight foreign policy speeches in 1993, the Clinton national security team gave itself more 
latitude in determining which fights to pick.  The result was the complete absence of any pattern 
when responding to international threats or crises. 
Tony Lake, who authored the proposals for democratic enlargement, attempted to replace 
Cold War containment with a more Wilsonian notion of spreading American ideals and power, 
only with an emphasis on international trade and domestic economic growth.48 Humanitarian aid 
and collective security were included in this framework, but quickly fell out of favor following 
the peacekeeping challenges of Clinton’s first year.  The main problem with democratic 
enlargement was its naiveté.  During a time when foreign conflicts involved ancient rivalries and 
struggles for power, fundamentalist-inspired terrorism, and authoritarians in search of nuclear 
capabilities, an obscure policy based on the spread of American values would not suffice.49  
When making the decision to send American troops into harm’s way, the containment of chaos 
could not serve as a foreign policy objective.    
Several global challenges awaited Clinton upon his arrival in office.  The focus he 
applied to non-urgent matters supports the view of his giving low prioritization to issues such as 
the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the crisis in Somalia, both of which reached disastrous levels 
during the first year of his presidency.  These two events were present during the campaign, so 
Clinton understood the demands awaiting him.  Haiti, too, falls into this category, though the 




taking place in the Horn of Africa and the Balkans.  Soon, Clinton would have to embrace his 
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Chapter 3.  “BLACK HAWK DOWN”:  UN PEACEKEEPING AND  
THE LEGACY OF A TRAGEDY 
 
On October 3, 1993, a team of US Joint Special Operations forces embarked upon a 
mission to hunt down and capture two lieutenants of Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aideed, 
part of a UN-designated, American-led command to cripple and capture Aideed himself.1 
Heading into the center of ancient rivaling tribes in the city of Mogadishu were nineteen aircraft, 
which included surveillance AH-6 and MH-6 Little Birds and eight Black Hawk helicopters.  
Ground assault forces consisting of Humvees and five-ton trucks carried additional Army 
Ranger, Delta Force, and SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Special Forces troops.  Their job was to escort 
both the prisoners and the assault forces back from the unstable area once the operation was 
complete.  In total, 160 American servicemen were in place to launch a formidable snatch and 
grab offensive against loosely formed, warring tribal factions who served as the only obstacle to 
the success of their mission.2 The US forces expected their assignment to last one hour. 
It was the middle of the day, and the soldiers undertaking this task understood, and 
respected, the dangers of being sent to an ill-defined, volatile area.  They were familiar with past 
conventional forces, on similar missions in other regions, that encountered unexpectedly 
effective resistance from locals.  But they were prepared.  After sitting around in their compound 
on the outskirts of Mogadishu where they had arrived five weeks earlier, these elite soldiers, by 
all accounts “heavy metal avengers, unstoppable, invincible,” looked forward to “finally going in 
to kick some serious Somali ass.”3 While the overarching target was achieved with the capture of 
Aideed’s lieutenants, the operation ended the next day after an intense urban firefight.  The fierce 
encounter culminated in two UH-60 Black Hawks shot down and destroyed, eighteen elite US 




clash would become known as the Battle of Mogadishu, and later as Black Hawk Down thanks to 
the success of Mark Bowden’s book and subsequent film.   
Back home, Americans were presented with the horrifying consequences of US attempts, 
made necessary by UN security resolutions, to economically and politically reconstruct chaotic 
nations with no central government, but merely violent clans vying for power.  Nothing brought 
this truth home more effectively than the televised images of a dead US soldier being dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu.4  To comprehend how and why the US intervention in Somalia 
escalated from a humanitarian aid mission to one of peacekeeping with the approved use of 
force, one must look at Somalia’s disintegration, and the roles of the UN, and Presidents Bush 
and Clinton, in the decision to dispatch troops to the region.  As the first major foreign policy 
defeat under the new Clinton Administration, it served as baptism by fire, and put under scrutiny 
when and how to utilize American troops, and risk their lives, in peacekeeping operations 
sanctioned by the UN. 
In 1960, Somalia achieved its independence as a nation after being held as a UN trust 
territory.  This status meant the land was held under the protection of another UN member nation 
as it prepared for independence and worked to establish democratic political institutions.5 In 
1969, a socialist faction, backed by the Somali Army, led a coup to bring the commander of the 
Somali Armed Forces, Mohamed Siad Barre, to power.  Barre first aligned himself with the 
Soviet Union, but after he invaded Ethiopia, which also received support from the USSR, the 
Somali president turned his attention towards the US.6 Barre’s goal was to gain assistance from 
the Americans in order to maintain power. 
Somalia is made up of rival clans, consisting of those who supported Barre, and those 




aligned with Barre joined forces to overthrow him.  Forced into exile, Barre later died in Nigeria 
in 1995.7 The conflict with Barre and his removal from leadership in Somalia exacerbated 
existing internal chaos and led to a shocking humanitarian crisis, as the warring factions 
continued to strive for power in the vacuum left in Barre’s absence.8 Savage clashes occurred in 
a state with no central authority, stable economic system, or democratic institutions; innocent 
civilians were often caught in the crossfire.   
The most notable consequence of the instability that plagued the region was famine, so 
the UN stepped in to provide assistance.  The UN Security Council passed Resolution 733, 
which noted the “rapid deterioration of the situation…and the heavy loss of human life and 
widespread material damage resulting from conflict in the country.”9 Newly-elected UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, under the guise of maintaining international peace and 
security, increased humanitarian assistance and sought to persuade conflicting parties to agree to 
a ceasefire.  Under UN Security Resolution 746, passed on March 3, 1992, a ceasefire agreement 
took place in Mogadishu; yet the resolution admitted that the “factions have not yet abided by 
their commitment to implement the ceasefire,” which caused a halt to the reception of life-saving 
assistance to the emaciated Somali people.10   
The Security Council also issued another resolution, UNSR 751, which formally 
established the UN operation as UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia).11 During this 
time, the two primary warring factions, with one headed by a notorious and charismatic killer, 
Mohammad Farah Aideed, continued to fight for control of the region as the populace starved.  
After televised images of “the gaunt faces of frail withering small children”12 spread worldwide, 




The UN dropped tens of thousands of tons of food and other supplies to the malnourished 
Somalis.  The US also sent aid through Operation Provide Relief, under the direction of 
President Bush, as part of the UN humanitarian mission.  The deliveries were often intercepted 
by members of the rivaling clans.  Security was necessary.  As a result, the UN enacted Chapter 
VII of its charter, which allows for the use of force to maintain peace.  Under Article 43, all UN 
member nations “undertake to make available to the Security Council…armed forces, assistance, 
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security.”13   
In December 1992, President Bush dispatched a small group of US Marines to protect the 
food drops and ensure the aid reached their intended targets.  Prior to this humanitarian action by 
the UN and Bush Administration, 300,000 Somalis perished either from war or starvation.14 This 
endeavor, known as Operation Restore Hope, included the US taking the reigns as head of 
UNITAF (United Nations’ United Task Force) in Somalia.  In this originally clear, limited 
leadership role under Chapter VII, the actions taken proved to be an initial success.  However, 
the UN changed its goal when increasing violence by Aideed and his supporters interfered with 
the operation.  Even with almost 30,000 soldiers on the ground, housed in compounds directly 
outside of urban areas, the situation deteriorated due to the altered initiative, with UNITAF 
peacekeeping troops now encouraged to capture Aideed under the designation UNISOM II.15 In 
response, Aideed ramped up his efforts at disrupting UN activities and attacked UN and US 
forces.   
Clinton’s UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright contended in August of 1993, when the 
situation in Somalia quickly deteriorated due to a lack of coordination among peacekeeping 




Albright may have been morally just in her comments about the responsibilities of the UN, but 
Americans, including those in the Democrat-led Congress, had little to say in the matter.  As a 
result, the public was ill-prepared for what would occur in October.17  
Clinton showed little fear as to the change in the UN mission and the escalation of 
hostilities that followed.  While the Bush Administration resisted the expansion of the role of the 
US military, the Clinton Administration’s ideas of assertive multilateralism mirrored UN 
concepts of peace enforcement and possible nation-building.18 However, as noted by the chief 
author of the Cold War-era containment policy, George Kennan, “the very prerequisites for a 
democratic political system do not exist among the people in question.”19 The region was mired 
in violent conflict, and showed no signs of developing a stable, centralized government without a 
lengthy commitment by US forces.  Any negotiations for peace or democracy-building between 
clans had to involve Aideed, due to his powerful position in the region.  Even if the Battle of 
Mogadishu had not occurred, Americans planned to exit Somalia after fulfilling their mission to 
feed and provide security for peacekeeping forces.  Without any governmental authority, the 
conditions would return to where they were prior to UNISOM intervention.20 Clinton himself 
spoke of these challenges in his speech to the nation following the Battle of Mogadishu.  The 
difference lies in the president’s promise that continued US involvement, even for a mere six 
months, and only to protect aid distribution and UN peacekeepers, would provide stability and 
sustainability for the Somalis once the American forces departed.21 
The Clinton Administration’s support for the UN’s authorization to hunt down Somali 
chieftains evolved from a shoot-out with Aideed’s loosely-formed militia that killed two dozen 
Pakistani soldiers during the summer of 1993.22 This shift changed the nature of the 




expected to lead.  Clinton’s top military advisor at the time, Colin Powell, who oversaw the 
initial troop deployment aimed strictly to protect humanitarian aid during the Bush 
Administration, contends Somalia remained first for him at this time.   
Powell describes the manner by which the situation escalated, and the lack of interest 
shown by the administration in the security of American troops.  As the raids by the Somali 
warlords continued, Powell viewed the mission as “quicksand that the UN ‘nation-building’ 
mission had sucked us into.”23 In his autobiography, Powell also angrily describes Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin’s casual refusal to provide Major General Tom Montgomery, who led the 
mission, “US helicopter gunships and AC-130 strike planes to attack Somali strongholds.”24 
Powell hated the idea of allowing the entrance of US soldiers into ancient clan rivalries.  Once 
American troops were on the ground, Powell wrote, Aspin should have granted them what they 
needed.  Clinton agreed with Powell’s assessment, and Major General Montgomery’s request, 
but failed to direct Aspin to fulfill the equipment demands of the mission’s commanders.  Just 
days prior to the October 3 battle, Powell told the president how he really felt about the 
confusion of the mission.  He advocated a quick departure.  Clinton responded with an admission 
that he had not paid much attention to the UN resolution to capture Aideed.25   
It is not the aim of this analysis to place the blame for the deaths of American soldiers on 
Clinton.  However, he was quite stubborn in his views regarding the efficiency of the UN, 
especially when placed in the unfamiliar position of deploying US forces.  Clinton’s unwaivering 
support of UN peacekeeping efforts, especially when they involved US troops, is somewhat 
surprising, given his detachment from both the actions taken by the UN and the new mission it 
forged.  The president seemed to place too much trust in the capabilities of the international 




Ambassador under George W. Bush, John Bolton, “The Bush Administration [George 
H.W.Bush] sent U.S. troops into Somalia strictly to clear the relief channels that could avert 
mass starvation.  It resisted U.N. attempts to expand that mission.”26 Essentially, the problem 
was the almost stealth manner by which the initial Bush mission to protect humanitarian aid 
deliveries transformed into one of peacekeeping, and then manhunting, with no explanation 
offered by the president until it was too late.  Limited intervention slowly evolved into “mission 
creep,”27 where the presence and purpose of American forces changed, and the prospect of a 
timely exit without serious incident evaporated. 
According to a Washington Post article after the Battle of Mogadishu, “Clinton and his 
aides viewed Somalia as a laboratory where their theories of a new kind of ‘peacemaking’ 
mission would be proved.”28 Several statements made by Clinton and his advisors support this 
accusation.  In July of 1993, when speaking to reporters, Clinton claimed that the goal of the UN 
was to fulfill its humanitarian mission and “continue to work with the Somalis towards nation-
building.”29 Just days after the October 3 tragedy, Clinton denied this statement in a report to 
Congress.  During a June 1993 press conference, the president upheld the UN’s purpose “to 
undermine the capacity of Aideed to wreak military havoc in Mogadishu.”30 In the same 
conference, he also refused the statement that US forces included getting rid of Aideed as one of 
their primary objectives.  The seemingly apathetic administration asserted as late as September 
1993 that the humanitarian mission was a stunning success.  Two weeks later, eighteen 
Americans and hundreds of Somalis were killed.   
After the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton conducted a policy review of what went 
wrong, and introduced a plan to withdraw all US troops from Somalia within six months.31 This 




Administration.  It served as a cautionary tale regarding what could likely occur when the 
president sent US soldiers into areas of foreign crisis, even under the pretense of peacekeeping.  
The losses in Somalia led to Clinton’s refusal to commit to any significant US aid during the 
Rwandan Genocide in 1994, and increased his hesitancy to commit to substantial military 
support in Bosnia.  Another unforeseen consequence involved radical Islamic militants, who 
were paying close attention to what they believed would be a long, drawn out fight between the 
US military and a small group of Muslim renegades in Africa.  When Clinton announced a six-
month withdrawal date, it did not go unnoticed.   
Here is where foreign policy, especially in an age of few conventional wars, gets tricky.  
Only a small percentage of Americans understand the brutal realities of war.  In the age of 
counter-insurgency warfare, which essentially defines Vietnam as well, the public has little 
patience for what it sees as elite US soldiers losing their lives to Third World criminals with no 
justification.  The images of American bodies being dragged through war-torn streets by a mob 
of criminals, along with the widely-distributed hostage video of Blackhawk pilot Michael 
Durant, confirmed public fears of utilizing military force with unclear objectives in unknown 
places.32 They were unaware of the heroics involved in the fifteen-hour firefight that followed 
the downing of US helicopters and the attack that ensued. 
Ignorance as to what occurs on the ground during combat is why the Commander-in-
Chief makes decisions regarding the use of force, sometimes against the wishes of the American 
people.  How many movie-goers wanted US troops to rush back in and exterminate the enemy 
after watching Black Hawk Down?  Does this question oversimplify the choice Clinton faced?  
Perhaps.  He had to decide whether to accept defeat, and abandon the ill-conceived operation, or 




As presidential advisor George Stephanopoulas notes, Clinton worried he would take public heat 
from the Democratic House and Senate if he decided to retaliate.34 To make matters worse, 
media outlets such as USA Today published articles suggesting Clinton’s national security team 
was not paying attention in Somalia.  Behind closed doors, the president vented his anger 
towards his foreign policy advisors, whom he felt made him look bad.  Image-driven aides like 
Stephanopoulas worried that his discontent was being leaked to the press, which did indeed make 
the president look bad.35   
While the administration worried over how to navigate the fall-out, the daunting question 
of whether to retreat, or allow US commanders to outline a more concise mission to protect 
humanitarian aid while simultaneously bringing the warlord Aideed and his cohorts to justice, 
had long passed.  After a long public explanation of what US forces were initially put there to do, 
and to justify the continuance of the peacekeeping mission for another six months, with an 
expressed prohibition against “vengeance,” Clinton left the military engaged in the fruitless 
venture; only this time with a resolute call to reduce troops from 28,000 to 5,000.36 
US military actions are not ignored by America’s enemies.  Investigative journalist 
Gerald Posner describes how Osama Bin Laden, while in Sudan, viewed the American-led relief 
operation as proof of the constant need for the US to assert influence.  Posner asserts that Bin 
Laden “dispatched Muhammad Atef, the second-in-command of al Qaeda’s military unit, to 
Somalia to meet with local militants.”37 Al Qaeda members in Africa instructed Somalis on how 
to use mortars and trained them in explosives.  Bin Laden did not initially take credit for what 
occurred in Somalia; in fact, he would not admit his role for another four years.  However, he 




the legendary US soldier off the battlefield.  He decided that Americans had no stomach for 
casualties in war.38 
Clinton, and many in the intelligence and defense communities themselves, knew little 
about Osama Bin Laden at this time.  It is unfair to use hindsight in order to condemn the 
administration’s decision to pull out of this fight based on information it did not have.  However, 
precedent does exist with regards to US military endeavors, whether successes or failures, and 
the messages they send to enemies lying patiently in wait, who often base their next move on 
American action or inaction.  Western media coverage of the Tet Offensive, for example, 
inadvertently brought a nearly vanquished Viet Cong (VC) rival back from the brink of death, 
who then exploited widening rifts within the American public to gain time to rebuild and 
relaunch.  The VC, along with their North Vietnamese Army (NVA) allies, utilized American 
politicians’ lack of understanding as to military strategy.  The enemy understood the American 
public, the America media, and American leaders, and used this knowledge to its devastating 
advantage.        
During the Clinton administration, Bin Laden publicly called for Muslims worldwide to 
drive American soldiers from their lands.39 Specifically with regards to Somalia, the terrorist said 
in a 1998 interview with ABC News that at the time of the Battle of Mogadishu, he and his 
followers were gearing up for a lengthy struggle in the Horn of Africa.  Bin Laden gained 
revolutionary status among Islamic extremists after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in 
which he embraced reports of his supposed heroic actions as a participant in “a ragged army of 
dedicated Muslims…[who overcame] a superpower.”40 Although his actual role is disputed, 
mostly among those in the US-supported Afghani Northern Alliance, who alone fought the 




constructed image spread throughout the Muslim world, and inspired extremists to join his 
deadly cause.   
Bin Laden confirmed that the Battle of Mogadishu showed him that the US would not act 
as the USSR did in Afghanistan, when the Soviets fought against the Mujahedeen for almost a 
decade.  He stated, “the United States rushed out of Somalia in shame and disgrace.”41 Seeing 
himself as the messenger to “bring the world to Islam”42 through acts of war against the world’s 
foremost superpower, it only confirmed his arrogant delusions of self-worth when the US pulled 
out of Africa without finishing its mission.  Bin Laden would later taunt American viewers, “you 
left the area [Somalia] carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you.”43   
 Somalia altered Clinton’s idealistic foreign policy objectives with regards to multilateral 
peace operations and the UN.  In response to the catastrophic events that occurred in Mogadishu, 
Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) on May 3, 1994.44 The policy put 
forth strict requirements which must be adhered to upon considering international peacekeeping 
operations.  It includes a statement confirming that US participation in these missions “can never 
substitute for the necessity of winning our own wars.”45 Although Clinton asserted that UN 
support can often serve as a “force multiplier,” the US would use its vote as a member of the 
Security Council to “take the lead in calling for them [multilateral peace operations], when 
member states are prepared to support the effort with forces and funds.”46 The Clinton 
Administration issued this national security policy directive at a time when the debate over the 
use of force under a UN mandate in Bosnia raged.  The PDD-25 policy also had a devastating 
effect on Rwanda and UN immobility during the genocidal acts of 1994.  In PDD-25, Clinton 




intervention and the prevention of human rights abuses, and ironically, UN Ambassador Albright 
was his chief salesperson for the new directive.   
Clinton affirmed that the US alone would decide whether or not an operation’s “political 
and military objectives are clear and feasible; and when UN involvement represents the best 
means to advance U.S. security interests.”47 In this national security directive, the president 
argued that although peace enforcement and UN cooperation will remain part of American 
security and military strategy, these operations cannot substitute for “unilateral or coalition 
action when that is what our national interest requires.”48 Clinton’s goal here was to advocate for 
reform, and clarity, when it comes to UN operations.  However, he also mandated a US 
leadership role; when large scale operations were conducted, they would fall under US command 
and operate in accordance with more competent regional organizations, such as NATO.  These 
written objectives break with his past ideas of internationalist cooperation and intervention.  
Somalia taught Clinton a valuable lesson; one that his military advisors struggled to teach their 
heretofore inflexible commander.  Clinton’s visions of assertive multilateralism and dreams of a 
UN Rapid Deployment Force were now less clear.   
Even Albright began to dismiss the phrase “aggressive multilateralism,” which she 
essentially created, and truly favored, particularly with regards to civilian crises or acts of 
genocide.  Less than two months prior to the Battle of Mogadishu, she wrote a New York Times 
op-ed in favor of tracking down and punishing Aideed.  She had a great stake in ensuring this 
new policy of working through the UN could succeed.  But even prior to the tragic events in 
October, Somalia challenged this narrative.  Up against heavy criticism over the logic of the 
changing mission, she stressed “Failure to take action [against Aideed] would have signaled to 




persevere.”49 After the deaths of American soldiers, public cries against sacrificing US 
sovereignty to the corrupt, incompetent power of the UN rang wide, especially from 
Republicans.50 Albright and others within the administration could not proceed unimpeded in 
their internationalist visions of multinational humanitarian missions and collective security.  This 
study’s findings on Rwanda only further illustrate the challenges facing proponents of this 
policy.  The legacy of Black Hawk Down completely encircled the administration when faced 
with an even deadlier humanitarian crisis. 
After Somalia, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake contended that the White House 
was “misinformed” about the situation in Mogadishu and, therefore, did not press for a political 
compromise.51 But as noted by Powell, even Clinton himself admitted he did not pay a 
significant amount of attention to the UN change in policy, when peacekeeping morphed into a 
combat mission.  Also, any diplomacy expended towards creating a peace agreement between 
factions, or supporting a central authority, would legitimize Aideed and other warlords 
responsible for raiding food and medicine drops and attacking UN peacekeepers.  This option 
was not popular prior to October 3, 1993, and reached a level of impossibility after.  With no real 
opportunities for European-style diplomatic negotiations, the condition of the Somali people, 
regardless of the six-month commitment of US forces, would remain dire.  In the past few years, 
the nation has experienced modest improvements in its economic and political institutions, but 
still suffers from both internal and external conflict.  It is currently a well-known haven for 
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Chapter 4.  BOSNIA AND THE “EUROPEAN PROBLEM” 
Few Americans hold a firm grasp of knowledge with regards to the collapse of 
Yugoslavia and the eruption of violence that followed, which led to almost 300,000 deaths and 
two million refugees between the years of 1991 and 1995.1 The Balkan region in Eastern Europe 
existed under Soviet rule during the Cold War, though Yugoslavia was unique in one respect.  
Under the dictatorial rule of Marshall Josip Bros Tito, who earned revolutionary status as the 
head of a communist-led resistance movement against Nazi occupation in WWII, a socialist-
inspired nationalism served as a uniting force for the previously unstable state, mired in ethnic 
and territorial conflict.   
After World War II, Yugoslavia was essentially recreated under Tito’s leadership; he 
often acted on his own accord to the frustration of many in Moscow.  The basis for the postwar 
government, known as the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, 
advocated for a federal state that would be “a voluntary union of separate peoples.”2 With this 
notion of unity in mind, Tito advocated for a Marxist state consisting of six equal republics, each 
with its own president and parliament to ensure fair representation.  Tito also created two 
autonomous regions within the Republic of Serbia.  All states were to exist under his blanket 
leadership, first as Prime Minister, then as President for Life.  The six republics included:  
Slovenia; Croatia; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Serbia; Montenegro; and Macedonia.  The two 
autonomous provinces within Serbia were Vojvodina in the north, and Kosovo in the south.        
 Gale Stokes, a specialist on Eastern Europe and the Balkan region, argues that Yugoslav 
Communists often looked to the unquestioned authority of Tito to preserve the multinational 
federation and suppress ethnic conflicts that existed among its Roman Catholic Croats, Bosnian 




revolutions of 1989, Stokes effectively explains the foundation upon which the civil wars of the 
1990s raged.  During WWII, Tito’s resistance movement, The Partisans, emerged victorious in a 
Yugoslav civil war that occurred in concurrence with the fight against Nazi Germany.  As Hitler 
marched across Europe, Croatians initiated a violent killing spree against its ethnic rivals, and 
forced the removal of “Serbs, Communists, Jews, Gypsies, Muslims, and others they defined as 
non-Croatians” from their territory.4 Upon achieving power and legitimacy in 1945, Tito’s 
Partisans murdered tens of thousands of Croats, while imprisoning many others.   
The memories of these savage acts, in which no group could claim innocence, seethed 
under the surface and would later erupt.  According to Stokes: 
Instead of permitting the Yugoslavs to face this unpleasant past, the Communists 
simply condemned the horrors of the wartime experience as an extreme outburst 
of bourgeois society and proclaimed that such things could not happen in the new 
order.  Any effort to confront the issues directly was forbidden…The wounds of 
World War II were covered over, but they never healed.5    
Although these tensions were contained, Tito’s death in 1980 served as a destabilizing event for 
the region.  His authoritarian rule, though repressive, kept his Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia united; he was loved by a majority of the Yugoslav people.  He also commanded the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), which remained dedicated to a united Yugoslavia even after his 
demise.  To make matters worse, economic hardships plagued the country at the time of his 
death.6 As a result, the 1980s passed under a dark cloud of political, social, and financial 
instability.  As the end of the decade approached, Yugoslavia’s historical scores began to seek a 
settlement.  
 The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s began when three of its six republics—Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Macedonia—declared independence in 1991.  These acts of secession were mirrored 




peaceful, with a dispute between the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Albanians over the newly-
independent state’s name being the most notable development at the time.  Therefore, it remains 
a separate issue from the topic under consideration in this particular study. 
Serbia, under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, along with the Republic of 
Montenegro, strove to become the inheritors of the federal system, now in disarray, and formed 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).8 In 1990, Milošević officially came to power in 
Serbia by stoking ethnic hatred towards Croatians and Muslims among ethnic, Orthodox Serbs.  
He did so not only within his own republic, but also among the minority Serb populations in 
neighboring states, particularly Croatia and Slovenia.9 Similarly, Croatia’s president, Franjo 
Tudjman, utilized the memories of past atrocities and conflict to demonize the Serb minority 
among Roman Catholic Croats.  Although Tudjman’s hands were not clean with regards to the 
persecution of Serbs within an independent Croatia, it is Milošević who embarked on the most 
vicious crusade from the federal capital of Belgrade, located within his Serbian republic.  With 
the JNA and its Serb members throughout the former federation willing to align with him, 
Milošević set out to recentralize Yugoslavia under a communist-inspired, yet nationalist 
ideology, concentrated within Serbia.  However, Milošević’s intent to destroy rival groups from 
areas both inside and outside of his direct authority eventually caused many non-Serbian 
members of the JNA to defect, and exposed his calls for a reunited Yugoslavia as a guise upon 
which to create a Greater Serbia. 
During the early years of the break-up, American intelligence agencies relayed their 
findings of an impending fissure.  A November 1990 New York Times article reported that “US 
intelligence is predicting…that civil-war in the multi-national Balkan country is highly likely.”10  




with the situation in the Middle East and Soviet disintegration top of mind, the Bush 
Administration did not view the crisis as one of urgent, vital interest to the US.  Most Europeans 
agreed. 
When fighting broke out in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, countries such as Great Britain 
and France remained apathetic.  To many Western Europeans, this violence was nothing new.  In 
the words of British historian Tony Judt, the Balkans were viewed as “a hopeless case, a 
cauldron of mysterious squabbles and ancient hatreds.”11 Judt contends, “What happened after 
[the Eastern European revolutions of] 1989 was simple:  the lid having been removed, the 
cauldron exploded.”12 Although the West expected unrest, and even bloodshed, it was ill-
prepared for the inhumane horrors that occurred.  The only firm response in the early days of this 
crisis, made by both the Bush Administration and its allies in the newly-declared European 
Union (EU), described the Balkan Wars as a “European problem.”13  
The wars began with an attack on Slovenia by the federal Yugoslav army in 1991, but 
this attempt to halt the republic’s secession barely lasted two weeks, and its independence was 
retained.  A far more intense situation arose in Croatia soon after, with the JNA backing Serb 
rebels, who were a minority in Tudjman’s republic.  In January 1992, the UN directed a ceasefire 
between the independent Croatian state and the federal army, largely managed by Milošević out 
of Belgrade.14 Earlier in 1991, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the entire 
region in an attempt to diminish the number of casualties should the fighting escalate.  After also 
applying sanctions, the UN deployed a multinational peacekeeping force.  The troops, known as 
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), were to oversee the ceasefire and monitor 
the escalating situation in Bosnia.15 UNPROFOR, barred from using force even in self-defense, 




Bosnian Muslims, as well as against Milošević’s nationalist aims.  Many Bosnians mocked the 
impotent UNPROFOR as “the UN Self-Protection Force (author’s emphasis).”16 
 The ethnic composition of Bosnia, which was the most diverse of the Yugoslav republics, 
was approximately forty-three percent Muslim, thirty-five percent Serbian, and eighteen percent 
Croatian.17 When Bosnia made its move for independence under its Muslim president, Alija 
Izetbegović, the Bosnian Serbs strongly rejected it.  But they were still in the minority, despite 
their significant numbers.  With Serbia now virtually leading what was left of the Yugoslav 
Federation, the Serbs in Bosnia wanted to remain part of a larger, Serb-dominated nation rather 
than become a powerless minority in a smaller republic led by their ancient rivals.  Conversely, 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats rejected the idea of their own marginalization by remaining part of 
a now Serb-dominated Yugoslav federation. With Milošević’s blessing and backing, and 
supported by the JNA, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces began what would come to be called 
“ethnic cleansing”18 of Muslims and Croatians who shared their homeland.  For many critics of 
US ambivalence on Bosnia, the term “ethnic cleansing” is seen as a less offensive, less urgent 
description of what occurred, which was outright genocide. 
With only the UNPROFOR standing in the way, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its capital city 
of Sarajevo, became the site of the most savage atrocities committed against civilians since 
WWII.  Upon the passing of the secession referendum put forth by Bosnian President 
Izetbegović in the spring of 1992, the Bosnian Serbs launched a campaign of murder, rape, 
torture, imprisonment, and expulsion under the orders of politician Radovan Karadžić, but with 
the guiding hand of Milošević.19 In response to Bosnia’s move towards independence from the 
Yugoslav Federation, Karadžić led a political movement among Bosnian Serbs to formerly 




Bosnia, known as Republika Srpska (Serb Republic).  The Bosnian Serbs saw Sarajevo as their 
stated capital, and under Karadžić’s leadership, opted to remain part of the Yugoslav Federation 
of Serbia and Montenegro.  The JNA covertly enlisted Serb paramilitary forces to combat what 
Milošević and his followers viewed as an attempt by Bosnian Muslims, as well as Bosnian 
Croats, to decrease Serbian influence within a new nation comprised of heavily populated Serb 
territories.20   
Violence broke out in April of 1992, when Serb snipers fired into a crowd of anti-war 
demonstrators in support of an independent, multi-national Bosnia.  From the top of a Holiday 
Inn, the gunmen shot at thousands of peaceful attendees, without concern for who they maimed 
or killed.  Soon after, the Serb paramilitary forces “pounded the city” of Sarajevo with heavy 
artillery.21 These militia members, who would form the Bosnian Serb Army, expected to take 
Sarajevo within days, and Bosnia proper within months.  The JNA was not officially responsible 
for the attacks, but only according to Milošević.  Those JNA members who did exit the region 
left their weapons and artillery behind for the Bosnian Serb militia.  This move, directed by 
Milošević, aimed to prevent international claims of a centralized Serbian directive with 
pronounced JNA intervention.22 However, former Yugoslav Army officers took control of those 
Serbs willing to fight in Bosnia.  Most of them were Serb army officers within the JNA who 
Milošević ordered to “return and organize.”23 In a move that would have disastrous 
consequences, former JNA Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladić placed himself in charge of the 
Bosnian Serb forces to oversee the brutal attacks.24  
Mladić did his job with devastating precision.  To ensure the complete removal of 
Muslims in particular, the Serbs forced Muslim men to rape their own daughters, mothers to 




Holocaust as a means to imprison their rivals prior to their inevitable executions.25 The Serbs 
aimed to ensure the Bosnian Muslims who did survive would never want to return to their former 
homes.  Many of these relayed incidences were based on stories told by those who escaped the 
rampage, or aid and human rights workers on the ground.  It was not until journalists were able 
to document some of the atrocities with visual confirmation, specifically mass graves and images 
of the detention camps, that international pressure for action built.26 Towards the end of the 1992 
election, the issue gained some ground in the US, and in retrospect, registers as a negative in the 
waning days of the Bush Administration.  From 1992 through 1995, the war in Bosnia loomed, 
with evidence of genocidal actions frequently reaching the highest levels of the US government.  
From the moment of his inauguration, President Bill Clinton and his administration’s “day-to-
day crisis management approach”27 to the publicized atrocities displayed an absence of 
willpower, even when they finally devised a credible strategy. 
The UN arms embargo had the greatest impact on Bosnian Muslims.  The JNA had its 
own arsenal prior to the ban on the sale of weapons to the region, and the Bosnian Serb Army 
were the recipients of this advantage.  Milošević presented any violence committed by the 
Bosnian Serbs as the actions of an autonomous entity, and attempted to detach them from any 
associations with his Serbian republic or the JNA.28 However, he later admitted that his public 
pronouncements to the international community on the supposed independence of the Bosnian 
Serb Army was a ruse to “reduce the severity of the sanctions”29 put in place by the UN against 
the Yugoslav Federation and Serbia.  From his Belgrade capital, illegal arms were sent via trucks 
and unauthorized flights between Serbia and Bosnia.30 
Those targeted by the Serb attacks had little with regards to any significant means of 




illegally purchased by neighboring countries, such as Hungary, the well dried up, and they, too, 
were at a significant disadvantage.  For this reason, during the 1992 campaign, Clinton argued in 
favor of lifting the ban in order to level the playing field and put a halt to the slaughter.31   
In his attempt to alter voters’ opinions, Clinton “took on a somewhat more aggressive 
tack than President Bush”32 with regards to Bosnia.  During the 1992 campaign, Americans were 
bombarded with televised and printed images of the horrors committed by the Bosnian Serb 
Army, particularly its consistent shelling of heavily populated areas in Sarajevo.  As noted, the 
Bush Administration viewed the issue as a “European problem,” and tried to settle the dispute 
diplomatically.  Candidate Clinton rebuked the president’s approach as lacking any action, and 
encouraged the US to “consider using military force to open Serbian detention camps 
and…lifting the arms embargo.”33 However, once president, Clinton ignored his own advice, 
even as the number of deaths reached 100,000.  He thus reneged on the only foreign policy 
criticism of the Bush Administration that held real weight.   
Clinton understood upon his taking the oath of office that Serb forces used mortars to 
shell innocent civilians in cities, raped women and young girls, executed entire families, and 
destroyed homes.34 Secretary of State Warren Christopher issued a statement listing the many 
atrocities committed by the Serbs as early as February of 1993, but his solutions were quite 
weak, and did not echo those put forth by his boss prior to the November 3rd election.  
Christopher tepidly swore to “bring the full weight of American diplomacy to bear on finding a 
peaceful solution.”35 He gave no ultimatum, and offered no threat of using military force.  For a 
group responsible for “mass murders, systematic beatings…prolonged shellings of innocents in 




detention camps,”36 Christopher’s words relayed the stalemate occurring both within the 
administration and among its allies.   
At this time, the death toll continued to rise.  It was open season. By 1993, Bosnian Serb 
forces held the capital city of Sarajevo and its Bosnian-Muslim government under siege.  
According to Samantha Power, who most recently served as President Obama’s UN 
Ambassador, “Saving Bosnian lives was not deemed worth risking U.S. soldiers or challenging 
America’s European allies who wanted to remain neutral.”37 At the very moment Clinton gained 
the most powerful position in the world, he diluted this power by miring himself in international 
intransigence, internal indecision, and a subservience to polling. 
One of the primary reasons for the absence of US leadership in Bosnia came from 
debates within the administration.  Colin Powell, who held onto his Bush-appointed position as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for nine months into Clinton’s first term, and thus served as the 
president’s paramount military advisor, expressed concern over US intervention.  His distrust of 
assuming a “limited” role, particularly one engaged in civil warfare, was shaped by his 
experiences in Vietnam.  As noted by Power in her book on America’s history with regards to 
genocide, “The one-word bogey ‘Vietnam’ became the ubiquitous shorthand for all that could go 
wrong in the Balkans if the United States became militarily engaged.”38 This association 
certainly remained top of mind for the highly-decorated Vietnam Veteran.  When speaking to a 
New York Times reporter in 1992, while still working with the Bush Administration, Powell 
stated, “As soon as they tell me it’s limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a 
result or not.  As soon as they tell me ‘surgical,’ I head for the bunker.”39 Powell’s criticism of 
confining US military strength to ineffective, constrained air strikes and an ill-defined presence 




 Powell set the stage for the dissent that would occur among Clinton’s national security 
advisors.  Representing the men and women who would be asked to enter into harm’s way, 
Powell echoed some European sentiments regarding the ancient ethnic rivalries at the root of the 
violence.  But he also vowed to repeat the overwhelming military effort he put forth in Desert 
Storm should the president firmly decide to go in; again, only with a well-defined strategy in 
place.  In the absence of this directive, and instead presented with civilian suggestions for “a 
little surgical bombing or a limited attack,” Powell noted how history betrays those who present 
an approach of increased escalation once the “desired result [of limited intervention] isn’t 
obtained.”40 Again, Powell referred to Vietnam.  
 Powell’s voice on this matter angered those who supported the US taking on a more 
active role.  The most notable confrontation arose between Powell and UN Ambassador 
Madeleine Albright.  Albright contends that Powell was intractable when it came to a bombing 
campaign or the possible interjection of ground troops.  She describes how the much-admired 
general consistently asserted that he viewed the proposal of intervention as an open-ended 
commitment.  Therefore, he would not even consider entering the region without a decisive 
force, including thousands of troops.  Albright notes his answer to her many suggestions as a 
repetitive “No can do.”41 Albright exploded: “What are you saving this superb military for, 
Colin, if we can’t use it?”42 Powell similarly describes this altercation with Albright, and notes 
his reaction to her sarcastic question as one of infuriation.  He felt as though the UN Ambassador 
and others who supported her position viewed America’s military force as “toy soldiers to be 
moved around on some sort of global game board.”43 His lack of enthusiasm for what was being 
proposed on Bosnia, specifically, angered him because no diplomatic objectives existed to 




Powell could not, and would not, present a battle plan without clarity in stated political 
goals to accompany whatever military presence the US agreed upon.  In this respect, National 
Security Advisor Tony Lake backed up Powell.  As noted, Vietnam Syndrome often came in 
direct conflict with Munich Syndrome.  Lake told Albright, “the kinds of questions Colin is 
asking…are exactly the ones the military never asked during Vietnam.”44 In the experienced 
mind of Powell, a civilian, Washington-directed “war” with limited engagement and a confused 
political strategy could not proceed without the voicing of his stern objections.  When Clinton 
asked Powell soon after his inauguration what could be done through airpower, the president 
made sure to stress the caveat of “something not too punitive.”45 The general rightly interpreted 
the president’s naïve question as “let’s not hurt anybody.”46 He gave Clinton the same answer he 
would repeat endlessly until he retired at the end of September in 1993.  Powell’s replacement as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, slightly improved on the 
relationship between the military and Clinton.  However, upon his succession, Shalikashvili 
remarked “What took place at that moment (Bosnia) was what I would call a holiday from 
leadership.”47 The Clinton Administration’s unwillingness to lead their hesitant European allies 
towards a proper, effective solution surprised the new chairman.  To him, the traditional role 
played by the US did not exist during this crisis. 
Lake himself offered no real alternative either.  Although most of his time as Clinton’s 
National Security Advisor was spent on Bosnia, Lake’s position seemingly involved holding 
endless meetings where high-level officials within the administration would vent or pontificate 
on the matter, then leave with no significant progress having been made.  Lake favored 
intervention, but given his status as a civilian, he refrained from pushing his viewpoint.  In these 




complained, “It wasn’t policy-making.  It was group therapy—an existential debate over what is 
the role of America.”48 
According to Strobe Talbott, an old friend of Clinton’s from his Rhodes Scholar days and 
another critic of the Vietnam War who served in the administration, the president was frustrated 
by what he deemed “incoherent” strategies from his foreign policy team.49 Secretary of State 
Christopher worried about Bosnia weighing down Clinton’s domestic achievements with a 
human rights disaster overseas.  The president’s domestic agenda was so broad, and demanded 
so much time and effort, he had little insight into what was required to confront the escalating 
situation in Europe.  In response to the televised images of the siege of Sarajevo, Clinton angrily 
told Talbott: “Some people are saying don’t just stand there, do something, but others are saying 
don’t do something, just stand there.”50  
Christopher was not known to be a stern, forceful diplomat, nor was he considered a man 
of action.  In May of 1993, when he embarked on a task to convince European allies to endorse a 
“lift and strike” proposal put forth by Clinton, which consisted of finally lifting the arms 
embargo and initiating NATO air strikes against the Serbs, Christopher could not sell it.51 A 
NATO official present during a meeting between Christopher and the NATO secretary-general 
Manfred Woerner noted the Secretary of State’s “singular lack of enthusiasm” for lift and 
strike.52 When he returned, Christopher described the meeting as a “healthy exchange of ideas”53 
between his European counterparts and himself.  Also in tow was the allies’ outright dismissal of 
the president’s proposed course of action.  A little over a year later, Tony Lake traveled to 
Europe to present an enhanced version of this plan himself, but with determination and the 
promise of a US troop presence behind it.  This time it sold, but only after tens of thousands 




In his assessment of the war in the Persian Gulf, Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les 
Aspin, along with ranking Republican Member of the House Armed Services Committee, 
Representative William Dickinson, published one important finding, which is applicable to any 
discussion of the use of military force in a particular arena.  They found, based on the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which in essence 
assured that all services of the military were fighting the same war, “There was a single chain of 
command with a clear-cut distinction between military and civilian roles with the theater 
commander in chief in unmistakable control over combat forces.”54 Aspin, who was surely no 
hawk, notes that “The decisive factor in the war with Iraq [Operation Desert Storm/ Shield] was 
the air campaign, but ground forces were necessary to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait.”55 During his 
tenure, Aspin advocated for committing US-led NATO forces in Bosnia under similar 
conditions, though on a smaller scale.56 However, he remained Secretary of Defense under 
Clinton for less than a year.  Aspin resigned due to his inadequate response to equipment 
requests from his commanders in Somalia and the tragedy that followed.  But the point made in 
his Gulf War assessment compliments Powell’s mindset.  Even though the confrontation in 
Bosnia was a bit more complex, and unconventional, it nevertheless required more than just 
sporadic NATO airstrikes.  It would take Clinton until 1995 to learn this lesson. 
In February 1994, Bosnian Serbs utilized heavy artillery to shell a Sarajevo marketplace, 
which killed sixty-eight innocent shopkeepers and patrons, and severely wounded hundreds 
more.57 The Clinton Administration forcefully condemned the aggressors, with tough talk about 
the resolve of NATO.  In April, after a brief respite in the shelling of the Bosnian capital, the 
NATO allies punished the Serbs “with ‘pinprick’ air strikes—usually a single strike against aged 




any NATO activity, which often involved raising the frequency and gruesomeness of attacks 
towards Muslim civilians, and even taking UN peacekeepers as hostages, the US and NATO 
members always capitulated.  Karadžić, the political leader of the Republika Srpska, even went 
so far as to brazenly announce to international decision-makers his directions to shoot down 
NATO planes and capture UNPROFOR troops if strikes persisted.59 It was this consistent 
Serbian response to limited and often inconsequential airstrikes that prevented any increase in 
military intervention.  Ironically, it was out of concern for the lives of UN peacekeepers on the 
ground that hundreds of thousands of Bosnians lost their own.  The peacekeeping force either 
needed to be protected by ground troops, or removed from their mission to pave the way for 
actual military intervention. 
One example of Clinton’s ineptitude on the Bosnia issue comes from his attempt to 
persuade French President Jacques Chirac to present an argument to the US president’s own 
Congress against lifting the ban; a ban he himself opposed while a candidate in 1992.  Clinton 
also wanted Chirac’s help with the legislature to raise funds for the increased protection of the 
rather ineffective UN peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.  After keeping the French leader occupied 
for almost two hours in a meeting with Republican Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich, who each favored lifting the ban and arming the Bosnian Muslims, 
Chirac sarcastically announced “the position of leader of the free world was ‘vacant’.”60   
After a short ceasefire in the first few months of 1995, the situation reached the point of 
no return in the late spring months and into the summer.  The president had to act, though it 
would take him months to implement a policy that would yield any ramifications for the primary 
Bosnian aggressors and deliver a ceasefire.  Some in his administration even excused the delay 




atrocities committed.  The CIA fought back against this false assessment of Serb cruelty with 
intelligence reports that confirmed approximately ninety percent of the genocidal actions were 
committed by the Bosnian Serb Army and Serb militias.  In a statement by CIA Deputy Director 
John Gannon, reports of “rape, torture, and murder”61 in UN-designated “safe areas,”62 such as 
Srebrenica,63 a small village near the eastern border with Serbia, further warranted the need for 
American power.  Gannon notes: 
The Bosnian Serb assaults have displaced tens of thousands of Muslims [from the 
supposed UN-protected “safe areas”], led to the detention of perhaps several 
thousand more, and resulted in the apparent purposeful deaths of at least several 
hundred—a number that could increase to thousands as we learn more.64  
 
The report also confirms the mysterious absence of almost 6,000 Muslim refugees from 
Srebrenica, mostly men and boys, most of whom were assumed dead.  This number would rise to 
approximately 8,000 murdered Muslim males as more evidence poured in.  These UN-designated 
safe areas, set up in 1993 by the Security Council and protected by UNPROFOR, were 
considered by the international community as off limits with regards to Serbian aggression.65  
The Serbs, apparently, finally crossed the line. 
Political calculations also played a role in Clinton’s decision to finally intervene with 
actions he championed while a candidate.  Much of the White House staff were obsessed with 
political fallout, such as George Stephanopoulas, David Gergen, and Dick Morris.  Morris, the 
president’s primary pollster and political advisor, opposed Clinton taking any action in Bosnia, 
advising “You don’t want to be a Lyndon Johnson…sacrificing your potential for doing good on 
the domestic front by a destructive, never-ending foreign involvement.”66 In 1994, Morris’s 
polling solidified Clinton’s worries regarding public support for military intervention.  About 
forty percent of Americans reflected an isolationist mindset, with just thirty-seven percent 




continued, particularly in UN safe zones like Srebrenica, public opinion made a slight shift in 
favor of US military action. 
To add to Clinton’s political concerns, Republican Senator Bob Dole of Kansas became 
an outspoken proponent of using force to stop the carnage.  After Secretary of State 
Christopher’s fruitless trip to Europe in an attempt to sell the president’s “lift-and-strike” policy, 
Dole noted that Clinton “finally came up with a ‘realistic’ Bosnia policy,” but then abandoned it 
“when [European] consensus did not magically appear on his doorstep.”68 Dole fought tirelessly 
to convince Congress to force the president’s hand.  As Senate Majority Leader in the summer of 
1995, he sold the Senate on a bill ending American support for the arms embargo, while giving a 
timeline for the UN to remove its peacekeeping forces out of harm’s way.  Since the Bosnian 
Serbs often took UNPROFOR troops hostage in response to air strikes, this action would clear 
the way for NATO attacks as well.   
In a bipartisan measure, both the House and Senate voted to revoke the ban on arms sales 
to Bosnia in an attempt to aid the Muslims under attack.  In August of 1995, President Clinton 
vetoed Dole’s successful legislation to unilaterally lift the arms embargo.  As noted, Clinton’s 
reluctance arose from the presence of UN peacekeepers, and the Serbian willingness to take them 
as hostages or even harm them physically in retaliation for NATO military intervention.  But 
given the attack on UN-designated safe areas and peacekeepers in the summer of 1995, the UN 
mission was already heading towards total failure.  Clinton believed differently.  He promised to 
lift the embargo “in the event the United Nations mission failed and withdrew.”69 Apparently, 
Clinton set a low bar for success.  He also warned that “unilaterally ending the United States role 
in the embargo would damage mutual security agreements with allies.”70 Since the argument 




present to peacekeepers on the ground—mostly Canadian, French, British, Spanish, and Dutch 
forces—Cinton held out.   
Here is where undaunted, principled American leadership in world affairs must come in 
to play.  Particularly at this time, Clinton should have been the one forming the agreements and 
setting the tone for multilateral participation.  He should have sold lift-and-strike to his European 
allies in 1993.  In 1995, when he ran out of new ways to stall, Clinton actually did persuade 
European leaders to follow a similar plan, and gave it credibility with the addition of US forces.71  
As noted, he sent Tony Lake to do the job Secretary of State Christopher could not, or would not, 
do. But prior to the atrocities of 1995, Clinton punted.  Instead of leading, he followed.  
However, once Senator Dole positioned himself as Clinton’s probable Republican opponent for 
the 1996 election, the president’s stance began to change.  The change could not come soon 
enough.   
On August 25, 1995, the Serbs launched another mortar attack on a Sarajevo 
marketplace, killing dozens of civilians.72 In response, NATO launched Operation Deliberate 
Force, which was a concerted air campaign attacking Serbian military positions.  Prior to this 
point, NATO intervention consisted of three years of satellite monitoring, securing a no-fly zone 
over Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight), and limited air strikes aimed at military targets, such as 
Serb ammunition depots.73 By the summer of 1995, the Serbs became especially adept at 
responding to the air attacks by threatening UN peacekeepers.  In May, Mladić took 350 
UNPROFOR troops hostage and held them as human shields in order to put a halt to any 
additional bombing of his artillery positions from which he launched mortar attacks and held 
Sarajevo, along with its airport, under siege.74 Out of frustration for this repeated, dangerous 




conduct a twelve-day air campaign accompanied by NATO ground forces.  These punitive 
actions severely weakened the Serbs, who were at this point also fighting against a united 
coalition of Croatians and Muslims.75   
On August 30th, “more than sixty aircraft, flying from bases in Italy and the aircraft 
carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in the Adriatic, pounded Bosnian Serb positions around 
Sarajevo…[with] French and British artillery joined in.”76 As the mission’s chief hawk, 
Madeleine Albright notes how the “psychological balance” of the conflict changed almost 
overnight.77 The Bosnian Serbs could no longer act without severe consequences. Operation 
Deliberate Force softened the earth for a ceasefire agreement.   
The man charged with the diplomatic challenge of bringing a close to the brutal war that 
left almost 300,000 dead was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard 
Holbrooke.  Holbrooke held a unique stake in the matter.  He visited Sarajevo for the first time as 
a nineteen-year-old in 1960, and in 1992, returned for the first time in over thirty years during 
the early stages of “ethnic cleansing” brought about by Bosnian Serbs.  During this second trip, 
Holbrooke witnessed the city he once saw as a “cosmopolitan combination of Muslim, Catholic, 
and Eastern Orthodox cultures,” even while under Soviet rule, condemned as a “desperate 
hellhole, under heavy mortar, artillery, and sniper attacks.”78 In the summer of 1995, when he 
was tapped to head negotiations towards a ceasefire between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croatians 
at war in Bosnia, he understood his task as a pragmatic yet imperfect one,79 with the 
multicultural existence of the past eviscerated by unimaginable evils.   
Holbrooke’s determination to bring an end to the violence increased dramatically when 
three of his American colleagues were killed during a diplomatic visit in August.  As part of a 




soldier, perished when their armored personnel carrier fell 400 yards off of a dangerous road into 
a ravine.80 Holbrooke briefly returned to the US to escort the bodies of his friends home, and 
then quickly resumed his work in their honor.   
Since the earliest days of the war, Holbrooke argued against the decision to turn the issue 
over to Europe and the UN instead of NATO.81 With NATO finally making progress in the 
region, and Serb losses on the ground, he felt he could achieve a settlement on an issue that 
consumed his attention for three years.  Yet, given the level of atrocities committed during the 
war, it was highly unlikely he would reach a ceasefire if demands for justice and territory made 
against the Serbs were met.82 He feared a Serb reprisal, because they remained indignant when 
presented with the atrocities they committed.   
After several meetings with representatives from the three ethnic groups within Bosnia, 
Holbrooke held a diplomatic conference in Dayton, Ohio, a neutral site in the US.  The 
conference included Alija Izetbegović, the president of the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman; and Milošević, who represented Karadžić’s Republika 
Srpska.  The November meetings produced a peace agreement officially signed by all parties in 
Paris in December 1995, which Clinton and his European allies welcomed. However, the Dayton 
Accords, as they came to be called, served as a tenuous ceasefire which essentially partitioned 
Bosnia, and transformed the man considered most responsible for the genocidal actions of the 
Bosnian Serb Army into a credible statesman.83 According to journalist Richard Sale, the Clinton 
Administration considered it vital that Milošević remain in power.  Clinton felt he needed some 
central Serb authority figure with whom to deal.  The president would come to regret this 





The most notable consequence of the Dayton Accords was the creation of two self-
governing entities within Bosnia:  the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation.  
The Serbs received forty-one percent of Bosnian land, with the Croat-Muslim Federation 
receiving a fifty-one percent majority.85 Each republic retained its own president, parliament, and 
army.  The agreement also created a US-led NATO operation to preserve the ceasefire.  As noted 
by Holbrooke, the broker of the peace settlement, “belatedly and reluctantly, the United States 
came to intervene and…brought the war in Bosnia to an end.”86 Also, the UN lifted the sanctions 
put upon the Yugoslav Federation (Serbia and Montenegro) when it followed through with 
elections one year after the agreement was signed.87 
In a speech on the Dayton Accords, given in November of 1995, Clinton announced the 
commitment of 20,000 US troops to preserve the shaky ceasefire agreement between the 
Muslims, Croatians, and Serbs of Bosnia.88 The settlement initially arranged in Dayton, and 
negotiated by Holbrooke, consisted of a commitment to peace and to the preserved unity of 
Bosnia as a single state.  Included in the Dayton Accords was a mandate to prosecute war 
criminals, which exposes its hollowness, as one of the signatories was Milošević himself.    
The words spoken by Clinton undoubtedly brought little comfort to victims of Serb atrocities, or 
the surviving family members of those slaughtered.  He stated: 
Implementing the agreement in Bosnia can end the terrible suffering of the 
people, the warfare, the mass executions, the ethnic cleansing, the campaigns of 
rape and terror.  Let us never forget a quarter of a million men, women, and 
children have been shelled, shot, and tortured to death.  Two million 
people…were forced from their homes and into a miserable life as refugees.  And 
these faceless numbers hide millions of real personal tragedies.  For each of the 
war’s victims was a mother or daughter, a father or son, a brother or sister.  Now 






The president was exactly right.  American leadership did bring about peace.  It did put a halt to 
the killing, to the rape, and to the systematic violence.  And American soldiers would, at least 
temporarily, protect that peace…now that the slaughter was over.  Clinton’s second Secretary of 
Defense, William Perry, openly criticized the president on his hesitant commitment to the pursuit 
of peace in Bosnia.  In his statement in favor of calling on NATO early on, Perry argued, “we 
should have been prepared to use or to threaten to use military force from the beginning.”90 
Under the terms of the Dayton Accords, NATO deployed an Implementation Force 
(IFOR) comprised of approximately 60,000 troops from member as well as non-member 
nations.91 As stated by Clinton, the US contributed 20,000 American soldiers.  US Admiral 
Leighton Smith, who served as head of the US Naval Forces in Europe as well as commander of 
the Allied Forces in Southern Europe, led the NATO occupation force.  The goal of IFOR was to 
preserve the ceasefire outlined at Dayton, and monitor the armies and weapons of all parties 
within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  IFOR also oversaw the safe transfer of 
territory and return of refugees.  After one year, in 1996, a NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
replaced IFOR, and the troop size was reduced.92 Under Admiral Smith, NATO expanded its role 
to included providing security for elections and assisting in the apprehension of war criminals.  
However, Smith took heavy criticism for the hands-off manner in which both the IFOR and 
SFOR troops engaged in peacekeeping, which many felt allowed too much freedom and 
opportunity for mischief by the Serbs.93   
 Holbrooke himself chastised one aspect of the Dayton Accords, which he determined to 
be “insufficiently aggressive.”94 The deficiency, according to the diplomat, was the failure to 
capture Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb political leader, or Ratko Mladić, who orchestrated 




Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide.  Karadžić was finally 
imprisoned and charged in 2008.  He was convicted in 2016 of committing war crimes and 
genocide.  He is currently serving a forty-year sentence.95 Mladić, too, evaded justice for almost 
sixteen years after the war.  Arrested in 2011, the man known as the “Butcher of Bosnia”96 began 
his trial in 2012, primarily for the incomprehensible actions he took during the 1995 massacres in 
Srebrenica.97 Milošević himself, who was essentially given immunity by the Dayton Accords, 
would not be arrested until 2001, after his second attempt at ethnic cleansing in Kosovo failed.  
The international community finally had enough when, as president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Milošević forced the removal of almost 800,000 Albanians from the autonomous 
province of Kosovo, and killed thousands more, including women and children.98 Unlike Bosnia, 
Clinton met Milošević’s actions in a more timely manner, perhaps due to the lessons the 
president learned during his first term.  The UN finally brought Milošević up on charges of war 
crimes leading back to the conflict with Croatia and his role in the Bosnian slaughter.  In 2006, 
he died of a heart attack while imprisoned at The Hague awaiting trial.99   
 One of the primary reasons for the improvements in this Eastern European region was the 
prolonged presence of US and NATO forces.  After Clinton removed the time limit for the 
departure of US troops,100 the American role in Bosnia would not end until December 2, 2004.  
For nine years, the NATO-led SFOR, consisting of over 500,000 members from 43 nations, 
including 90,000 Americans, delivered stability to the former Yugoslavia.101 This contingency 
brought back economic and political ties to Bosnia, and prevented the existence of “a Korea-like 
demilitarized zone between the Serbs and Muslims,”102 which many of Holbrooke’s critics 
feared.  Today, only a small force of Americans remain in Sarajevo at the Bosnian capital’s US-




 Some analysts refer to Clinton’s actions in 1995 as proof of his capability as a leader on 
foreign policy.  To his credit, he did announce the deployment of American troops and sent them 
into harm’s way on the eve of an election year, which could have cost him his re-election bid had 
the intervention gone sour.  However, according to Morton Abramowitz, a former State 
Department official and President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during the 
Clinton years, “It’s wrong to say something is a success when there was massive ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and two million people displaced.”103 Abramowitz contends that the intervention of 
NATO and the ensuing Dayton Accords merely “suspended the war for the election; it didn’t 
create a peace.”104 It is unclear just how much of a role the 1996 election drove Clinton’s sudden 
jump to action, but it is not out of line to suggest politics played a decisive role.  
Abramowitz’s harsh criticism over the possible politics of Clinton’s move on Bosnia does 
not stand alone.  But more objective assessments of the president’s actions, or rather, his 
reluctance to act in this particular case, emphasize his initial abandonment of a well-structured 
policy idea in “lift and strike” due to European and UN entrenchment.  The US president must 
persuade.  He or she must lead, especially in world affairs.  This reality also rings true when it 
comes to internal infighting within a presidential administration.  Advisors are present to advise.  
The president makes the ultimate decision.  Inexperience is one reason Clinton took as long as he 
did to understand the situation, challenge the UN and European allies, and make the right call.  
His focus on other issues, mostly domestic in nature, and his inattention to the continuing crisis 
in Bosnia is another.  The specter of Vietnam and Somalia also figured into his thinking.  
Clinton’s worries about damning US forces to an open-ended commitment in a country mired in 
civil war undoubtedly affected his judgement.  However, the president would not make the same 




though Clinton became more pragmatic and confident, and learned a valuable lesson from his 
delayed reaction to human tragedy.  Through his immediate deployment of NATO to once again 
stop Milošević, one can deduce that he finally understood how American capabilities to right the 
ship can be efficiently unleashed.  But the narrative of the president’s supposed evolution in 
foreign affairs becomes complicated when examining other national security issues that arose 
during his tenure.  Clinton’s absence of resolve with regards to direct attacks on US interests, and 
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Chapter 5.  RWANDA:  A GENOCIDE IGNORED 
During a visit to the Central African nation of Rwanda in 1998, President Bill Clinton 
addressed Rwandese government officials and survivors of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide with a 
somber admission: “We did not act quickly enough after the killing began.”1 In what is now 
regarded as one of the most chilling human rights disasters in modern history, the world and its 
foremost superpower refused to answer the door when decimation knocked.  In a span of three 
months, almost one million Rwandans lost their lives in a premeditated, gruesome act of 
genocide which stunned the global community.2 Nations with the greatest capacity to intervene, 
most notably the US, claimed ignorance as the reason for the vacancy of any attempts to impede 
the mass murder engulfing Rwanda either before or after its springtime start.3 But evidence of 
American knowledge and capability betrays this excuse, and illustrates what can occur without 
resolute US leadership on the international stage.   
 To understand what occurred during approximately one hundred bloodstained days in 
1994, one must first grasp the underlying divisions separating those who committed the 
barbarous acts from those on the receiving end.  Rwanda is located within Central Africa, 
bordered on the west by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Uganda to the 
north, Tanzania to the east, and Burundi to the south.  It is primarily comprised of two ethnic 
groups: the Hutu, who form the overwhelming majority, and the Tutsi, who before the genocide, 
accounted for about seventeen percent of the population.4 Prior to the colonial era, when 
European nations participated in the late nineteenth-century “Scramble for Africa,”5 and imperial 
ambitions overcame the sovereignty of many African nations and territories, the Hutu and Tutsi 
lived within a Tutsi-ruled kingdom.  The majority Hutu were agricultural, and worked the land, 




region of Rwanda, given its proximity to the Central African Great Lakes region, and adopted 
Hutu language and customs.6   
 The foundation of differences between the two groups relies heavily on economic factors 
rather than any variations in ethnicity or culture.  The Tutsi, who represented a minority of the 
population, raised cattle, which granted them a higher status in comparison to the Hutu, who 
were overwhelmingly farmers.7 As journalist Ryszard Kapuszinski explains, “The more cattle 
one had, the richer one was; the richer one was, the more power one had. The [Tutsi] king owned 
the most cattle, and his herds were under special protection.”8 For this reason, the Tutsi held onto 
a prominent position of wealth and privilege, regardless of their significantly smaller numbers.  
In a sense, the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi was reminiscent of Middle Ages 
feudalism, even though daily interaction and even intermarriage was commonplace.  The Tutsi 
landowners allowed the Hutu to work the land in exchange for security and food, thus placing 
the Tutsi into a position of superiority.9  
The elevated stature of the Tutsi continued once Rwanda and its southern neighbor, 
Burundi, fell under Belgian control in 1916.  Belgium gained the territory, which it held as a 
combined state, from Germany after its defeat in World War I.  Like Somalia, Ruanda-Burundi, 
as it was known, would later become a UN trust territory under continued Belgian authority.10 
Hutu resentment of Tutsi wealth and political power stewed as the Belgians treated the Tutsi 
with advantages denied to the lesser Hutu.  With a move that only worsened relations, the 
European colonizers demanded their subjects carry identification cards meant to distinguish the 
two groups, which labeled their carriers as either Tutsi or Hutu.11 While under colonial rule, the 
identification cards served the Tutsi quite well, but antagonized the Hutu. As a result, during the 




gain independence as two separate nations, the Hutu not only sought to assume greater influence 
within the new Rwandan state; they sought revenge.    
 Beginning in 1959, the Hutu initiated a brutal overthrow of Tutsi dominance, and gained 
control of the now sovereign nation of Rwanda.  Many Tutsis fled to surrounding states, like 
Uganda, which had its own problems with violence and chaos.12 Others were murdered.  Several 
subsequent Tutsi attempts to reclaim their authority were met with continued bloodshed.  In the 
years immediately following independence, the Hutu killed approximately 20,000 Tutsi and 
forced 300,000 out of their homes and into neighboring countries.13 After decades of Rwanda 
existing under sole Hutu control, Tutsi refugees in Uganda, many of them who were the children 
of those either killed or displaced during the cruel transition period, created the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) to take back their former lands by force.  Operating alongside its political 
arm, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi rebel military invaded Rwanda in October of 
1990.14 The RPA clashed with Hutu-led forces under Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, 
and a civil war commenced.   
 Habyarimana gained dictatorial power in Rwanda after he orchestrated a military coup in 
1973 and established the Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le 
Développement, or the National Republican Movement for Development and Democracy 
(MRND).  The MRND existed as the nation’s sole political party, and ruled largely from its hub 
of power located within the northwest region of Rwanda.  As the fight with the RPA intensified, 
two groups whose Hutu members would play significant roles during the upcoming genocide 
formed out of the MRND.  In 1992, Hutu hardliners within the MRND created a radical branch, 
known as the Coalition pour la Défense de la République, or the Coalition for the Defense of the 




which would come to be known as the much-feared Interahamwe.15 Both the CDR and 
Interahamwe were considered militia organizations, and their increasingly extremist members 
viewed any mercy displayed towards Tutsi invaders as acts of betrayal.   
But the minority Tutsi force was neither inept nor weak.  After years spent in Uganda, 
where the Tutsis lived in exile in the midst of civil unrest amongst the Ugandans themselves, 
guerrilla forces trained many RPA members.  The guerrillas prepared the Rwandan Tutsis to 
assist with a coup against their own Ugandan government in 1986.16 For this reason, the Tutsi, 
though smaller in size, gained significant ground in their fight against Habyarimana’s Rwandan 
Armed Forces (FAR) despite heavy losses.  In the minds of hopeful peace brokers within the 
international community, this advantage increased the possibilities of securing a ceasefire once 
exterior diplomatic forces intervened. 
While the bloody internal war raged on, many human rights workers, specifically from 
the International Red Cross and Human Rights Watch, consistently urged for outside 
intervention.  In 1993, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), along with France and the US, 
orchestrated the Arusha Accords, which ushered in a tenuous ceasefire.17 The Arusha Accords 
attempted to deliver a political solution not only to the immediate hostilities under way, but also 
to the centuries’ long resentment and division that fomented the outbreak of combat.  The 
document required its signatories to reaffirm “their unwavering determination to respect 
principles underlying the Rule of Law which include democracy, national unity, pluralism, [and] 
the respect of fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual.”18 To anyone with the slightest 
knowledge of history regarding the Hutu and Tutsi, this agreement, though officially certified by 
both parties, amounted to a fool’s errand.  Regardless, its intent was to put an end to the 




Signed on August 4, 1993 in Tanzania by representatives of both the RPF and the Hutu 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda, the most notable element it contained was an 
“Agreement on Power-Sharing,” which attempted to bring together the rivaling ethnic groups 
through political reconciliation.19  
While other political parties emerged during the three years leading up to the proposed 
ceasefire, the “power” up to this point remained firmly in Hutu hands.  Habyarimana opposed 
weakening his own executive authority in any form, but the leader explicitly rejected the 
recommendations for promoting Tutsis to positions of leadership within a Rwandan 
parliamentary system.  However, as a result of the military advances made by the Tutsi RPA 
forces, and intense international pressure, Habyarimana reluctantly signed and agreed to the 
proposal of shared power.20 He may have done so with his fingers crossed behind his back. 
In an effort to monitor the proposed peace and implementation of Arusha’s power sharing 
agreement, the UN passed Security Resolution 872, which demanded the urgent deployment of 
an “international neutral force in Rwanda.”21 The UN Security Council established the “United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” or UNAMIR, to provide an international military 
presence and oversee the process for an initial period of six months, with a proviso for an 
extension should the council’s review find it necessary.  The original UNAMIR mandate was to 
secure the capital city of Kigali; assist in humanitarian and relief operations; monitor the 
ceasefire; establish demilitarized zones and assist with the demobilization of armed forces within 
Rwanda; aid in the clearance of mines; and to prepare the warring parties as they each 
transitioned towards free elections.22 UNAMIR established an arms-free zone in Kigali on 
December 24, 1993, but those working in Rwanda towards a ceasefire had little faith in its 




was Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon, and many considered him to be far too friendly 
with Hutu government forces, who adamantly opposed the agreement.  
As noted in the introduction, the UN intervenes in a region under the rules of neutrality.  
It is expressly forbidden to take sides while in the role of peacekeeper, and therefore, it is also 
not allowed to militarily confront an aggressor without proper authorization via a mandate.  Self 
-defense, or working alongside a country’s official policing operation, are the only possible 
exceptions.  Unless the Security Council votes to enact Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the use of 
force to maintain peace equals action taken outside of the peacekeeping mandate.  To reiterate, 
under Chapter VII, Article 43:  All UN member nations “undertake to make available to the 
Security Council…armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary 
for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”23 In other words, the evocation 
of Chapter VII would allow UN peacekeepers to flex their military muscle in their efforts to 
promote security.  It is important to restate this legal exception, because it played an integral role 
in multinational discussions on intervention in Rwanda once the genocide began.  Once brutal 
forces within one party set out to exterminate members or even mere associates of another, 
UNAMIR’s position of neutrality came into question.  UNAMIR could not uphold its 
peacekeeping mandate on this particular mission if it remained in its non-aligned, pacifistic state.  
The arbiter of the “civil war” quickly became the only obstacle to one group’s systematic 
slaughter of another; due to UNAMIR’s confining rules of engagement, the word “obstacle” in 
this instance is an overstatement. 
To protect the fragile ceasefire outlined in the Arusha Accords, the UN chose Canadian 
Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire to lead the UNAMIR force, which included Bangladeshis, 




well-trained soldiers came from Belgium, which once held Rwanda as a colony.  Compared to 
the others, who were unarmed, shabbily dressed, and lacked basic military skills, the Belgians 
represented the UNAMIR force well.  However, their numbers were insignificant for the task at 
hand, even under the limited peacekeeping mandate.  Once on the ground in Africa, Dallaire, 
whose knowledge of Rwanda was especially narrow before his assignment, realized he was in 
over his head.   
When Dallaire landed in Rwanda in October of 1993, he immediately determined he was 
ill-equipped in terms of troops and supplies.  The UNAMIR force he led was insufficiently 
staffed to confront the realities on the ground.  Although the well-orchestrated genocide would 
not occur for months, Dallaire noticed many early signs of Arusha’s impotence.  Once debriefed 
by aid workers and Rwandans on the ground, he knew he needed more support.  As mentioned, 
UNAMIR’s mission involved overseeing the ceasefire, monitoring the political agreements of 
Arusha, and also, demilitarizing and demobilizing both the RPA and the FAR in order to prevent 
further bloodshed.25 The UN soldiers had to keep the region stable for the ceasefire and political 
agreement to work.  But reports of Hutu extremists, most notably the CRD and Interahamwe, 
stockpiling weapons, such as guns, grenades, and machetes, rushed in; as did evidence of their 
outright dismissal of the power-sharing arrangement with the despised Tutsi.  The disclosure of 
these suspicious actions caused great concern among those on the ground who felt Booh-Booh 
was “blinded by his ties to the President’s [Habyarimana] circle.”26     
Prior to both the Arusha Accords and Dallaire’s arrival, Human Rights Watch, led by its 
most accomplished champion in the region, Alison Des Forges, and in concert with 
representatives from eight countries, conducted the International Commission of Investigation to 




prevent further violence.27 Completed in March of 1993 at the urging of the executive director of 
the Rwanda Association for the Defense of Human Rights, Monique Mujawamariya, the 
commission found a multitude of atrocities committed by extremist Hutus.  The subsequent 
Arusha Accords attempted to halt these human rights violations, but the ceasefire arrangement 
was viewed unfavorably among the Hutu militia groups and thus mostly ignored.   
Even prior to the blatant nonobservance of Arusha, the international commission 
cautioned the UN of the likelihood of a potential genocide.28 Its warnings included evidence of 
public, racist denunciations of Tutsis; mass Tutsi gravesites; nighttime grenade attacks; an 
increase in non-governmental militias; death lists containing the names of Tutsi politicians and 
moderate Hutu; and the build-up of weapons, particularly machetes, within the capital city of 
Kigali.29 Armed with this information, and spurred to action by an unexpected discovery, 
Dallaire sent what is now regarded as the single most important document relating to the 
Rwandan massacre:  the “Genocide Fax.”30  
On January 11, 1994, Dallaire immediately cabled his superiors at the UN Headquarters 
in New York after speaking with a credible informant who worked as an intermediary between 
the MRND and the Interahamwe.  The double agent, now known as Jean-Pierre Abubakar 
Turatsinze,31 came from a half-Hutu, half-Tutsi family, as did so many other Rwandans.  
Turatsinze was able to work on both sides of the conflict, but found himself in a precarious 
position once he discovered the true intent of the Rwandan government’s more extreme allies, 
which he firmly believed was to kill all Tutsis.  With a Tutsi mother and wife, three children, and 
twins on the way, Turatsinze sought political asylum and protection for himself and his family in 
exchange for information.32 What he relayed to Dallaire was chilling, and compelled the UN 




proportions.  The memo, entitled “REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT,” 
vouched for Turatsinze’s credibility by listing his post as trainer of an Interahamwe militia, his 
former position as security detail for President Habyarimana, and his location within the 
Rwandan capital.33 Dallaire had to ensure his warnings held weight. 
Dallaire’s transmission detailed the Hutu extremists’ initial plans to assassinate all Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu political opponents.  He also informed the UN of the Hutu intent to murder 
Belgian UNAMIR troops in order to guarantee their full withdrawal from Rwanda.  Turatsinze 
had orders to register all Tutsi in Kigali for “extermination,” and asserted that his militia 
members could “murder 1000 Tutsis within twenty minutes.”34 Dallaire noted the informant’s 
promise to lead UNAMIR forces to the Interahamwe’s weapons cache in Kigali, which included 
grenades and AK-47s.  Aware of the magnitude of what he was hearing, the UNAMIR leader 
sought permission from the UN to raid the cache, and also safely evacuate Turatsinze and his 
family out of Rwanda.35 Dallaire realized the Hutu were in the process of conducting “an 
outright slaughter and elimination of the opposition.”36 He wanted to stop it. 
In his effort to signal the UN with regards to Hutu plans, the Canadian received support 
from an unlikely source in Booh-Booh.  Dallaire and Booh-Booh often clashed due to each 
man’s different interpretation of the developments in the region.  Booh-Booh felt his personal 
relationship with Habyarimana and the FAR aided the UN in securing a peace and ensuring the 
government’s commitment to Arusha.  Conversely, Rwandans, particularly Hutu, viewed 
Dallaire as far too sympathetic to the Tutsi, and Booh Booh agreed.  However, once Dallaire 
discovered the information provided by Turatsinze, Booh-Booh “vouched for the informant” and 
supported his military counterpart.37 Dallaire’s request for slightly extending UNAMIR’s 




reached the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).  Its head, Kofi Annan, who 
would become UN Secretary-General in 1997, refused Dallaire’s request due precisely to the 
commander’s move towards mission expansion.  Annan even directed Booh-Booh and Dallaire 
to discuss the matter with the MRND, who as mentioned, held deep connections with the more 
extremist Hutu elements in the Interahamwe and other radical groups.  Annan also denied 
protection to Turatisinze and his family.   
Armed with Dallaire’s dire warning, as well as numerous other similar notifications by 
UNAMIR and human rights organizations, Annan maintained his position until it was too late.  
The information provided by Dallaire was also transmitted to the American, French, Belgian, and 
Tanzanian ambassadors in Kigali, but to no effect.38 Turatisinze’s admission, along with several 
other reports of large Hutu rallies against the Tutsi and an increase in the knowledge of death 
lists and widespread killings, led to an outcry from humanitarian activists, diplomats, and UN 
workers on the ground.39 But the UN’s focus remained on securing a ceasefire and fostering 
healthier diplomatic relations; any calls to put a stop to the murderous rampages that signaled an 
even further, cataclysmic loss of life were ignored. 
One of the most adumbrated aspects of the “Genocide Fax” is Turatisinze’s belief that 
President Habyarimana “does not have full control over all elements of his old Party/ faction.”40 
Although Habyarimana did not entirely act in accordance with the Arusha Accords, and 
downplayed the document’s significance in private, he publicly agreed to them.  He signed them.  
To the dismay of many Hutu within Habyarimana’s Presidential Guard and other radical 
factions, the Arusha Accords served as the catalyst for UN intervention through UNAMIR.  As a 
result, many anti-Tutsi zealots within his own party, the MRND, and primarily the Interahamwe, 




Hutu and Tutsis afflicting Rwanda’s southern neighbor, Burundi.  In November of 1993, 
Burundian Tutsis assassinated the democratically-elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye, 
which caused a violent outbreak of anti-Tutsi attacks and a dramatic increase of Tutsi refugees 
fleeing into Rwanda.41 Dallaire noted this development as an additional cause for concern, as 
Hutu avengers in both states became even more emboldened. 
Before Dallaire’s arrival in Rwanda, the UNAMIR commander estimated his need for a 
force of at least 5,000 to effectively perform his duties.  With Americans already weary of UN 
peacekeeping due to the escalating situation in Somalia even prior to the Battle of Mogadishu, 
the Clinton Administration rejected this appeal from its position of power within the UN Security 
Council.  According to one US official, “Anytime you mentioned peacekeeping in Africa…the 
crucifix and garlic would come up on every door.”42 Reluctantly, the US agreed to half of 
Dallaire’s proposed troop numbers.  Dallaire had to settle for a UNAMIR force of 2,500 soldiers 
to uphold the Arusha Accords’ hollow directives and protect a non-existent ceasefire.   
For the first few months of 1994, warnings of genocide flooded the world’s foremost 
international body.  But Rwanda remained low on the list of priorities at the UN, which at the 
time, posted 70,000 peacekeepers on seventeen missions worldwide.43 Dallaire constantly fought 
with his superiors over inadequate equipment and a severe shortage of food and medicine.  
Annan’s DPKO, along with its rejection of UNAMIR’s arms raids, consistently pointed to the 
October 3 tragedy in Somalia to shut down any recourse regarding mandate expansion. Dallaire 
found himself powerless as he witnessed increases in political assassinations and blatant 
weapons procurement.  To add to this inadequacy, his full force of 2,500 did not arrive in total 
until April 1994, only days before the genocide began. UNAMIR’s mandate for the security of 




start.  Unfortunately, the multinational coalitions with the most influence, such as the UN and 
OAU, did not adequately respect the devolving situation.     
An incident that occurred in early April inspired the OAU and other African Heads of 
State, who later reviewed the genocide, to assert in 2000: “The rockets that brought down 
President Habyarimana’s plane on April 6, 1994, became the catalyst for one of the great 
calamities of our age.”44 While returning from a meeting in Tanzania regarding the declining 
status of Burundi and a possible strengthening of the Arusha Accords, the plane carrying 
Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntarymira of Burundi, both Hutu, was shot 
down in Rwandan air space.  Within an hour of this event, a combination of FAR and 
Interahamwe forces initiated the fastest and most organized slaughter of the twentieth century.45 
In the span of a few days, any individual seen as holding power or influence against the Hutu 
aggressors within Kigali, along with their families, lost their lives in a blur of brutality.  The 
Hutu forces set up roadblocks to prevent any attempts to escape, and handed out lists peppered 
with names of those to be eliminated. The perpetrators also utilized an extremist radio station, 
Radio Mille Collines, to out Hutu opponents, incite ethnic hatred, and inspire Hutu supporters to 
join them and “weed out the cockroaches.”46 What began in Kigali quickly spread throughout the 
country.  The plane crash signaled the official start to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. 
Prudence Bushnell, who worked as the Deputy Assistant at the State Department’s 
Bureau for African Affairs, remembers her reaction to the news of the plane crash with vivid 
detail.  Immediately upon being notified, she exclaimed, “Oh shit…Are you sure?”47 As one of 
the few Americans with any real appreciation for what faced the Rwandan people as a result of 
this event, Bushnell sent an urgent memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s office.  In 




deaths of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira and the consequences that lie ahead.  Bushnell warned 
top State Department officials of the Rwandan military’s disarmament of the mostly Belgian 
UNAMIR troops, who hurriedly rushed to the scene.  After taking away their arms, the FAR 
forces prevented the UNAMIR soldiers from inspecting the crash site.48 As an aside, the crash 
was almost certainly caused by elements within Habyarimana’s own presidential guard who shot 
it down.  It remains officially unsolved, though most observers, including the CIA, agree it was 
an inside job.  
Bushnell understood Habyarimana’s open seat of power would not only cause a 
succession crisis due to the absence of any political assembly (a National Assembly had yet to 
form under the Arusha Accords), but also, widespread atrocities.  She visited the region as late as 
March 1994, and registered “deep concern over the mounting violence in Rwanda,” as well as 
the “distribution of arms and arms caches.”49 In her memo, she mentioned that FAR forces 
informed Booh-Booh of their intention to temporarily take over.  Booh-Booh challenged this 
plan, and encouraged them to follow the “framework of the Arusha Accords.”50 But due to 
FAR’s resistance to working with the moderate interim Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana, 
this request was made in vain.  All of this information reached the highest levels of the State 
Department the night of the plane crash, and mere hours before the well-planned genocide 
became a reality. 
In a 2003 interview for PBS’s Frontline, Bushnell recalls learning of barricades being 
erected around the airport in Kigali on the evening of the crash.  Due to her familiarity with 
Rwanda and the Presidential Guard, she knew instantaneously that “civilians…were being 
rounded up and killed.”51 On previous visits to Rwanda, RPF members warned her of Hutu 




admits that due to the State Department’s focus on political reconciliation and its reliance on 
Arusha, she did not lend her full ear.  But as soon as the news hit her on April 6, the RPF’s 
emphatically-stated concerns rushed back.  They were right.  She describes receiving information 
within hours of the crash, and affirms the fact that “it [reports of murders] didn’t let up.”52 From 
the genocide’s starting point, Bushnell understood the bloodshed was not confined to political 
upheaval, and she communicated this fact to her superiors.  She knew that for the Hutu, it was 
not mere politics.  It was mass slaughter.  She states, “It just kept getting worse and worse and 
worse.”53 But she had to do her job.  Bushnell’s primary responsibility was to account for US 
personnel on the ground, and safely evacuate them.  She would later learn the horrors witnessed 
by her American colleagues, who each made it home unharmed, but forever scarred. 
Some of the more telling accounts of the ruthlessness of the genocide are included in 
Power’s detailed analysis.  In “A Problem From Hell,” Power describes the helplessness felt by 
American diplomats, and in particular, Joyce Leader, who was second in command under the US 
Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson.  Leader lived in a home owned by the US Embassy, and 
located next door to the moderate Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana.  Upon learning of 
Habyarimana’s fate on the night of April 6, Dallaire immediately informed an eerily calm group 
of Hutu FAR forces of the proposed line of succession under Arusha, which would make 
Uwilingiyimana the lawful head of state.  The men were indignant about their army assuming 
control, despite Dallaire’s admonitions.  Hours later, on the morning of April 7th, 
Uwilingiyimana called Leader in a panic, begging the American to hide her and her family.  
Leader describes her own mindset as one of complete shock.  Leader recounts, “She 
[Uwilingiyimana] was prime minister…I was just a lowly diplomat.”54 UNAMIR troops 




compound, but sporadic gunfire stalled this effort.  She eventually made it into another 
compound with her husband and children.  Shortly after, more shots were fired.  Leader heard 
the screams of Uwilingiyimana and her family.  She then heard silence.55  
In order to achieve free reign to carry out their well-organized mission, Hutu soldiers 
knew they had to drive the UN peacekeepers from the region.  One of the ways they succeeded 
in this endeavor was to murder ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers who were guarding 
Uwilingiyimana.  After the Belgians laid down their arms, the Hutu killed each of them, then 
mutilated their bodies.56 This action incensed the Belgian government and confirmed US 
attitudes on Rwanda as the equivalent to Somalia.  It echoed the soured, post-Mogadishu 
perspective American officials held regarding peacekeeping.  Almost immediately, Belgium sent 
additional troops, but only to safely remove any Belgian soldiers who remained in Kigali.  The 
strongest UNAMIR troops were gone.  Within one week, most other nations followed suit, and 
the UN revisited the question of continued intervention.  The murders of Uwilingiyimana and her 
family, the Belgian peacekeepers, and almost every other moderate politician in Rwanda 
signaled to Dallaire that his mission died along with them.57 
 Over the next few days, Dallaire witnessed horrors that confirmed the deaths were not 
just politically-motivated killings; it was the coordinated, intentional genocide he feared.  No 
Tutsi was off limits.  The same was true for any moderate Hutu.  Escape was not an option for 
most.  Ironically, the identification card system put in place during Belgium rule remained, and 
served as a bullseye for Tutsi who attempted to pass through a Hutu-guarded roadblock if he or 
she chose to flee.58 Additionally, since intermarriage was common among Rwandans, those Hutu 
with half-Tutsi, half-Hutu children either chose death, or witnessed the slaughter of their 




Those UNAMIR troops who remained did what they could to halt the killings, which 
were mostly carried out with machetes.  But their deficiency in numbers, lack of equipment, and 
most importantly, the neutrality mandate, tied their hands.  They witnessed hundreds of children 
chopped to pieces outside of a local church.  Bodies piled up in the streets, and choked the 
Kagera River, which the Hutu used as a dumping site.  Most Tutsis evacuated their homes and 
fled to places they believed would offer them refuge, such as churches, hospitals, or schools.  
Those who did so often put themselves in greater danger, as the Hutu targeted these areas.  
Large, centralized gatherings of Tutsi made their job easier.  Some of these locations existed 
under the watchful eye of Red Cross volunteers, human rights workers, or what was left of 
UNAMIR.  Though not always a deterrent, the presence of outsiders did protect some potential 
victims.  For this reason, a significant number of Tutsi in Kigali were alive at the end of April, 
which was more than enough time to mobilize international military intervention to put a stop to 
the genocide and save those who remained targets.  Even so, as reported by Human Rights 
Watch, survivor testimonies indicate that in only fourteen days, 250,000 Tutsi were killed.59 In 
many cases, the Hutu, especially the young, bloodthirsty Interahamwe, would stand outside of 
these supposed safe zones, and wait.  Some of the aid workers, and peacekeepers in particular, 
often had multiple locations to monitor.  As soon as these foreign observers left a certain “safe” 
site to offer their services to another, the Hutu would move in and implement their savage 
agenda.  When the workers would return, they were greeted by the mangled corpses of the 
people they were desperately trying to protect.  
 For most of these peacekeepers and humanitarians, the men, women, and children 
mercilessly slaughtered by the Hutu were their friends and co-workers.  Bushnell painfully 




employees who were ordered to evacuate by the Secretaries of State and Defense, under the 
direction of President Clinton, just one day into the genocide.  Bushnell knew her main objective 
was to get her people out of harm’s way, but it also meant abandoning those Rwandans who 
worked beside them in the interests of peace.  Rawson himself had to leave behind almost 300 
Rwandans who gathered at his home seeking refuge.60 The diplomats did not even have the 
capacity to save members of their own staff.  Power tells of Rawson’s chief steward, who begged 
the US ambassador to come to his home and save him during the first wave of killings.  Rawson 
was trapped in his own residence, and could not aid his friend in any way.  Rawson’s steward 
and his wife were among those murdered.61   
It took about one week to successfully evacuate all Americans, including the ambassador.  
The embassy closed, and the American flag was lowered.  Bushnell notes of concern for their 
“Rwanda team,”62 and the certainty among the evacuated Americans of the fate awaiting their 
African colleagues in their absence.  She and others in the Bureau for African Affairs knew the 
Rwandans had gathered in places they sincerely believed would be protected.  But the cavalry 
was not on its way.  They, unfortunately, knew what was about to occur.  Bushnell notes: 
I mean, it really would be abandoning people.  It’s one thing to say, ‘OK, well, 
we’ll hope for the best.’ It’s another thing to know that thousands are gathered in 
one locale and to say, ‘Bye, you know, good luck,’ and leave them to the 
slaughter.  [That] was repulsive.63 
 
Following the successful evacuation of all Americans in Kigali, the genocide quickly fanned out.  
Due to the concentration of large numbers of Rwandans in the capital city, most of the killings 
took place during the month of April.  But these numbers were not known to the international 
community at the time.  For all it new, a chance remained for organizations such as the UN to 
increase support and save lives.  The exact number of those who could be protected may have 




its fellow UN member nations had ample opportunity to confront the brutality taking place.  
From the few resources left on the ground in Rwanda, Dallaire included, UN and US officials 
received regular updates on the expansion of the murders, both in size and scope.64 The decision 
against active and forceful intervention was made within the first week after Habyarimana’s 
death.  For the US, it was essentially made on October 3, 1993 in the streets of Mogadishu.  
Rwanda was condemned to its fate.  The actual number of those killed is estimated at 800,000, 
but the true total will never be known.65 
 In his 1998 speech in Rwanda, Clinton claimed he was not fully aware of the genocide 
consuming the African nation at the time it reached its highest levels.  He ultimately blamed the 
American decision against intervention on ignorance.  Clinton attempted to justify his inaction 
by asserting: 
It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of 
your family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, 
day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with 
which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”66   
 
The release of classified documents obtained by the National Security Archive at The George 
Washington University as a result of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request challenge 
Clinton’s move to evade responsibility.  William Ferroggiaro, the Director of the Freedom of 
Information Project, compiled these materials into a report, which includes a multitude of 
evidence to counter Clinton’s pretense of unawareness.  Although the report lacks many 
materials which remain classified, particularly those of the CIA, it contains substantial 
documentation to uphold its summarized view that Clinton’s decision against intervention was 
not based on a lack of knowledge as to what was happening in Rwanda.  It was a risk-adverse 





 The Bushnell Memo is part of this report.  The collection largely consists of 
memorandums circulated within the State Department, the UN, intelligence agencies, and the 
Department of Defense.  One significant finding comes from the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR), which acts as the State Department’s intelligence arm.  It produces the 
Secretary’s Morning Summary (SMS), which is the equivalent of the CIA’s Presidential Daily 
Briefing (PDB), but for the Secretary of State.  The most notable SMS briefings are from April 
12 and April 26.  On April 12, INR analysts warned against pulling the UNAMIR mission, 
stating it “could lead to a bloodbath involving the civilians UNAMIR is protecting.”67 On April 
26, the SMS included that the INR “foresaw in Rwanda ‘genocide and partition’,” and noted “at 
least 100,000 Rwandans have been killed.”68  It also cautioned “the toll could be 500,000,” with 
an added, ominous comment: “the butchery shows no sign of ending.”69 The use of the word 
“genocide” here is notable. 
 Similar to the SMS, the CIA provides a highly-classified intelligence report to hundreds 
of policymakers within the US government.  This National Intelligence Daily (NID) is presented 
in newspaper format, and distributed six days per week.70 Since the NID often includes much of 
the information contained in the PDB, Ferroggiaro states that the release of some NID documents 
provides evidence similar to that which would be found in the classified PDBs.  If anything, the 
PDBs contain greater detail about certain events and threats, so the NIDs released by the CIA 
prove the president received daily updates on Rwanda.  Of note in this analysis are two NIDs 
from April warning of the escalating situation.  On April 7, the morning after the plane crash, 
CIA analysts predicted the resumption of civil war and the probability of Rwandan military 




“in an effort to stop the genocide, which relief workers say is spreading south.”71 Again, the use 
of the word “genocide” is important.   
Documents within Ferroggiaro’s report also show the administration and officials 
throughout various levels of the US government knew the plane was shot down by the Rwandan 
Presidential Guard, and understood the implications of the power vacuum.  For months leading 
up to the crash, and after, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted extremist 
communications via what it deemed “hate radio.”72 The NSA provided real-time information to 
policymakers, and warned of the calls for genocide coming from Rwandan broadcast radio 
sources, such as Radio Mille Collines.   
The UN also received an influx of reports noting the killing of civilians and affirmations 
of early categorizations of genocide.  In a briefing memo to the Security Council on April 20, a 
Nigerian representative shamed the international body regarding the preferential status given to 
the situation in Bosnia.  Although reprehensible, the ethnic cleansing taking place in the former 
Yugoslavia was only about one third the size of what would occur in Rwanda, and the genocide 
in Rwanda took place prior to the Summer 1995 Srebrenica and Markale Market Massacres.  The 
representative declared, “Nigeria cannot understand how the West could contemplate reinforcing 
UNPROFOR [UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia] and withdrawing UNAMIR at the same 
time.”73 On April 10, Dallaire requested troop reinforcements.  He wanted to double the 
UNAMIR force to match his initial estimate of the 5,000 needed for the mission.  He desperately 
needed vehicles and fuel, ammunition, and communications equipment as well.  Dallaire did not 
even have sufficient rations of food or clean water.74 While he dictated his demands to UN 
officials, it was the US who ultimately controlled their response.  The UN Security Council 




300.75  Although the UN troop drawdown officially left a force of 270, 503 stayed under 
Dallaire’s command.  Dallaire later wrote of this defeat: 
My force was standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by guttural 
moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with 
their wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies…I found 
myself walking through villages where the only sign of life was a goat, or a 
chicken, or a songbird, as all the people were dead, their bodies being eaten by 
voracious packs of wild dogs.76 
 
Ironically, it was Madeleine Albright, the Jewish child of Czechoslovakian parents and a refugee 
herself during WWII, who carried Clinton’s water at the UN and resisted all attempts to gain US 
support.  As the American representative at the UN, Albright blocked most efforts to rebuild the 
UNAMIR force, or even to adequately equip it once an affirmative decision was made to 
intervene.  Albright presents her role as one of following orders.  However, she also notes how in 
her duties as US Ambassador to the UN, she “became increasingly convinced we were on the 
wrong side of the issue.”77 Albright recalls how during the early days of the genocide, she had 
already cooled to the idea of UN peacekeeping in Africa.  Somalia’s legacy tainted all American 
decisions on Rwanda.  She did not see any practical way for the UN to restore order, and 
describes the weeks wasted on a new plan as the product of infighting among UN member 
nations and the OAU, who was asked to send troops.78    
 Albright was not considered someone who held her tongue.  During council discussions, 
a report by Doctors Without Borders, a non-profit medical relief group working in Rwanda, 
revealed that Hutu extremists killed an entire hospital staff and returned the following day to kill 
any remaining patients.79 In an astonishing and unlucky coincidence that generated bad optics, 
the genocide occurred during the Rwandan UN Ambassador’s two-year term as a rotating 
member of the Security Council.  Albright asked the Rwandan government representative to 




sanctioned answer that it was the Tutsis who were unwilling to participate in peace talks and 
implement the Arusha Accords.  Albright records her level of disgust that the Rwandan kept his 
seat on the council despite the government-sanctioned violence he represented.80 But it was not 
enough for her to try to convince Clinton or anyone else in the administration to take corrective 
action.  Like most other members of the administration during the genocide, Albright only 
expresses regret.   
In response to the UNAMIR drawdown of troops, Africa specialists from state begged, 
“the [remaining UNAMIR] force is protecting 12,000 refugees in Kigali.  We should not 
advocate…abandoning these people.”81 An April 21 letter from Rwandan human rights activist 
Monique Mujawamariya sent directly to Clinton echoed these cries.  Mujawamariya, who was 
initially thought to have died in the early days of the genocide, demanded the president act 
against what she called “a campaign [of]…genocide against the Tutsis.”82 As a prior guest of 
Clinton’s at the White House only months earlier, she felt she could get through to him.  
According to Des Forges, Clinton was aware of Mujawamirya’s perilous position, and relieved 
when he found out she survived.  But he did not heed her call to abide by the “moral and legal 
treaty obligation to ‘suppress and prevent’ genocide.”83 The “legal” part of Mujawamirya’s letter 
undoubtedly refers to the 1948 Genocide Convention.   
In his examination into “naming the crime” during the 1994 genocide, Eric Heinze, who 
specializes in political science and international studies, argues “conventional wisdom now holds 
that Clinton Administration officials avoided using the ‘g word’ for fear that using it would have 
obliged them to take action under the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention.”84 US officials 
did not use the word genocide until May 21, 1994.  Even then, they made sure to define what 




authoritatively documents the hesitancy by American officials to accurately describe events on 
the ground in Rwanda as deliberate.  Disagreement within the UN about the use of the word 
plagued the organization, and the US delegation led the fight against it.  When Boutros Boutros-
Ghali drew up a statement referring to the situation in Rwanda as “genocide,” the Americans 
shot it down.86 At issue was not only the administration’s fear of public reaction should the US 
intervene in Rwanda, but also fear of public reaction for failing to intervene in what was the 
clearest case of genocide since the Holocaust [emphasis added].87 Although becoming a party to 
the Genocide Convention, which the US finally did in 1988, does not require a nation to commit 
military forces in the case of genocide, defining an event as genocide would dramatically 
increase both foreign and domestic pressure to stop it.  In Heinze’s words, “Since naming the 
crime would have pressured the United States to do just this, the crime was not named.”88   
 The US also argued against changing the UNAMIR mandate to a Chapter VII, which 
would allow it to use force against the Hutu aggressors.89 The US denied requests to jam radio 
signals so as to halt extremist, racist calls for genocide.  The US rejected calls for greater 
resources and a new, “beefed up force (UNAMIR II).”90 After weeks of stalling, the Americans, 
led by Albright, finally agreed to a version of Dallaire’s request using mostly African troops, but 
few of the continent’s nations supplied them.  Then came more US equivocation.  Towards the 
end of May, with the majority of the genocide carried out, further arguments over equipment, 
which was to be procured by the Americans, as well as who was to pay for the logistical support 
of the revised mission, dragged on.  This shuffling resulted in tens of thousands more dead.  The 
French launched an operation on June 23, and it saved some lives.  But it would not be until the 




genocide would finally end.  Not one additional UN troop arrived in Rwanda between the 
beginning of the genocide and the finality of it.   
Given this information, the question to ask is whether or not the Clinton Administration 
should have undertaken the task and deployed forces to Rwanda, or even used its position on the 
UN Security Council to propel the international body into resolute action.  As noted by William 
Hyland, Clinton’s stated proposals for post-Cold War US involvement on the international stage 
introduced a heavy focus on humanitarian missions and the advancement of human rights.  Most 
of Clinton’s national security advisors viewed the adherence to moral principles as a means to 
bolster American interests both overseas at home.91 Though commendable in its goals, the 
Clinton team’s foreign policy rhetoric could not keep up with global instability.  An ongoing 
dilemma which continues to confront and divide Americans is found within this historical chasm 
between intent and implementation.  Do the costs of acting as the world’s policing power 
outweigh the benefits derived from fighting oppression and protecting vulnerable societies 
wherever the need arises?  After just one test in Somalia, the once idealistic Clinton 
Administration answered in the affirmative.  It could not afford Rwanda.       
It is no question that the US military had the capability to intervene and stop the genocide 
either before its start or within the first few days of its progression.  However, as pointed out by 
Bushnell, the Pentagon fought against her requests for support, largely due to the Clinton 
Administration’s preference for intervention elsewhere.  The removal of a democratically-elected 
president by a military junta in Haiti, which created a massive refugee problem in the US, won 
Clinton’s attention, which he did not share even amid the escalating murder rate in Rwanda.  
Acting under this authority, the Pentagon repeatedly informed Bushnell of its inability to commit 




introduction of any US military presence in Rwanda for the purposes of stopping the genocide 
would divert too many assets away from Clinton’s chosen mission in Haiti.  According to 
Democratic Congressman Alcee Hastings of Florida, the Haitian focus took over based on 
“megashocks of refugee influx.”93 He suggested that his own complacency towards Rwanda, 
which was shared by most in Congress, rested on the idea that “Africa seems so far away, and 
there is no vital interest that my constituency sees.”94 Absent congressional or public support, 
and amid the simultaneous challenge presented by Haiti, Clinton chose not to act. To provide 
even further context, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia overshadowed reports coming in from 
Central Africa.  Thus, the ideas founded in the administration’s proposals for democratic 
enlargement and aggressive multilateralism, which largely rested on a broad latitude given to the 
president in his choices of when and where to respond to foreign conflict, proved damning for 
Rwanda. 
In his comprehensive analysis of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Alan Kuperman of the 
Lyndon B. Johnson School for Public Affairs at the University of Texas argues against critics of 
the Clinton Administration, who maintain the president could have acted in Rwanda to stop the 
killing, but chose not to.  However, Kuperman contradicts his own case by stating it is both 
realistic and in the nation’s interest that “an exception…be made for cases of genocide, 
especially where intervention can succeed at low cost.”95 Although Kuperman effectively 
outlines the options presented to Clinton, as well as the progression of alternatives to the 
president’s adherence to noninterference, his defense of US policy in Rwanda hinders on 
impersonal statistics.  Kuperman concedes that if Clinton made a firm decision in favor of 
intervention in Rwanda: 
Advance units…could have begun operations much sooner.  Approximately four 




parachuted in and seized [the] Kigali airport…[and] Follow-on troops could have 
expanded outward from the airfield to establish a secure operating base.  Within 
about two weeks, sufficient troops and equipment could have arrived to halt the 
fighting, form a buffer between FAR and the RPF in Kigali and northwest in 
Rwanda, and fully police the capital.96 
 
Also notable is the fact that within forty-eight hours, almost 3,000 troops from multiple countries 
landed in Rwanda.  The US had also stationed 200 US Marines close to the Rwandan border with 
Burundi.  But the purpose of each of these forces was to safely evacuate their own foreign 
nationals.     
Many experts on the Rwandan Genocide contend the mere presence of Western forces 
with a changed mandate would have served as enough of a deterrent to stall the actions of the 
Hutu extremists in the capital.  Kuperman challenges this point by assuming this strategy may 
have actually encouraged the killers to expedite their mission.  But what is most disconcerting 
about his article resides in its insistence that due to the genocide’s rapid progression, “such an 
intervention would have saved about 275,000 Tutsi, instead of the 150,000 who actually 
survived.”97 So, according to Kuperman, the 125,000 who may have stood a chance did not 
warrant the risk involved with deploying well-armed American soldiers, or UN reinforcements, 
against mostly machete-wielding militia members.    
This analysis of Kuperman’s well-researched work does not intend to criticize its findings 
as unfeeling.  Foreign policy decisions, particularly those which must account for sending US 
troops into harm’s way, are often made with a healthy dose of dispassion due to the enormity of 
losing just one American life.  But even without direct US military intervention, American 
diplomatic and economic power would have made a solid impact.  Instead, US entrenchment and 
stalling efforts in the UN allowed the gruesome process to march on unimpeded.  The genocide 




throughout the countryside and finally reclaimed Kigali.98 Only then did the Clinton 
Administration outstretch its hand.   
As described by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson, instead of using 
American military prowess to stop the mass murder of women and children, Clinton agreed to 
deploy troops to deliver more UN peacekeepers, medical personnel, and supplies to support 
refugees under a new UN mandate, issued after the majority of the killings occurred.99 Patterson, 
a lifelong soldier, decries how in the wake of Somalia, the administration made it very clear that 
the American involvement in Rwanda was “humanitarian support” and not “peacekeeping.”100  
He documents the dispatch of 2300 US troops, but also notes their removal within two months.  
Patterson criticizes this use of American military might as providing nothing in terms of 
significant achievement: “Nothing to stop the genocide, nothing really to justify our involvement 
at all…we never had the resolve.”101 David Scheffer, who served as Ambassador Albright’s 
senior advisor and counsel during Clinton’s first term, further documents his disappointment in 
the American response to Rwanda.  He notes that a dedication to humanitarian intervention, 
particularly when it reaches the level of ethnic cleansing or genocide, requires that “policy-
makers have the political will to act on the imperative of human survival.”102  
In 1998, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) commissioned a panel comprised of 
multiple African heads of state to uncover the reasons for the genocide and the role other nations 
and international organizations played in its progression.  Known as the International Panel of 
Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 
the group’s goal was to “establish the facts about how such a grievous crime was conceived, 
planned, and executed; to look at the failure to enforce the Genocide Convention in Rwanda…; 




any possible recurrence of such a crime.”103 The OAU delivered its report in July of 2000.  
While its findings on the causes of the horrific brutality are presented with a strong anti-Western 
tone, its documentation of the UN’s deficient response, and the apathy of other nations with the 
power to stop the killings, finds credibility in reports of what outside forces knew and when they 
knew it.   
Even though the report lays heavy emphasis on European, and in the case of Rwanda, 
Belgium colonialism, and its stoking of already tense internal divisions between the Hutu and 
Tutsi, the panel agreed: “It is of course true that there would have been no genocide had a small 
group among Rwandan governing elite not deliberately incited the country’s Hutu majority 
against the Tutsi minority.”104 Therefore, the damning critique of the UN and outside nations lies 
more in the years prior to the genocide.  Before, during, and after the killings, moves could have 
been made. But, according to the OAU, “this terrible conspiracy only succeeded because certain 
actors external to Rwanda allowed it to go ahead.”105 The OAU findings reveal a strong bias 
against Western powers and the authority they hold at the UN.  But African nations themselves 
did little to address the problem in Rwanda.  This fact, however, does not diminish the 
responsibility held by the US, and especially the president, when a crisis of this magnitude is 
allowed to proceed unimpeded.  American leadership is required to bring along the rest of the 
world, whether it is in Europe, the Middle East, or Africa.   
Holly Burkhalter from the International Justice System (IJS), who once served as the 
Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, blames a “lack of leadership”106 within the 
Clinton Administration for its slow response.  In her examination of the Rwandan Genocide and 
the president’s response to it, Burkhalter makes the oft-repeated and validated suggestion of 




slowing the rampage.  She emphatically states that the “loss of American servicemen in 
Somalia” led directly to a “distrust of peacekeeping in Africa;”107 not only in The White House, 
but particularly in the Pentagon.  As emphasized throughout this work, military officials 
operating under the Clinton Administration suffered from an unwillingness to commit troops to 
missions containing murky, if not completely absent, objectives.  Insufficient logistical support 
often accompanied any suggestions by civilian leaders as to the possible use of US forces.  
Bosnia serves as a concrete case, as does Somalia.  But Rwanda solidifies the pattern.  Even with 
all of the rhetoric aimed at an “internationalist vision,” combining the “use of force” with a 
“reliance on multinational institutions,”108 Clinton’s growing distaste for the pressures of 
committing American lives to endeavors determined by a stretched and inefficient UN served as 
a powerful deterrent.  In the minds of the once-idealistic Clinton team, humanitarian intervention 
and multilateral peacekeeping each lost its status as a moral imperative.  
Albright also points to Somalia as the major obstacle to any effective action taken by the 
US.  She regrets the manner by which American leaders, herself included, viewed Somalia and 
Rwanda as too similar in nature for another expanded peacekeeping venture.  But she cautions, 
“Somalia was something close to anarchy.  Rwanda was planned mass murder.  Somalia 
counseled caution; Rwanda demanded action.”109 Sadly, the Clinton Administration did not have 
the patience, nor the foresight, to lead the international community.  Albright asserts that a US-
led coalition of multinational troops under firm orders to stop killings, arrest leaders, and 
establish security could have been deployed quickly.  She regrets not advocating for this solution 
at a time when she held such an influential position with regards to international authority. 
Likewise, Bushnell points to the UN peacekeeping failure in Somalia as the primary 




forces, “we didn’t want to put money in something that was not going to be a success, both 
politically for President Clinton, and for the United States and the U.N. as a whole.”110 Clinton 
somewhat concedes this point in his autobiography.  In his own telling of the event, which is 
somewhat self-serving, Clinton expresses pride in how quickly his State Department was able to 
evacuate all Americans on the ground in Rwanda unharmed.  But he also admits:   
We were so preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six 
months old, and with opposition in Congress to military deployments in faraway 
places not vital to our national interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign 
policy team adequately focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter.  The 
failure to try to stop Rwanda’s tragedies became one of the greatest regrets of my 
presidency.111  
 
Possibly out of an attempt to gain forgiveness, Clinton mentions the Africa Crisis Response 
Initiative put forth by his administration to better prepare Africans to stop wars and prevent other 
Rwandas. He also points to his post-presidency creation of the Clinton Foundation, and its work 
to reduce the AIDS epidemic in Africa, and Rwanda in particular.  These moves, although noble 
in effort, do little to assuage a collective American guilt over the nation’s failure to lead, or even 
act, during the most significant case of systematic, deliberate mass murder since the Second 
World War. 
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Chapter 6.  WHY HAITI? 
 
“Here we go again,” remarked one of Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson’s 
captains at the Travis Air Force Base operations room in California.1 While Patterson’s squadron 
watched CNN’s coverage of their next mission, a staff sergeant echoed, “I can’t believe the 
president is putting us into Haiti…and for what?”2 Within days, Patterson and his team would fly 
to the small Caribbean island with reinforcements, equipment, and vehicles to support a 
disproportionally large invasion force.  For many members of the military, the rapid increase in 
peacekeeping deployments since 1992, along with a decrease in troop strength and above all, 
mission clarity, grew tiresome.  On September 15, 1994, President Clinton announced his intent 
to utilize American military forces to oust a violent military junta that deposed the 
democratically-elected president of Haiti in a 1991 coup d'état.  With a posture of securing 
national interests, and again working under the auspices of the UN, Clinton emphasized the 
country’s responsibility to act “when brutality occurs close to our shores.”3 But for many outside 
of the administration, including those tasked with carrying out the assignment, the timing of the 
event seemed suspicious.  With the violence in the Balkans still raging, and in the aftermath of 
UN peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda, it appeared to them as though Clinton was in 
dire need of a foreign policy success.  With mid-term congressional elections looming, the 
president publicly issued the orders as the last of the US soldiers stationed in Africa reached 
American soil.       
On September 19, 1994, the Multinational Force for Haiti (MFH), led by the American 
military and consisting of 20,000 US troops, headed towards Haiti as part of a multilateral 
mission to restore deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power.4 Under the code name 




to solidify the democratic process in Haiti.  The problems with this objective were plenty.  First, 
and foremost, democracy in Haiti remained elusive despite the 1991 elections, as did the 
peaceful internal means to protect it should Aristide regain his position of leadership.  Second, 
the UN-approved mission essentially called for some form of nation-building in order to secure 
democratically-elected leaders in Haiti, which the US was not prepared to undertake.  The US 
again found itself heavily involved in yet another UN peacekeeping mission with vague, 
idealistic objectives.  But this time, the UN immediately triggered its Chapter VII mandate 
sanctioning the use of force, with the US military designated to coordinate and lead the military 
action.  Just days after many of the soldiers who served in Somalia and Rwanda arrived home, 
they were again venturing off to an unstable, violent region under the premise of securing 
political reconciliation between two warring factions.  Historically speaking, their presence 
would do little to solve the problems facing the Haitians, whose past woes with regards to 
democratic representation, political corruption, and brutal rebellion were numerous.  The 
president’s promise to keep the action “limited and specific,” with an emphatic caveat that 
American soldiers “will not be involved in rebuilding Haiti or it is economy,”5 left many cynics 
questioning the true motives behind the overwhelming force headed towards Haitian shores. 
 This intervention in Haiti would not be the first for the US.  Since it became the world’s 
first “black” republic after winning its independence in 1804, democracy had unfortunately 
evaded Haiti.  Prior to 1991, the country existed under a succession of exploitative, murderous 
dictators, who condemned the nation to poverty, famine, persistent violence, and overall societal 
disorder for almost two centuries.6 When Haiti won its independence from the French, it was 
saddled with a “badly damaged plantation system, a powerful political class composed of former 




thousand former slaves.”7 These innate problems persisted over the course of almost two-
hundred years, mainly due to a constant flux of political instability and economic strife.   
Despite these failures of leadership, Haiti often served as a psychological threat to 
Americans, due to their own shameful history with regards to race.  During the antebellum years 
in the US, slaveholding states feared the impact the successful Haitian Revolution could have on 
American slaves.  The success of freed black Toussaint L’ouverture, the initial leader of the 
rebellion for Haitian independence, relied heavily upon a foundation comprised of the American 
revolutionary ideals of individual liberty, self-governance, and the inherent equality of all men.  
However, L’ouoverture and his followers also drew from the more radical concepts born out of 
the French Revolution, which left many Americans worried that reports on the victorious 
uprising may reach those who they themselves still held in chains.  Even after the Civil War, 
with American slaves technically liberated, widespread discrimination and inhumane treatment, 
along with racist societal and state-sponsored codes of behavior, severely hindered the 
advancements of newly freed blacks in the US.   
At the turn of the twentieth century, when Progressivism began to take hold, a more 
paternalistic and scientifically-motivated view of relations between whites and blacks emerged.  
Social Darwinism, scientific racism, biological determinism, and Rudyard Kipling’s The White 
Man’s Burden all contributed to cultural attitudes regarding “liberal interventionism”8 in foreign 
policy in the early 1900s.  These condescending concepts are widely apparent when analyzing 
the first American occupation of Haiti under Progressive President Woodrow Wilson. 
 Despite American westward expansion under the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, which 
defined “Anglo-Saxons as superior…[and] gave members of the dominant culture in the United 




themselves as anti-colonialists.  Most saw the nation as unique to its European counterparts for 
its stated rejection of empire, and justified western continental settlement using religious terms, 
often referencing an American divine decree.  Though some exploits challenge the anti-
colonialist narrative, such as the US occupation of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and for 
some, westward continental expansion itself, Americans rationalized their anti-imperialist claims 
by concentrating on economic investment, as opposed to military conquest, to exert influence in 
foreign nations, most of which were in close proximity to the US.   
Rooted in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which stressed that further European 
intervention in the Western Hemisphere would be met with US force, Americans saw their 
foreign policy as one which protected the nineteenth-century independence movements in Latin 
America from their mostly Spanish and Portuguese occupiers.  In the early twentieth century, 
Theodore Roosevelt expanded on the Monroe Doctrine through his Roosevelt Corollary, which 
designated the US as the sole mediator in disputes between Central/ South American countries 
and European powers, often involving the payments of international debts.  The purpose for the 
policy enhancement was to strengthen America’s global position and stave off European 
attempts to intervene in cases of Latin American misbehavior.  Many historians view the 
Roosevelt Corollary as a means to further solidify America’s leadership role in the Western 
Hemisphere, as it compelled the nation to act, militarily if necessary, within countries under its 
influence to prevent outside European meddling.  It is with these developments fresh in mind that 
Wilson invaded Haiti in 1915. 
 The official catalyst for Wilson’s decision to intervene was the assassination of Haitian 
President Jean Sam.  Sam was the sixth president in just four years, and along with most of his 




Haitian insurrection, along with the advent of World War I, as the overarching reasons for the 
deployment of US Marines to the tiny island of Hispaniola.  Others point to imperialist 
ambitions, based largely on patriarchal cultural assumptions, as well as financial motives.  With 
regards to WWI, which broke out in 1914, the fear of German influence on Hispaniola, the island 
home of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, was a persuasive argument for US intervention.  
This line of reasoning pushed forth the possibility of German occupation as a threat to American 
interests in Haiti, as well as a danger to Americans at home due to the country’s location.11 
Clinton would echo similar concerns in 1994, as he sold the political and social instability in 
neighboring Haiti as a direct menace to American national security interests.   
 US military forces that were deployed to Haiti in 1915 checked some of the chaos 
engulfing the country.  The US remained in Haiti for eighteen years, until Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt withdrew the last of the Marines in 1934.  During the time of US occupation, “a series 
of puppet presidents” were put into place by the Americans, so Haitians showed little interest in 
their own political affairs.12 Their apathy undoubtedly strengthened some of the more 
patronizing viewpoints put forth by those, like Wilson, who felt the Haitian people needed 
American guidance and leadership, backed by a strong US military presence.  According to 
Jeffrey Sommers, a specialist on international political economies, developmental states, and 
hegemonic transitions, Wilson reconciled his actions in Haiti with the stated claim of anti-
imperialism as a “US ethos,” and presented America as “a nation whose existence rested on 
ethical and moral values from its democratic form of government.”13 Sommers’ assessment of 
Wilson’s expansionist endeavor sees its reflection in the subsequent policy of democratic 
enlargement put forth by the Clinton national security team.  For this reason, as well as Wilson’s 




Anthony Lake, Warren Christopher, and Madeleine Albright in 1993 is often described as 
Wilsonian in its foundation.  Like Wilson eventually did in 1917, when he committed US troops 
to the war in Europe, Clinton often had to eschew idealism when confronted with the realities of 
international crises.  
The US never did reap much economic benefit from Haiti.  Therefore, those charging 
Wilson with imperialist actions based on financial concerns stand upon weak ground.  The fear 
of disorder in the American sphere of influence, combined with World War I, constitutes a 
stronger case, as does Wilson’s own progressive, paternalistic views towards the Haitian people 
and his attempt to gift them with democratic governance.  The Haitians, predictably, deeply 
resented the American occupation, seeing it as an impediment to their national sovereignty.  
Decades later, the situation remained somewhat similar.  As the US had no real economic 
interest in Haiti during the 1990s, the only real basis for selling American intervention in Haiti 
revolved around humanitarian concerns or interests of national security.  Clinton combined the 
two, and once again, the US was on its way to bring some form of political stability to Haiti, 
using American military strength as the only feasible delivery mechanism.  And similar to the 
first American venture into Haiti, most Haitians did not condone excessive US interference in 
their affairs. 
 After Americans discontinued their Haitian occupation in the first part of the twentieth 
century, the political system within the Caribbean nation further devolved.  The US presence 
thus had little effect on the implementation of successful democratic institutions.  The Marines 
oversaw “public works, tax collection, treasury management, and the development of a native 
Haitian Constabulary, which was Haiti’s first professional military force.”14 Some of these 




Haitians from exuding any real authority on their own.  US forces were also accused of 
discriminating against the poorer black population in favor of the elite mulatto class, which 
deepened existing resentment among Haitian citizens.15 Once the US pulled out of Haiti, 
instability persisted, as did the consistent turnover of national leaders, mostly by violent means.  
The economic and social status of Haiti showed no significant progress, with only some roads, 
public buildings, and medical facilities being built or expanded during the occupation period.16 
Then, in 1957, Haitians finally gained a strong leader in Francois Duvalier.  But the 
implementation of their new president and his dictatorial regime merely ushered in a yet another 
violent reign of terror; one that would last for almost three decades. 
 Duvalier, known as “Papa Doc,” gained power with the backing of the Haitian Army by 
promising the country’s “poor black majority, who for years…[were] exploited by a small clique 
of mulattoes”17 a more efficient and friendly government to meet their needs.  Almost 
immediately, Papa Doc reneged on this hollow promise.  With the implementation of his secret 
police force, known as the feared Tontons Macoutes, which is Creole for “bogeymen,”18 
Duvalier utilized imprisonment, rape, torture, and execution to solidify his hold on the Haitian 
people.  His regime imposed irregular, unofficial taxes, often in the form of tributes, on 
businessmen and peasants alike, and often mutilated political detractors, “sometimes leaving a 
victim’s severed head on display in a marketplace as a warning to others.”19 The US cut foreign 
aid to the nation in the early 1960s, even though Haiti held the status of the poorest nation in the 
Western Hemisphere.  The population under Papa Doc lived in a perpetual state of brutality and 
poverty.  Disease, hunger, and random atrocities were the norm.  In 1964, Papa Doc declared 
himself President for Life, and met little resistance in doing so.  He relied on a cult of 




Voodoo spirits and his supposed possession of supernatural powers, to strengthen his authority.20 
During Papa Doc’s rule, “at least 50,000 people were killed, millions were driven into exile, and 
many of those who remained were tortured.”21 No significant opposition to his power existed. 
 When Papa Doc died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude, assumed his father’s role with an 
equally vicious ardor, much to the dismay of the Haitian people.  Jean-Claude, who went by the 
nickname “Baby Doc,” seamlessly continued the Duvalier legacy and avoided any political 
upheavals regarding succession.  At just nineteen years old, Baby Doc, who ruled with his older 
sister, Marie-Denise, at his side, assumed power without disruption.  The duo punished their 
rivals in a gruesome manner, and ruled “with an iron fist from 1971 to 1986.”22 Baby Doc also 
utilized his father’s Tonton Macoute forces, and embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from 
his already severely impoverished people.  His oppressive rule eventually gained the attention of 
international organizations, and he was seen as a flagrant violator of human rights.  Both Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented cases of his “imprisoning and torturing 
hundreds of Haitians, including journalists, and using violent means to silence voices of 
opposition.”23 Finally, after fifteen years under Baby Doc’s repressive leadership, a popular 
revolt forced the Duvalier regime from power.  Baby Doc was exiled, but his legacy of theft, 
savagery, and corruption remained deeply engrained in Haitian society.  In the period between 
Baby Doc’s ouster in 1986 and December 1990, five Haitian presidents were elected, and 
deposed.  This period of political instability during the late 1980s, which existed largely under 
the thumb of the Haitian Army, led to a considerable influx of immigrants fleeing towards the 
US.  Haiti was once again on America’s radar. 
 In December 1990, Haiti held what is considered by most international observers and 




contest brought a revered priest, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power.  Prior to the 
presidential election of 1990, Haitian elections were overwhelmingly fraudulent, especially 
during the Duvalier years.  Any citizens viewed to be in opposition of Papa Doc or Baby Doc 
were often kept from voting, either by means of intimidation or with the use of violence.  Even 
prior to Duvalier rule, elections were conducted in a primitive and expedient manner, which 
often excluded many rural areas from exercising any considerable means of influence.  
Corruption was rampant.  For this reason, Aristide is deemed the first legitimate, democratically-
elected president of Haiti.   
 Aristide’s appeal spread largely due to his humble origins, and his position as a religious 
figure, which “added a messianic character”24 to the prospects of his leadership.  He ingratiated 
himself with the majority of the Haitian population, who were largely impoverished and 
therefore, held resentment towards previous political leaders from affluent backgrounds.  
Aristide also espoused the tenets of liberation theology,25 born largely out of a Latin American 
understanding of Christian doctrine that encourages social justice and a responsibility to the poor 
and oppressed.  These characteristics, when juxtaposed against his political opponents, who 
either had ties to the Duvalier regime or the US, inspired a mass movement among those who 
believed only Aristide could implement effective reforms in Haitian society.   
 The US, represented by the CIA, held some stake in the Haitian elections due primarily to 
the refugee crisis caused by the unstable political and economic system in Haiti.  Aristide was 
certainly not favored by most Americans in government.  Although the Duvaliers were 
authoritarian and cruel, they were not viewed by American foreign policy experts as susceptible 
to leftist, or communist, propaganda.  During the Cold War, the rise of communist powers within 




a proponent of land distribution, resisted American intervention with regards to economic 
interests, and was a rabid anti-imperialist.  With this approach, Aristide won almost seventy 
percent of the Haitian vote; but he simultaneously provoked suspicion among many Americans, 
and in some circles, outright condemnation. 
Aristide self-servingly entitled his inauguration “Haiti’s Second Independence.”26 But the 
new Haitian president’s lack of outreach to those beyond his base caused immediate concern and 
disruption.  Judson Jeffries, a political science scholar and specialist on issues of race, offers a 
sympathetic view of Aristide’s election and plans for reform.  Jeffries describes Aristide as a 
threat to the Haitian business community and US investors due to the president’s promises to 
“double the minimum wage, initiate new public works projects, make the wealthy pay their fair 
share of taxes,…and support the growth of trade unions.”27 Jeffries also makes note of Aristide’s 
proposals to weaken the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH), and argues that improvements to Haiti’s 
human rights record took place prior to Aristide’s deposal.   
Caribbean specialist Philippe Girard offers evidence that contradicts Jeffries’ assessment 
of Aristide’s leadership prior to his forced removal from office, which consisted of a mere eight 
months.  Girard mentions the feelings among many American foreign policy specialists that 
Aristide was no better than other despotic Haitian rulers.  In his analysis of Clinton’s 1994 
invasion, Girard states that many opponents to US intervention accused Aristide of “advocating 
[for] grisly acts of violence during his short tenure of power.”28 A 1993 report conducted by the 
Congressional Research Service, and specifically, by Latin American Affairs analyst Maureen 
Taft-Morales, provides background for some of the American discomfort towards Aristide.  
Morales describes him as a “demagogue,” who “encourages…rampages, known as dechoukajes, 




his advocacy for class struggle, which resonated with his impoverished supporters, Aristide 
condoned acts of vengeance against those previously associated with the Duvalier regime.  
Ironically, the newly-elected president also held a long record of vocal opposition to democratic 
elections in Haiti.  Prior to his victory, Aristide contended that “free and fair elections were 
impossible as long as Duvalierists still had a hold on economic and political power.”30 His 
attitude somewhat changed once he became the beneficiary of the very democratic process he 
formerly denounced; though he sometimes acted in an undemocratic manner.  Aristide often 
stepped outside of the authority given to him by the Haitian Constitution, such as his 
appointment of Supreme Court judges without the approval of the Senate.  He was also accused 
of removing several newly-elected mayors, most of whom spent decades fighting the Duvaliers, 
in order to grant members of his political movement, known as Lavalas, local power.31   
Following Aristide’s election, popular celebrations often led to mob violence.  Aristide 
supporters would take to the streets and hunt down members of the Tonton Macoutes and other 
political detractors.  The Haitian president received outside criticism, mostly from diplomats, for 
not only refusing to condemn the violence, but in some cases, for actually condoning it.  He was 
seen as encouraging the brutal practice of “pere lebrun”32 as a means to spread fear among 
Tonton Macoutes and those responsible for their prosecution in Haitian courts.  Pere lebrun is the 
method of burning someone alive by placing a “gasoline-soaked auto tire,” or “necklace,” around 
the victim’s neck and lighting a match.33 Aristide once described this vile mob tactic in an 
address to his acolytes by stating: 
You are watching all macoute activities throughout the country…We are 
watching and praying.  If we catch one, do not fail to give him what he deserves.  
What a nice tool!  What a nice instrument!  What a nice device!  It is a pretty one.  
It is elegant, attractive, splendorous, graceful, and dazzling.  It smells good.  
Wherever you go, you feel like smelling it.  It is provided for by the Constitution, 




Aristide later backed away from these comments while in exile in the US.  But these prior 
stances, as well as his many attacks upon the Haitian bourgeoisie, overshadow much of the 
reforms he proposed.   
After tampering his rhetoric prior to the December election, Aristide enthusiastically 
returned to denouncing the rich, the military, and the former political elitist class.  This increase 
in hostile condemnations alarmed his opponents, who quickly tired of his self-righteous claims 
against them.  For this reason, a military junta, led by General Joseph Raoul Cédras, overthrew 
Aristide on September 30, 1991, and forced the president into exile.  Cédras solidified his hold 
on Haiti through the use of paramilitary death squads, who ruthlessly suppressed the population.  
Human Rights Watch estimates that from the time of the coup through 1993, “well over 1,500 
people were estimated…to have been killed.”35 Under Cédras, the FADH attempted to eradicate 
all political, social, and professional organizations it believed to be in opposition of the junta.  
Students, rural activists, members of the clergy, human rights monitors, journalists, politicians 
and others seen as supportive of Aristide were often arrested without reason, tortured, or 
executed.36 Intimidation and extrajudicial punishment, often gruesome, was widespread. 
While awaiting international and American responses to the coup d'état, Aristide 
officially resided at the Haitian Embassy in Washington, D.C.  Though critical of the military 
coup that brought the deposed Haitian leader to the US, members of the George H.W. Bush 
Administration also expressed concerns over Aristide’s own record of abuses.37 Although Bush 
denounced the actions of Cédras, as well as the escalation of violence and human rights atrocities 
that followed, the restoration of democracy, and the return of Aristide via US military force, was 




 During the 1992 campaign, Clinton criticized the ambivalence of the Bush 
Administration with regards to Haiti as a means to elevate his foreign policy acumen.  Where 
Bush vacillated on his support for the ousted leader, Clinton vowed to restore Aristide to his 
rightful place as the democratically-elected president of Haiti.  He also chastised Bush for his 
treatment of Haitian refugees, who fled Haiti either due to their political allegiance to Aristide, or 
as a means to escape their impoverishment.  Deemed “boat people,” these Haitian immigrants 
landed in Florida in large numbers during the 1980s.  The volume markedly increased in the 
early 1990s.  In response, the Bush Administration implemented a policy of denying them entry 
or political asylum, which forced most to return home.38 Clinton attacked this approach as 
“cruel,” and vowed to grant asylum to those fleeing torture, rape, imprisonment, and murder until 
“democracy could be restored in Haiti.”39 But as he did on many other issues involving foreign 
conflict, Clinton mimicked the actions of his predecessor once in office, and continued the policy 
of intercepting Haitian refugees and sending them back without asylum.   
Clinton argues that he only continued Bush’s policy of intercepting and returning Haitian 
immigrants because most “were…risking their lives by traveling in makeshift, rickety boats.”40 
Indeed, a number of them perished in the process.  So, under the auspices of promoting safety, 
Clinton agreed to stop the boats and return them to Haiti.  With his extension of Bush’s policy, 
not only was Clinton backtracking on a campaign promise; he also angered many human rights 
groups in the process.  As a result, Clinton grew determined to take more aggressive action in 
Haiti to stem the tide of refugees and restore Aristide as president.  But contradictory evidence 
suggests the Haitian immigration problem may not have been the direct result of Aristide’s 




In a book chronicling his father’s role as Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on 
Haiti, author Ralph Pezzullo challenges the prevailing notion that Aristide’s removal had a 
significant impact on why Haitians headed towards the US.  Plunging Into Haiti documents the 
Clinton Administration’s struggles with its Haitian policy through accounts offered by Lawrence 
Pezzullo, a career diplomat who served as Head of Catholic Relief Services prior to his role as a 
Clinton advisor on Haiti.  He worked under the Carter Administration and served as US 
Ambassador for Nicaragua, where he is credited with convincing the authoritarian Somoza 
regime to abdicate its rule after being overthrown by the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) in 1979.  The diplomat’s assessment of Clinton’s approach to Haiti is that the president 
entered into deliberations under a false assumption.  Clinton “believed they [his administration] 
could solve in one bold stroke…[both] the refugee problem and the political crisis in Haiti.”41 
Like most international crises, the situation was more complex, and would require more of a 
commitment than Clinton was willing to extend. 
The refugee issue was one of vital importance, particularly due to its impact on the 
politically-indispensable state of Florida.  Clinton also worried about the optics involved in 
refusing entry to black Haitians.  Clinton himself referred to Bush’s refugee policy as “racist,”42 
so it was no surprise when African-Americans began to make the same claim about him.  
Restoring Aristide to power seemed like the only politically viable solution.  But some evidence 
suggests the numbers of refugees had more to do with US policy than with events in Haiti.  
According to Ralph Pezzullo, “the 1,318 Haitians interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard in those 
months [during Aristide’s short tenure as president] actually exceeded the 1,132 who were 
picked up…preceding President Aristide’s inauguration.”43 He adds that in the months following 




Haitians were stopped at sea.”44 These numbers challenge the working assumptions of the 
Clinton White House, put forth most vociferously by Aristide himself, that refugees would cease 
to flee Haiti once the US backed the ousted president’s restoration.   
A review of these numbers suggests news reports of America’s Haitian refugee policy 
held more influence than Aristide.  When word reached Haiti that a group of refugees were 
allowed to remain in Florida in October of 1991, Haitians headed towards the US in droves, with 
over 6,000 being intercepted by the Coast Guard the following month.45 After Bush issued his 
executive order in May of 1992, which essentially banned Haitian refugees, denying them 
political asylum should they reach American shores, the influx halted.  In June 1992, only 473 
Haitians were detained and turned away.  By July, this number dropped to 160.46 Despite 
evidence challenging the linkage between Aristide’s removal and the refugee crisis, Clinton and 
the American public were influenced by the original narrative.  But in his promise to end the 
refugee crisis, he inadvertently shifted control of the objective out of his own hands.  Aristide 
would continuously exploit this issue to stall diplomatic efforts made by both the UN and 
Clinton, resisting any conciliatory demands on his part. In this case, perception was reality, and 
Aristide took full advantage. 
 On June 16, 1993, the UN voted to impose an oil embargo on Haiti in an attempt to 
pressure Cédras into negotiations.  This action added to sanctions already put into place by the 
Bush Administration, working in concert with the UN and the Organization for American States 
(OAS).  The UN also froze much of Haiti’s foreign assets. For this reason, Cédras informed the 
UN Special Envoy to Haiti, Dante Caputo, that he would agree to take part in negotiations with 
Aristide. The diplomatic meetings took place in July on Governors Island in New York.  But 




and the destruction of the Haitian Army, while General Cédras wanted Aristide gone and Haiti 
left alone.  The Clinton Administration was at the mercy of two maniacal leaders who would not 
budge.  Repeatedly, Aristide told UN Special Envoy Caputo, “You have to get rid of the 
military.”47 But Caputo, understanding Aristide could not allow the international community to 
completely solve the crisis in Haiti for him, responded by stating, “No, Mr. President, You have 
to get rid of the military.”48 Aristide’s proximity to Washington, as well as his support among 
Democratic members of Congress, the press, and some in Hollywood, gave the leader an 
arrogant heir of superiority when he entered into the negotiations.  But it was up to Clinton, the 
UN, and the OAS to implement a diplomatic agreement suitable for all parties.  What these 
policymakers did not realize was the deep-seated distrust and fear encompassing Haitian politics 
for over 190 years.49 One State Department official familiar with Haitian history remarked, 
“Haiti is a universe unto itself.”50 
 Bernard Aronson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intra-American Affairs, oversaw 
the day-to-day situation in Haiti since the coup unfolded.  With a clear understanding of how 
both sides worked, he feared the Governors Island meeting would produce little.  Anything it did 
generate was unlikely to change behaviors.  Aronson described the FADH and General Cédras as 
“experts at rope a dope,” who would most certainly “procrastinate, procrastinate, and 
procrastinate some more” when it came to implementing any diplomatic resolution.51 Aronson 
also described Aristide as a “narrow, rigid man”52 who had two sides.  In public, he was affable 
and agreeable.  But Aronson contends that in private, Aristide was quite difficult.  He would 
agree to certain concessions and then quickly back away from them.  Aronson saw a pattern in 
Aristide’s approach to diplomacy.  The Haitian president worked tirelessly to preserve his image 




 The UN-sponsored Governors Island Agreement, signed by both Aristide and Cédras, 
mandated the return of Aristide to the presidency in exchange for an end to the oil embargo and 
the loosening of sanctions.  It allowed for a transition period during which the Haitian Army 
would facilitate Aristide’s restoration with the help of a small UN contingent.  Aristide agreed to 
appoint a Prime Minister, install a consensus government, and replace the high command within 
the Army.  He was given the authority to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief to replace Cédras, 
who agreed to an early retirement.53 But the president had to promise that he would take no 
retributive action against Cédras or the FADH.  The agreement required that he put aside his 
demands that the military be brought to trial and punished.54 Sanctions would not be suspended 
until the alliance between the Haitian elite and the military allowed the Haitian Parliament to 
confirm Aristide’s choice for Prime Minister.  They followed through with this portion of the 
agreement when on August 25, the Haitian Parliament ratified the appointment of Robert Malval, 
Aristide’s choice for Prime Minister.  Both Cédras and Aristide described the accord as a 
“satisfactory solution to the Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national 
reconciliation.”55 But the UN, the OAS, and the Clinton Administration depended on parties who 
had a long history of violating previous agreements.  Even so, Clinton enthusiastically embraced 
what he considered to be a historic moment for Haiti and “for the principle of democratic rule.”56 
His celebration was premature. 
 On October 12, 1993, the diplomatic initiative agreed to by Cédras and his military 
apparatus met unexpected resistance, which resulted in another foreign policy embarrassment for 
the Clinton Administration.  Under the Governors Island Accord, the Haitian Army was given a 
target date of October 30 for the return of President Aristide to the presidency.  On October 11, 




225 US and Canadian members of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to ensure 
Aristide’s safe return and clear any obstacles to his resumption of leadership.  Under the 
Governors Island Accords, and created by UN Security Resolution 867, UNMIH was to assist in 
modernizing the Haitian military and establishing a new police force.57 When the ship 
approached the Port-au-Prince harbor, it was unable to dock.  In the presence of television 
cameras and journalists, paramilitary members of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of 
Haiti (FRAPH), led by Emmanuel Constant, who had strong ties to the army under the Duvalier 
regime, led a violent mob of armed civilians, or attachés, in a demonstration against Aristide’s 
return.58 The far-right group surrounded the car of the US Embassy chargé d'affaires, “wielding 
machetes” and chanting “remember Somalia.”59 Just days prior to this incident, eighteen elite US 
Army Rangers were killed in the Battle of Mogadishu, and the anti-Aristide thugs on the dock 
used this tragedy to their advantage.  On October 12, the ship’s captain decided to turn around 
and head towards Cuba, fearing he would be fired upon.  The mighty US Navy vessel was 
successfully intimated into retreat by a loosely-armed, ragtag bunch of criminals.  UNMIH was 
not allowed to carry out its September 1993 mandate.  Constant and his FRAPH collaborators 
did not act alone; they had Cédras’s approval, thereby justifying concerns over the FADH and its 
history of default with regards to international agreements.   
The decision to withdraw the USS Harlan County completely undermined the diplomatic 
initiative agreed upon under the Governors Island Accords.  Largely based on a fear of the 
American public equating Haitian intervention with Somalia, the US backed away from initiating 
any punishment for the acts of provocation.  As a result, Clinton took a massive beating in the 
press.  An article in The New York Times noted that the US had “seemingly capitulated in the 




diplomats involved with the negotiations.  Most of the criticism regarding the ship’s turnaround 
arose from diplomats among the “four friends”61 of Haiti, a UN group comprised of France, 
Venezuela, Canada and the US.  The abandonment of the Governors Island stipulations for 
Aristide’s return “delivered a serious blow to their efforts.”62 Clinton was criticized for 
responding to the incident by dispatching his special advisor on Haitian affairs, Lawrence 
Pezzullo, along with Major General John Sheehan of the US Marine Corps, to meet with the 
Haitian military leaders in an attempt to salvage the agreement.  In response, Western diplomats 
called Clinton “naïve”63 in his belief that new global sanctions and a strengthened oil embargo 
would alter their behavior.   
Cédras underhandedly maintained that he would continue to respect the Governors Island 
Accord, but was careful not to mention whether he would relinquish his position as required by 
the agreement.  Political commentator Joe Klein of Newsweek argued that the retreat of the 
Harlan County showed that “America can be defied, even in its own backyard.”64 It was evident 
that Haiti’s military rulers had no intention of relinquishing power, regardless of diplomatic 
maneuvering.  In the wake of the Harlan County evacuation, the FADH initiated an even more 
relentless crackdown on those who embraced Aristide’s arrival, and returned to the process of 
assassinating anyone seen as supportive of the agreement.  An Aristide insider told Newsweek, 
“They’ve [the US] been telling Haitians, ‘Be patient, help is on the way’,…This round is over—
now wait for the bloodbath.”65 Many Haitians, as well as critics across the international 
community, could not understand how the powerful US was incapable of dismantling the junta, 
and therefore, finally helping to revive Haiti’s political and economic situation. 
After the humiliation of the USS Harlan County incident, Clinton faced increasing 




remove General Cédras and restore democratic rule, in Haiti.  One of the loudest of these voices 
was Aristide himself, who surrounded himself with expensive lobbyists demanding US 
intervention.  To the aggravation of many political leaders in Washington, Aristide purposefully 
tried to escalate the immigration problem by publicly encouraging his Haitian supporters to 
depart from the island on “flimsy rafts and balsa-wood boats”66 and make their way towards the 
US.  Since most involved felt it was his removal that generated the refugee problem, Aristide 
knew an influx of Haitian immigrants would overwhelm local communities in Florida, resulting 
in greater pressure for action.   
Aristide was also determined to maintain his credibility within Haiti by denouncing any 
suggestions that he may be a US puppet.  He often publicly claimed that US support kept the 
Duvalier regime in power, and had a well-documented history espousing anti-American 
propaganda.  Privately, however, Aristide begged the American government, under Presidents 
Bush and Clinton, to reinstate him by force.  He initiated an intense public relations campaign to 
influence Clinton to act militarily.  But he was careful never to specifically request American 
intervention openly.67 He wanted Clinton to commit troops, but Aristide claimed he could be 
impeached under the Haitian Constitution if he were to directly ask for US military support.  He 
attempted to solve this problem by sending a “weakly-worded letter” to UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali requesting “prompt and decisive action to implement the Governors 
Island Accord.”68 The substance of this correspondence was quite ironic considering Aristide and 
his advisors put forth the claim that he signed the agreement against his will.  Even so, Clinton 
showed signs of capitulating to Aristide’s demands, given the Haitian president’s champions in 




For this reason, many Americans, particularly the Republicans in Congress, questioned 
the motives behind restoring the Haitian president.  Conservatives believed the notion of a 
Haitian democracy was an oxymoron; the Haitian people never experienced democracy, even 
with the election of Aristide.  They concluded that living under depots, Aristide included, was all 
the Haitians ever knew.69 Republican political leaders accused Aristide of implementing violent 
tactics against his opposition during his short time in office.  They did not see the morality in 
using the American military to reinstate a leader who ruled using some of the same harsh 
methods employed by his predecessors when dealing with those who challenged him.  He was 
elected by the people, but then removed by force.  In the eyes of many American conservatives, 
“Haitians…were not ready to govern themselves.”70 But other political concerns pushed Clinton 
farther towards his aims of returning democratic rule to the Haiti. 
One of the most powerful entities in support of Aristide’s restoration was a coalition of 
African-American organizations who couched their demands for US intervention in Haiti in 
terms of race.  In his analysis of the efforts by some African-American groups to equate 
humanitarian intervention in Haiti with national security interests, international relations 
specialist Michael Hughes points to a shared identity of the black experience when it comes to 
“oppression through colonialism and imperialism on the African continent, the legacy of the 
transatlantic slave trade, slavery in the United States, and systemic racism and discrimination.”71 
Hughes highlights a coalition of African-Americans, whose influence on foreign policy consists 
primarily of lobbying American leaders on behalf of sovereign nations with majority black 
populations.  Dismantling the South African system of Apartheid remains one of their most 
vociferous efforts.  According to Hughes, the faction consists of: 
the NAACP; the Congressional Black Caucus, formed in 1971 as an institution 




and TransAfrica, formed in 1977 as a private lobbying organization to advance 
African American interests in foreign policy circles.72 
 
Hughes’ work compares the African-American response to the crises in both Haiti and Rwanda.  
It provides a useful point of reference that enhances the charge that action in Rwanda was 
deemed a political liability, while Haitian intervention was viewed as a political asset.  His 
examination of the lobbying efforts by those comprising the faction above yields evidence of a 
more forceful, well-publicized means of attracting support for Aristide.  Hughes references “a 
clear campaign by the African American lobby to influence US policy towards Haiti, and the 
refugee crisis in particular, “including the use of Civil Rights Era “sit-ins, protests, and hunger 
strikes.”73 No such actions were taken with regards to Rwanda, or Somalia for that matter.   
Hughes blames this disparity on the locations of each crisis, but he also notes the lack of 
support among black Americans for strictly humanitarian interventions in foreign nations, 
without a clear benefit to domestic considerations.  In this finding, African-Americans differed 
little from the rest of the American population.  Haitian intervention was viewed as less costly 
and more aligned with American interests, given the rapid increase in immigration and the 
subsequent strain on social services it initiated.  As a key demographic group for Democrats, the 
influence of the African-American community with regards to calculating the risks of 
intervention cannot be overstated.  The crisis in Africa, though more urgent, deadly, and 
occurring within the “homeland,”74 was not enough to bring these lobbying groups together.  The 
conflict in Haiti proved more capable of providing a rallying point to alleviate the sufferings of 
those seen as sharing an African identity with their supporters in the US.   
A significant point is how Haitian immigration began to overwhelm African-American 
communities in Florida, a key swing state.  Again, the midterm congressional elections were 




such as Florida Representative Alcee Hastings, political considerations most certainly figured 
into President Clinton’s decision.  New York Congressman Major Owens asserts that Haiti 
would have remained outside of the president’s consideration were it not for the efforts of 
African-American leaders in organizations such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.  The representative argues “if we had not pressed,”75 
Haiti would have been a second priority.  Owens continues, “I think that in the final analysis, the 
fact that [Clinton] wanted a positive relationship with us [the Black Caucus] made him look at 
the situation very seriously, and made him move in a forceful way, more rapidly than he intended 
to.”76 The African-American lobby made no similar efforts for an effective US presence in 
Rwanda or Somalia.  As previously noted, Somalia had an immense impact on the Clinton 
Administration’s forceful denunciations of any proposed action to stop the genocide in Central 
Africa.  And it did not pay a political price for doing so.  Haiti was different. 
Deputy Assistant for the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, Prudence 
Bushnell, describes the reluctance of the Joint Chiefs to approve any action in Rwanda due to the 
president’s chosen mission to restore Aristide in Haiti. In her interview with Frontline, Bushnell 
provides a context for this mindset.  She points to the president’s preference to combat the 
escalating situation in Haiti as a major obstacle to increasing any American role in Africa, where 
almost one million people were slaughtered.  Somalia undoubtedly had the greatest effect on the 
Clinton Administration’s lack of support for Rwanda, due to its impact on the collective 
American psyche.  But Haiti served as a significant hindrance as well, particularly among leaders 
at the Pentagon.  The Clinton Administration needed a foreign policy win, particularly against 
the backdrop of Somalia and the USS Harlan County incident.  Given this presidential 




move them to Haiti.  As stated by Bushnell, “’there was a reluctance to invest resources 
anywhere except where the president says he puts his influence and his policy.”77 According to 
Bushnell, the Pentagon resisted doing anything in Rwanda out of concern for what the military 
knew faced its forces in the near future.  She relays the stock answer she received from the Joint 
Chiefs whenever she demanded action to put a halt to the killings in Africa.  They were 
unwilling to commit resources where the administration felt the US did not have “strategic 
interests,” and consistently explained to her “we just don’t have the resources.”78   
 Following the USS Harlan County disaster, the Clinton Administration understood it had 
to restore American credibility, particularly with the Battle of Mogadishu still fresh in the 
public’s mind.  It could no longer allow the actions of a few dozen protestors to proceed 
unpunished.  Nor could it stand by as the Haitian military junta continued to defy international 
agreements and increase its abuses.  But Clinton decided against immediate retributive military 
action.  The debate over a proper response continued.79  
Senior Aide George Stephanopoulas struggled with how to advise Clinton.  True to form, 
the young advisor believed an invasion “could be a political plus.”80 Even though Republicans, 
such as John McCain (R-AZ) and Bob Dole (R-KS), both war veterans, believed Clinton’s focus 
on Haiti involved risking American lives to appease a political constituency, others felt a resolute 
US-led military action would show strength.  But Stephanopoulas had his doubts.  He notes that 
“two-thirds of the country [was] against military action in Haiti.”81 The situation under General 
Cédras continued to deteriorate, and Clinton resisted calls for intervention.  In his account of the 
incident with the USS Harlan County, Stephanopoulas admits that he felt Aristide to be “a 
flake.”82 He refrained from giving Clinton any real policy advice on the matter due to Aristide’s 




impressions of the exiled Haitian leader.  After Vice-President Al Gore called Aristide to inform 
him of the president’s decision to re-impose economic sanctions, and delay returning him to 
power using American military forces, Gore informed Clinton that the Haitian was “ecstatic.”83 
Clinton was relieved.  This acquiescence to Third World criminals further illuminates the 
president’s lack of seriousness involving foreign policy decisions that have real ramifications for 
US credibility on the global stage.   
Clinton seemed pleased that Aristide was not demanding his immediate return to Haiti.  
The American president sarcastically responded to Gore, “See, I told you.  What would you 
rather do?  Go back to Haiti, or sip champagne in Harry Belafonte’s apartment?”84 Still, Clinton 
remained determined to reseat Aristide, even after the CIA leaked an assessment of him as “an 
unstable manic-depressive.”85 He excused this analysis by stating “You can make too much of 
normalcy.  A lot of normal people are assholes.”86  
One particularly valid claim for Clinton’s ultimate decision to forcefully restore Aristide 
comes from an unlikely source.  David Gergen, a former aide to President Ronald Reagan, joined 
the Clinton Administration in 1993, where he served as a Senior Advisor to both the president 
and Secretary of State Warren Christopher.  After the Harlan County debacle, Gergen described 
the political success generated by Reagan’s successful invasion of Grenada just days after the 
devastating 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon.  To Gergen, Haiti 
could serve as Clinton’s Grenada.  Reagan addressed both events on television simultaneously.  
In doing so, he juxtaposed a severe blow to his Lebanon policy against a decisive military 
victory over Cuban forces attempting to turn Grenada into a staging ground for possible Soviet 
adventurism in America’s backyard.87 Reagan’s October speech actually led to an increase in 




were not there for combat purposes.  After hearing Gergen out, and to the shock of the liberals in 
the administration, Clinton said, “The Reagan people were much better at the politics of foreign 
policy than we are.  Look at Lebanon.  They went into Grenada two days later and fixed it.”88  
The comparison to Grenada is ironic considering who carried the most influence within 
the Clinton national security apparatus. Many believed that Haiti was merely a “test case” for a 
foreign policy that placed at the forefront the defense of human rights and the advancement of 
democracy.89 But a group within the administration, led by National Security Advisor Tony 
Lake, came to be described as “Haiti Hawks” 90 for their vociferous calls for action.  Most served 
within the Carter Administration, and as described by Newsweek, “they all speak the same 
language, thee Carteresque ‘human rights first’ policy…All hated the Central American policy of 
the 1980s.” 91 But in May, a new comprehensive review on Haiti was conducted, and invasion 
plans were being prepared. 
Clinton’s comparison of possible military action in Haiti to Grenada lends credibility to 
those, like Lt. Col. Patterson, who believe that Operation Restore Democracy was born to score a 
“win” after the embarrassments of Somalia and Rwanda, and amid the inaction over Bosnia.92 
Regardless, the president had to show strength and rehabilitate America’s integrity.  Even though 
the public was against intervention, Clinton had the skills to persuade.  As noted by Paul 
Wolfowitz, “The use of force cannot be approached in an experimental way, by dispatching 
military personnel to Haiti to withdraw them if they meet opposition.”93 It also does not signal 
effective leadership for an American president to poll other countries for their input regarding a 
possible US response.  Clinton had to make a decision.   
 On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, authorizing the use of 




one of a threat to regional peace, Clinton led the effort to establish a military presence to pave 
the way for UNMIH.  One of the deciding factors was the attempt by General Cédras’s 
government to install Haitian Supreme Court Judge Emile Jonassaint as a “provisional 
president,” which was a blatant attempt to replace Aristide, the legitimate president of Haiti.95 
Under Security Council Resolution 940, Chapter VII of the UN Charter was activated.  The 
Americans began the process of coordinating member states to form a multinational force under 
unified (US) command, or the MFH.  Towards the end of August, Clinton announced that all 
diplomatic efforts had been “exhausted,” and “force might be used to remove the military 
leadership from power in Haiti and ensure the return of the democratic Government of President 
Aristide.”96 
Clinton delivered his “Address to the Nation on Haiti” on September 15, 1994, in which 
he declared an upcoming invasion to “restore democratic government” in a “mission [that] is 
limited and achievable.”97 The president described the American role as leading an international 
effort, supported by the UN, to forcefully remove General Cédras and his military junta from 
power.  Twice in the speech, Clinton references Grenada as a comparable mission, thus assuring 
the American people of the mission’s likely success and expeditiousness.  He correlated the 
military role with national interests by stating, “History has taught us that preserving democracy 
in our own hemisphere strengthens America’s security and prosperity.   Democracies here are 
more likely to keep the peace and stabilize our region.”98 After presenting a long indictment of 
the Haitian dictators who deposed Aristide, including recent increases in violence, Clinton spoke 
directly to them, warning: “Your time is up.  Leave now, or we will force you from power.”99 He 
vowed that action must be taken to:  
protect our interests; to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of 




in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of commitments we make and the 
commitments others make to us.100 
 
The president spoke authoritatively about the national intolerance of brutal dictatorships that use 
murder, rape, torture, and mutilation as a means to intimidate and oppress their populations, 
especially when it occurs so close to American soil.  He declared the planned action to be the 
only logical step forward, as three years of intense diplomatic efforts by the UN, the OAS, the 
Caribbean community, and six Central American presidents had failed.  The US was on its way 
to war in Haiti. 
In a letter written to Congress on September 18, in which Clinton announced the 
proposed troop landing, he echoed the sentiments of his September 15 speech by noting, “The 
United States has a particular interest in responding to gross abuses of human rights when they 
occur so close to our shores.”101 As referenced by Hyland, Clinton’s remarks had the “quaint 
aura of the Monroe Doctrine”102 attached to them.  Haiti was in the American sphere of 
influence, thus it demanded US assistance.  But Clinton had yet to fully give up on diplomacy.  
On September 17, in a final diplomatic effort, the President sent a diplomatic team into Haiti in a 
last-ditch attempt to solve the crisis by peaceful means.  At the same time the US-led MFH 
headed towards Haitian shores, former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and 
Senator Sam Nunn were dispatched to Haiti to convince General Cédras and his military leaders 
to resign.  It was a last-minute maneuver, but it worked.103 Clinton remained dedicated to the 
invasion deadline despite the progress, or lack thereof, of Carter and his team, so the Americans 
held the upper hand. Cédras and his team agreed to transfer power back to Aristide, and leave the 
island nation for good.  With this agreement firmly delivered, the large American force landed in 




or resignation with amnesty, the military junta finally gave in.  Almost immediately, the 
president received a “bump” in the polls.105 
 Under the agreement, the FADH and police forces complied with the stipulation of 
cooperating with the US military, which would clear the way for UNMIH personnel to enter the 
country without fear of harm to their personal safety.  This arrangement is partially credited with 
setting the Haiti mission apart from what occurred in Somalia.  But another difference existed.  
Although held under dictatorial rule for almost two centuries, Haiti was a cohesive nation, with a 
shared culture and national consciousness.  Somalia had no such legacy around which to 
coalesce.  Unlike Haiti, Somalia lacked basic national institutions, such as a parliament or 
constitution, upon which to rely.  Additionally, the Haitians had a leader in Aristide.  As difficult 
as the Haitian president could be, he still provided the US with someone to use as a point of 
contact in negotiations.  Somalia lacked any similar authority, with the exception of General 
Aideed, who violently opposed any American diplomatic attempts.106 
 Since no organized military opposition to US forces existed, the American troops relied 
upon the local military to aid in civilian control.  What they feared most was civil unrest.  Once 
the American forces landed in Haiti, their mission became less clear.  Within one month, Aristide 
resumed his position as president.  With Clinton’s credibility restored, he turned his attention 
elsewhere.  But any clear goals for the operation during the occupation period did not exist.  In 
an effort to prevent American casualties, and in combination with battle fatigue, US commanders 
on the ground instructed soldiers to take a more passive role in peacekeeping.107 This task fell to 
the very army US forces originally planned to fight.  The US-led multinational force reduced the 
availability of weaponry by raiding some FADH compounds, but they mostly passed on the job 




 Along with the restoration of Aristide, the Clinton Administration also set goals of 
developing the Haitian economy and solidifying the democratic process.  By the end of his term, 
neither of these aims were met.  Few members of the FADH, who committed such heinous 
violence against Haitian civilians, ever answered for their crimes. Reforms for Haitian courts, 
prisons, and banks were passed, but due to a lack of funds, they rarely succeeded.109 Even the 
overarching theme of democratic restoration suffered once Americans retreated from taking an 
active role during the occupation.  Although they were greeted as liberators upon the return of 
Aristide, the operation quickly devolved into one Haitians referred to as a “humiliation.”110 
Significant opposition to US-directed financial reforms stalled economic development, which led 
to continued poverty and social ills.  Foreign aid was squandered, violence persisted, and 
political instability returned.  Clinton approved the initial portion of the mission, and he achieved 
one of his stated aims.  But he lacked the will to remain involved to solve the challenges facing 
Haiti.  Aristide was one of the main obstacles.  He attacked foreign donors and ignored voices of 
opposition.  As a result, political leadership at all levels in Haiti suffered.  He continued these 
actions when he was re-elected in 2004.  And once again, he was forcibly removed from office.  
Haiti remains mired in poverty, corruption, and chaos.  
In his assessment of Clinton’s intervention in Haiti, Lt. Col. Patterson points to the 
military’s frustration with the president’s inconsistency with regards to the use of America’s 
Armed Forces.  Patterson illuminates the disparity in support for the president’s chosen mission, 
and others for which Clinton showed little interest or resolve. Patterson expressed his disdain 
over the helplessness felt by those tasked with providing strict humanitarian aid in Rwanda, as 
well as the administration’s incompetence when it came to providing much-needed equipment to 




the multitude of gear flown into Haiti, such as jeeps, communications equipment, and most 
importantly, the disproportionately large number of US soldiers, including the entire 82nd 
Airborne Division.  He notes, “There was so much military metal, the ramp was literally sinking 
into the bay [in the Port-au-Prince harbor].”111 Given his own experiences with peacekeeping 
missions gone awry, Patterson concluded: 
 
The disparity of this picture compared with the one I’d seen in Somalia was 
revealing and disappointing.  When casualties were possible, as in Somalia, 
President Clinton used strong rhetoric and little action.  When casualties were 
unlikely, he used overwhelming force.112 
 
 
American troops remained in Haiti for five years.  After reinstating Aristide, he adhered to his 
role under the Haitian Constitution, and peacefully passed the presidency on to his successor 
when his term ended, leading to the first successful transition of power in Haitian history.   
Despite this milestone, significant problems continued to plague the country.  After the 
US spent almost $3 billion in Haiti, the economy only worsened, unemployment reached above 
seventy percent, and drug trafficking increased.113 The military forces stationed in Haiti steered 
clear of internal issues, particularly to avoid an international incident.  Their confidence in 
Operation Restore Democracy, and Operation Uphold Democracy, which transferred the original 
mission back into UN hands, lessoned significantly as they watched the disorder, corruption, and 
poverty around them.     
Aside from what occurred in the years following Operation Restore Democracy, the 
mission did restore some of the president’s credibility.  Though the 1994 Congressional 
Elections resulted in a massive Republican takeover, Clinton was pragmatic enough to work with 
the opposition on domestic issues, and parlayed this bipartisan effort into some successful 
policies at home.  For this reason, Americans do look back upon the 1990s as the decade of 




intervened, global disorder continued to challenge Clinton and his administration, who lacked 
both the willingness and perspective to confront issues of foreign struggles with any sense of 
duty.  Even though instability in Haiti provided some consequences for the US, given its status as 
an American neighbor, it would pale in comparison to deliberate, direct attacks on US interests, 
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Chapter 7.  A MISCALCULATED FOE:  OSAMA BIN LADEN AND  
AL QAEDA ON THE MARCH 
 
"Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent. We are all over the place… I see 
buildings. We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low. Oh my 
God, we are flying way too low. Oh my God!"1 These were the last words heard by the 
American Airlines Operations Center, spoken by one of their flight attendants, Madeline Amy 
Sweeney, just before the line went dead.  For twenty-five minutes, Sweeney and her colleague, 
Betty Ong, attempted to remain calm and describe the hijacking of their flight by “Middle 
Eastern men.”2 Each woman grew increasingly frightened by her lack of contact with the 
cockpit, but even amid this fear, both were able to relay the unfolding events, as well as the seat 
numbers of the hijackers.  American Airlines Flight 11, from Boston to Los Angeles, struck the 
North Tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) in Manhattan, at 8:46am Eastern Time, on 
September 11, 2001.   
New Yorkers on the street, their attention drawn to smoke bellowing out of the North 
Tower, gasped as they witnessed United Airlines Flight 175 slam into the WTC’s South Tower at 
9:03am, killing all on board, and an unknown number within the building, upon impact.3 It was 
now clear the United States was under attack.  As the catastrophe unfolded on live television, 
friends and relatives of those either traveling on the hijacked planes, or stuck inside the structures 
hit, watched in horror as the lives of their loved ones were stolen.  Melissa Doi of Queens, a 
manager at IQ Financial Systems, was trapped on the 83rd floor of the South Tower. Doi 
remained on the phone with a 9-11 dispatcher for over twenty minutes as she waited for help to 
arrive.  Struggling to breathe, she informed the operator, “It’s so hot, I’m burning up.”4 The 
dispatcher repeatedly apologized, and tried to calm her.  Doi then tearfully cried, “I’m going to 




you’re not going to die.  Say your prayers.  You’re doing great.  We’re going to get help.”6 At 
9:59am, the South Tower collapsed. The North Tower tumbled to the ground less than a half an 
hour later.  Doi was one of thousands killed in the WTC attacks. 
Barbara Olson, a best-selling author and wife of then-US Solicitor-General Ted Olson, 
called her husband to inform him that her plane, American Airlines Flight 77, was hijacked by 
men with box cutters and knives.  As soon as the call cut out, Mr. Olson notified the Department 
of Justice of his wife’s account.  At 9:37am, AA Flight 77 slammed into the Pentagon.7 
Terrorists had struck the heart of America’s most visible emblem of military strength.  
Americans were in disbelief.  Within an hour and forty-two minutes of the commercial airliner 
strikes on the WTC Twin Towers, and with hundreds of police, firefighters, and Port Authority 
officers working to evacuate as many people possible, each building disappeared from the New 
York skyline.  In Washington D.C., the Pentagon was on fire, with a gaping hole in a large 
section of its five-sided structure.  The total number of people who lost their lives, which 
eventually reached 2,996,8 would not be known for weeks.   
The only glimmer of hope on this dark day arrived among unraveling reports of heroic 
actions taken aboard United Airlines Flight 93.  Believed to be headed towards either the White 
House or Capitol Building, a determined group of passengers on this final hijacked plane, after 
being made aware of the hijackers’ true intentions through phone calls, decided to rush the 
cockpit.  Passenger Thomas Burnett informed his wife, “I know we’re going to die…There’s 
three of us who are going to do something about it.”9 In a purely American act of defiance, 
another passenger, Todd Beamer, delivered a line that would become synonymous with the 




The cockpit voice recorder on Flight 93 “captured the sounds of the passenger 
assault…the assault was sustained.”11 Confirmed by the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States in The 9/11 Commission Report, the resolute Americans aboard 
this plane thwarted the hijackers’ attempts to destroy another national symbol, losing their lives 
in the process.  What began with the chilling message, “We have some planes,”12 communicated 
by a hijacker to a shocked Boston air traffic controller, ended with the most pivotal, deadly 
attack ever to occur on American soil.  America was at war.  From the Oval Office, as the 
harrowing day ended, President George W. Bush addressed a mourning nation, and vowed to 
bring the perpetrators to justice.  
Historical analysis of 9/11, in addition to the multitude of government inquiries, media 
coverage, and personal accounts, is overwhelming.  Virtually every American alive at the time 
vividly recalls where he or she was that day, and how the tragic events personally affected each 
of them.  Blame for the attacks cannot be placed on one person, unless that person is Osama Bin 
Laden, who, along with his Al Qaeda terrorist network, orchestrated and funded the operation.  
Within the US government, mistakes were certainly made.  But hindsight brings clarity to signals 
that, at the time, were obscure.  Americans lacked the vision to foresee the possibility, and the 
magnitude, of 9/11.  However, this admission does not rationalize inaction, especially with 
regards to prior attacks delivered specifically against US interests.  Within a mere decade, what 
began as loosely-formed, “petty Muslim extremist groups wandering the deserts, on the margins 
of international relations,” developed into “a full blown terror network operating in [over] 55 
countries.”13 Al Qaeda matured in the face of American complacency.   
The responsibility for monitoring the metastasizing terror group fell on many agents and 




sense of guilt felt by these dedicated employees is palpable.  But it is important to document how 
prior Al Qaeda attacks against American targets were received by senior level officials, most 
notably President Clinton.  Even though it is irresponsible to suggest that a specific action, or 
actions, could have stopped the brutal events of 9/11, it is beneficial to document how a lack of 
attention and response by the Clinton Administration allowed the culprits the time and space 
necessary to strengthen their association and plot their deadly assault against the US. 
During Clinton’s eight years as president, Al Qaeda grew to be the most sophisticated, 
organized, and deadly terror organization in the world.  Some members of the US intelligence 
community observed this progression, and began notifying the president regularly just prior to 
his second term.  They sent warnings.  But even they did not foresee the level of devastation that 
would occur.  According to the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, one of the most consequential 
deficiencies that allowed the calamitous homeland strike to proceed unimpeded was a failure of 
imagination.14 Attacks on American interests that preceded 9/11 presented government officials 
with a pattern, as did the statements made by the designated leader of Al Qaeda.  While Bin 
Laden was at war, and publicly declared his violent intentions, the US was investigating crimes.  
Americans were handing out warrants overseas as terrorists in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Africa 
were building bombs.  
Clinton’s foreign policy centered on the perception that a world “governed by globalism, 
free markets, technology advances and soft liberalism”15 would choose peace and global 
cooperation over conflict.  The Clinton Administration began disposing of their initial policies of 
democratic enlargement and aggressive multilateralism early on, particularly after the failed 
peacekeeping efforts in Somalia.  But they could never reach a healthy middle ground between 




dividend upon which Clinton could decrease investment in the military and adequately fund his 
domestic programs.  He therefore resisted most requests for more assets in the fight against 
international terrorism.  It was not until the end of his second term that he began to advocate for 
increased funding for the CIA in its fight against Al Qaeda.  As with so many other instances of 
foreign conflict during his tenure, the world refused to cooperate with his preferred areas of 
interest.  Unfortunately for Clinton, and Americans in general, foreign policy proposals based on 
such ideals as free markets and the expansion of civil liberties meant nothing to Islamic 
fundamentalists determined to destroy those they deemed responsible for the exploitation of 
Muslim lands and people. 
Osama Bin Laden originally gained notoriety as a wealthy financier of the successful 
Mujahedeen effort to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan during the 1980s.  The Saudi-born 
son of the head of the Binladen Group, who had close ties with the royal family due to the 
company’s massive investment in The Kingdom’s infrastructure, was instilled with animosity 
towards the US at a young age.  After his father’s death, members of the Saudi royal family took 
him in as their own.  Growing up in the 1970s, Bin Laden became engrossed in the anti-Western, 
anti-Israeli Arab nationalism sweeping across the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War and the 
Arab oil embargoes.  He informed a reporter in 1998, “Every grown-up Muslim hates 
Americans, Christians, and Jews…It is part of our belief and our religion.  Ever since I was a 
boy, I have been harboring feelings of hatred towards America.”16 Bin Laden became a dedicated 
follower of Wahhabism, which is a strict, fundamentalist view of Islam with a firm adherence to 
Sharia Law that originated in Saudi Arabia.  He was further radicalized in his position as the 
primary fundraiser for Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahidin (Afghan Services Bureau), an 




Arab nations to fight the Soviets.17 In this role, Bin Laden traveled the world, raising several 
billion dollars, and “establishing branches in over fifty countries for encouraging recruits and 
raising money.”18 These actions would serve as the foundation upon which he would build his 
terror network shortly after the Soviets left Afghanistan. 
 At the time of the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA, which funneled millions in funding and 
support towards the Afghan effort, initially regarded Bin Laden as merely a wealthy 
philanthropist.  In his memoirs of his time at the agency, former CIA Director George Tenet 
categorically states, “[the] CIA had no contact with Bin Ladin during the Soviet’s Afghan 
misadventure.”19 In 1986, Bin Laden established his first training camp in Afghanistan, and from 
this location, led a group of guerrilla fighters in a successful stand-off against Soviet forces.  
From this endeavor, Bin Laden created Al Qaeda, which is Arabic for “The Base.”20 In 1989, 
when the Soviets left Afghanistan in defeat, an internal battle began for control of the region.  
The conflict was often among rival tribes, but two distinct powers emerged from it:  The Taliban 
and the Northern Alliance. Both factions would play integral roles in Bin Laden’s quest to wage 
war on the US. 
Prior to the departure of Soviet forces, Bin Laden was introduced to a radical Egyptian 
doctor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who shared the Saudi’s militant vision of Islam.  Both Zawahiri and 
Bin Laden had relationships with high-ranking members of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI), who held a mutual view of continuing the training centers in Afghanistan in order to 
prepare for a fight against “disloyal, secular Muslim regimes, and…non-Muslim countries.”21 
With the ISI’s blessing, Al Qaeda increased the numbers of terror training camps throughout 




Upon Bin Laden’s return to Saudi Arabia, the Al Qaeda founder grew incensed at his own 
government for its cooperation with the US during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  
After the Saudis denied his offer of aid in their conflict with Iraq, and instead allied with the 
Americans, allowing them to install military bases in what extremists considered Muslim holy 
lands, Bin Laden departed for Sudan.  Regardless of his family’s prominence, the Saudis were 
content to see him go.22 They stripped him of his citizenship in 1994.23 
During Clinton’s two terms as president, Islamic extremists, largely recruited and 
supported by Bin Laden, expanded their funding, reach, and capabilities for destruction.  The 
first known strike against the US by Al Qaeda occurred in Yemen in December 1992, under the 
George H.W. Bush Administration, and during Clinton’s transition period as President-Elect.  
The Yemen hotel bombings targeted US troops in Aden who were headed towards the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Neither Bush nor Clinton were aware of Al Qaeda’s 
connection to the Somali warlords responsible for the unrest in the African nation at the time.  
Due to a premature detonation, the attacks in Yemen achieved little success.  Two Australian 
tourists were killed, with no American casualties.  One month later, shortly after Clinton’s 
inauguration, the World Trade Center was attacked for the first time on February 26, 1993.  A 
truck bomb that detonated in an underground garage killed six, including a pregnant woman, and 
seriously wounded 1500 others.  The first foreign terrorist attack against Americans civilians at 
home was treated as a matter for law enforcement, and not an act of war.    
At the time of the WTC bombing, Clinton’s first nominee for Attorney General, Zoe 
Baird, was abandoned by the administration due to her neglect of Social Security taxes for her 
illegal immigrant household help.  The Senate was therefore in the process of approving Janet 




Additionally, Clinton’s new FBI Director, Louis Freeh, would not be confirmed by the Senate 
until August 6, 1993.  Prior to Freeh’s tenure, William Sessions, a Bush appointee, remained 
head of the Bureau, despite Clinton’s intense distrust of him.  Due to the Clinton 
Administration’s treatment of the WTC attack as a law enforcement issue, the absence of an 
Attorney General, as well as a virtually leaderless Federal Bureau of Investigation, illuminates 
the initial chaos surrounding the investigation.  Investigative journalist Richard Miniter describes 
the detachment embodied by the president in reference to the 1993 WTC attack by noting, 
“Clinton never even visited the site to assess the damage, nor did he order swift retaliation. It 
was the start of a pattern.”24 Clinton’s only speech on the bombing came in the form of a radio 
address, which largely consisted of his planned economic programs.   
Though the issue should have been treated as a detriment to national security, which 
would mobilize additional intelligence and investigative resources, Freeh notes, “Ever since the 
1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the Bureau had been all but obsessed with terrorism and 
its proponents.”25 The FBI took the matter as an affront to domestic security, and began to 
methodically build a case.  But chain of custody demands prohibited the sharing of evidence with 
other investigative agencies.  The Bureau gathered evidence, not intelligence.  It was a different 
approach from methods used by the CIA.  The FBI sought justice through the application of 
American law, with prosecution and conviction as its ultimate goal.  Their meticulous work 
resulted in the 1995 conviction of Sheikh Abdul Rahman, the head of a terrorist organization 
known as the Islamic Group.  Prosecuted by the US Attorney’s Office in New York, and 
specifically, Andrew McCarthy, the “Blind Sheik,” as Rahman was known, was given a life 
sentence for his leading role in the 1993 WTC bombing.26 He died while imprisoned in February 




FBI counterterrorism agents were aware of the Blind Sheik’s role as a spiritual leader for 
Al Qaeda.  The investigation into the 1993 bombing also generated the uncovering of plans to 
bomb bridges, tunnels, and symbolic buildings in Manhattan, including UN headquarters.  The 
Bureau referred to this operation as the “Day of Terror” plot.27 Much of Rahman’s planning for 
this attack was done within the US, and the evidence was under the protection of a sealed 
indictment.  The CIA would not receive the full findings of the FBI’s investigation until 1996, 
when the details of the case were made public.  
Although some of the terrorists directly responsible for the 1993 WTC bombing were 
tried and convicted in criminal court, the escalation of terror activities, and the expansion of Al 
Qaeda, proved the US legal system was becoming increasingly incapable of responding to these 
international threats. Bin Laden declared war on the US, and acted accordingly.  The CIA began 
to put itself on a war-footing against Al Qaeda in the mid-1990s, recognizing the magnitude of 
hostile danger Americans faced from Islamic combatants.  The FBI, too, understood the 
ramifications of the expanding global jihadist network, but operated under greater restraint than 
its foreign intelligence counterpart.  Unfortunately, American political leaders, the president 
chief among them, refused to follow the lead of the nation’s chief law enforcement arm and its 
premier intelligence agency. 
The biggest failure to come from the 1993 WTC bombing investigation was the exclusion 
of the CIA.  Since the attack was not treated as an international counterterrorism operation, or act 
of war, the CIA had no access to the evidence gathered.  Unfortunately for the CIA, as well as 
other intelligence agencies, “every lab test, every scrap of paper, every interview, every lead, 
every clue from overseas was theirs [the FBI’s] alone.”28 Initially, the FBI lost two vital Al 




agents captured Ramzi Yousef in Pakistan.  He was staying in a guesthouse known to be funded 
by Bin Laden.  Yousef was tried and convicted in New York, but was never detained or 
adequately interrogated.  If he was subjected to harsher forms of questioning, perhaps he would 
have revealed his relationship to fellow terrorist Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM), who also 
escaped to Pakistan following the bombing, which he helped plan.   
Yousef was KSM’s nephew, and while in custody, he never revealed the level reached by 
his uncle within the command structure of Al Qaeda.  KSM, now notoriously regarded as the 
mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, narrowly escaped the grip of the FBI and CIA in 1996.29 KSM is 
now perhaps best known for the questionable treatment he received after his capture in 2003.  
His detention, and the methods used by the CIA to gain intelligence from him, became 
synonymous with the Agency’s controversial use of enhanced interrogation techniques—or 
torture—depending on one’s perspective.  Regardless, it was what KSM revealed, both directly 
and indirectly, during this process that would eventually lead agents and analysts to a valued, and 
highly protected, Bin Laden courier.  After locating the courier, the CIA finally discovered Bin 
Laden living in Abbottabad, Pakistan.  On May 1, 2011, almost ten years after the deadly attacks 
of 9/11, the elite Navy Seal Team 6 raided his compound and put a bullet in his head.  
According to a 1996 State Department assessment of terror patterns, the US 
counterterrorist policy stressed “treating terrorists as criminals.”30 It advocated their aggressive 
pursuit, but emphasized the application of the “rule of law.”31 Many in the law enforcement 
community took issue with this approach.  Until 9/11, terror investigations were often treated as 
those conducted against organized crime syndicates.  Freeh states he does not know one FBI 




investigation was a reasonable alternative to global intelligence gathering, or military and 
diplomatic action.”32 Freeh sarcastically argues: 
The enemy meanwhile was arming itself with trucks loaded with five thousand 
pounds of explosive, with suicide boats…Our warrants could help us snatch a 
Ramzi Yousef and bring him back to the United States to face justice.  Their 
trucks and boats…could rip the face off a military barracks, split open 
embassies…al Qaeda is not the Cosa Nostra, and Osama bin Laden is not a John 
Gotti or a Ted Kaczynski.33  
 
One glaring example illuminates the limits faced by the FBI in its fight against global terrorism 
prior to 9/11.  It was not until June 1998 that the Bureau was able to secure an indictment against 
Bin Laden for the plot to murder Americans in Aden, Yemen in 1992.34 But, Freeh states, “Those 
are the tools we had available to us, the ones our legal system and our political system outfitted 
us with to wage the war on terrorism.”35 As the attacks on US interests abroad became more 
numerous, and more destructive, the CIA and the American military each felt it had to assume a 
greater role.   
As noted prior, the Clinton Administration started out on an uncomfortable footing with 
the military due to the controversy over lifting the ban on gays serving in the military.  The 
tension escalated over the deep defense cuts planned in the president’s budget.  Then-House 
Minority Whip Newt Gingrich warned Clinton in the days after the 1993 WTC bombing to 
proceed cautiously with regards to slashing funding and decreasing military capabilities.  
Prophetically, Gingrich urged, “there’s a very real requirement for human intelligence and 
military strength.  Every time we have any display of weakness, any display of timidity…there 
are people on the planet eager to take advantage of us.”36 Human intelligence (HUMINT), in 
particular, has proved indispensable in the post-9/11 War on Terror.  But neither the military, nor 
the CIA and its Counterterrorism Center (CTC), were privy to the information gathered on the 




matters worse, Clinton’s first choice for Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for the CIA, 
James Woolsey, resigned in 1994, barely two years after his appointment, primarily due to his 
lack of access to the president and the CIA being shut out of the WTC investigation.  In his short 
tenure, Woolsey never had one personal, face-to-face meeting with Clinton.   
Although Clinton apparently refused to consider the 1993 WTC bombing a significant 
threat to national security, the president did fervently push for the capture of Yousef.  Instead of 
tasking the CIA, military generals, or members of his cabinet with encouraging international 
cooperation in locating the terrorist, the president turned to a National Security Council (NSC) 
staffer, Richard A. Clarke.37 His purpose for such an unusual, and low-profile appointment was 
to keep all operations regarding Yousef secret.  While a public declaration and a shared sense of 
mission would have generated more evidence in the process of the manhunt, Clinton had to 
assure any failure of Clarke’s would not fall on him.  Clarke’s success, however, would also be 
his.  For Clinton, Yousef “had to be caught, preferably before the 1996 presidential election.”38 
The FBI came through for Clinton on Yousef, but Bin Laden remained in the shadows. 
The pressure on the FBI in its role as the foremost authority on investigating foreign 
terrorists began to build, mainly due to reasons of ineffectual diplomacy and restricted access. 
On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb detonated directly outside of the Khobar Towers, a complex that 
housed members of the US Air Force and American contractors.  The attack resulted in the 
deaths of nineteen American soldiers and one Saudi.  Almost 500 were wounded. The 
responsibility for the Khobar Towers Bombing in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, though mostly assumed 
to be the work of a Shia faction operating in The Kingdom, is still somewhat disputed.  
Officially, the attack is believed to have been carried out by Saudi members of Hezbollah, and 




partially the work of Al Qaeda.  In an interview in 2006, former Clinton Defense Secretary 
William Perry admitted that he believed Osama Bin Laden orchestrated the attack on the Khobar 
Towers.  Though the Al Qaeda leader commended the action, most evidence points to an Iranian-
directed attack carried out by Hezbollah elements in Saudi Arabia.  However, as noted in The 
9/11 Commission Report, “While the evidence of Iranian involvement is strong, there are also 
signs that Al Qaeda played some role, as yet unknown.”39 US intelligence later uncovered 
evidence of plans devised by the terrorist network to attack a US target in Saudi Arabia.  Al 
Qaeda sent weapons into the region for this purpose, and some of Bin Laden’s associates “took 
credit” for the Khobar Towers attack.40 
Confusion with regards to who was ultimately responsible for the bombing of the Khobar 
Towers arose due to limited American access to evidence as the investigation progressed.  
Immediately after the attack, Freeh and a team of FBI investigators, as well as then-Director of 
Central Intelligence, John Deutsch, CIA agents, and military officials, headed towards Saudi 
Arabia, with the aim of investigating the scene before evidence disappeared or was 
compromised.  Through the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, as well as the Saudi 
Deputy Chief of Mission to the US, Rihad Massoud, Freeh received some level of initial 
participation.  Clinton made a call to Prince Bandar to let him know the FBI Director was in 
charge, but stopped short of exerting any influence with King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah.  
The Saudi royal family had to manage a delicate balance between the ruling monarchy and its 
more fundamentalist population of traditional Wahhabis, who exerted control over mosques and 
local villages.41 Allowing Americans access to suspects captured in the years following the 




Freeh suggests the president was indifferent to the attacks on US interests abroad; the 
same attacks that consumed the FBI and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  The 
American public paid less attention to foreign affairs than domestic ones, so the president did not 
experience much pressure for retaliation.  But since the FBI again took the lead on the Khobar 
Towers bombing, it remains a sore spot for Freeh.  He vowed to uphold the president’s own 
promise of delivering justice to the loved ones of those killed, and found it difficult to maintain 
his word in the face of the administration’s obstruction.  Clinton, whose decision it was to put the 
FBI in charge of the investigation, which even Freeh believed to be more effective in the hands 
of the CIA and the US military, offered no resistance when the Saudis quickly beheaded a few 
low-level terror suspects without first informing the Americans.42 
Although the man has little in the way of credibility, even with those on the Right who, 
for a short time, entertained his insight into Clinton, Dick Morris served as the president’s top 
political strategist, to the dismay of many who worked within the administration.  Prior to Morris 
being ousted during Clinton’s second term for unsavory moral behavior, he diligently worked 
behind the scenes, and behind the backs of other trusted advisors, in an effort to gauge each 
statement, action, piece of legislation, and domestic or foreign development through relentless 
polling.  Therefore, Morris’s statements regarding Clinton’s adherence to public opinion can be 
viewed as notable, even while taking them with the proverbial grain of salt.   
In reference to the bombing of the Khobar Towers in June of 1996, which occurred in the 
middle of the president’s re-election campaign, Morris recalls that he “ordered an immediate 
poll,” because “he was concerned about how Clinton looked in the face of [the attack] and 
whether people blamed him.”43 While initial polling was encouraging, TWA Flight 800 




viewed it as another act of terror prior to the investigative findings being made public. Clinton’s 
numbers began to fall, and advisors worried about the public’s view of the president as soft on 
issues of national security, thus giving his Republican opponent, Senator Bob Dole, an edge. 
Morris explains that he actually polled whether or not Clinton should present himself as a 
“Peacemaker” or display “Toughness.”44 Toughness won the day, so Clinton changed his tone, 
but not his actions.  Here is where and why Clinton often comes across to men like George Tenet 
and Colin Powell as more of a pragmatic, and almost hawkish leader, as opposed to one who was 
often hesitant to use American force when absolutely necessary; when American interests were 
directly attacked.  He often told people what they wanted to hear, and was damn good at it.  Even 
his critics, such as Robert Patterson, struggled with the idea of coming forward with information 
painting the president in a negative light, because he talked a great game.  But Clinton’s attention 
was elsewhere.   
Clinton Senior Aide George Stephanopoulas states that in June 1996, “it felt like the 
entire herd was converging on the White House.”45 Stephanopoulas was speaking of Special 
Prosecutor Kenneth’s Starr’s convictions of Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker and Clinton’s 
partners in the questionable Whitewater land deal, Jim and Susan McDougal.  Starr also indicted 
Bruce Lindsay, an Arkansas banker with ties to Clinton.  Another Clinton scandal, known as 
“Filegate,” appeared during this time.  In his description of Filegate, Stephanopoulas compares 
the actions of two White House staffers, hired by First Lady Hillary Clinton and investigated for 
obtaining the private FBI files of nine hundred Republicans, to Watergate.46 The Clinton 
Administration was in full-on damage control mode.  In his article in National Review, Byron 




busy with something else.”47 It is important to note that Stephanopoulas makes no mention of the 
attack on the Khobar Towers in his description of this period of time. 
Freeh also points out that in Clinton’s autobiography, My Life, the president misstates the 
number of those injured in the attack.  Clinton writes that the blast wounded “almost 300.”48 
Freeh notes that it was actually 372 who were seriously injured.  Clinton also confused the 
Khobar Towers attack with an earlier Al Qaeda assault on a Saudi National Guard building in 
Riyadh, in which five Americans were killed.  The former FBI Director suggests: 
He [Clinton] also appears to have somehow conflated the resolution of Khobar 
with that of an earlier attack on the Saudi National Guard building in Riyadh.  
‘Eventually,’ Clinton writes, ‘Saudi Arabia would execute the people it 
determined to be responsible for the attack.’ Not so. Whether Clinton’s mistakes 
resulted from speed of composition or indifference to the fate of those killed at 
Khobar and their survivors, I’m not prepared to say.49  
 
Freeh argues that the purpose for Clinton’s disconnection to the Khobar Towers investigation 
evolved from the administration’s hopes for building a positive relationship with the newly-
elected Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami.  The FBI Director blames Clinton’s focus on 
building diplomatic relations with the most infamous state sponsor of terror for the lack of 
support given towards the Bureau’s efforts.  Also, as the years wore on, and no progress had 
been made in getting the Saudis to cooperate fully with the Khobar Towers investigation, Clinton 
again became distracted by another domestic scandal: the media’s obsession over his improper 
relationship with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.   
Freeh repeatedly asked National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to convince the president 
to approach the Saudi King and persuade him into granting the FBI greater access to detained 
suspects and Saudi evidence.  Each time Clinton returned from a meeting with King Faud or 
Prince Abdullah, Berger claimed Clinton did not have time to address the issue.  Adding greater 




in the attack.”50 This mistake infuriated Freeh.  The FBI Director corrected Berger: 
“Look…there were nineteen people killed, not seventeen.”51 Freeh states he had nothing against 
Berger personally, but the National Security Advisor came from the “political side of the Clinton 
machine.”52 He argues that as Deputy National Security Advisor under Anthony Lake, Berger 
saw every foreign policy issue through the lens of getting Clinton re-elected.  According to 
Freeh, once he was appointed National Security Advisor, Berger only slightly altered his role 
into one of “preserving Clinton’s legacy and the Democratic hold on the presidency.”53  
Freeh’s frustration finally led him to call on former president George H.W. Bush, who 
used his personal relationship with the Saudi royal family to encourage greater cooperation.  The 
Saudis agreed, and provided the FBI with new evidence, all of which pointed to Iran.  When 
Freeh presented this information, sufficient for several new indictments, Berger demanded to 
know if anyone else knew about this connection.  Referring to Freeh’s evidence of Iranian 
involvement, Berger called it “hearsay,”54 and refused to bring it to Clinton’s attention.  It was 
suppressed.  Freeh ended his personal interaction with the case when he handed over his suspect 
list to President George W. Bush just before he left his post in June 2001.  The Bush 
Administration used the information to generate fourteen indictments against the suspects 
unveiled by Freeh.   
By the time of the Khobar Towers bombing, Bin Laden had already left Sudan, and 
operated comfortably under the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  However, Bin Laden’s 
time in Sudan is both significant, and controversial.  While in its capital city Khartoum, Sudan’s 
leader, Hassan al-Turabi, aided Bin Laden in building a network of companies to serve as fronts 
for his worldwide terrorist network.55 The Al Qaeda leader operated several successful 




late as 1996, many within the CIA believed Bin Laden to be nothing more than a financier of 
terror.  After his name kept appearing in intelligence traffic beginning in 1993, the agency 
formed “The Bin Laden Issue Station,” which would later become “Alec Station,” named after 
the son of the unit’s first leader, Michael Scheuer.56 Operating under the CIA’s CTC, its initial 
purpose was to investigate terrorist financial links.  But Alec Station eventually became the 
primary entity for gathering intel on Bin Laden and recommending action against the terrorist 
and his network.57 As they delved deeper into his connections and influence, they learned he was 
more than just a wealthy Saudi who despised the West.  In Tenet’s words, Bin Laden “was an 
engine of pure evil.”58 
Bin Laden’s time in Sudan is dubious particularly due to one post-9/11 accusation made 
by a Pakistani-American businessman and millionaire Democratic donor, Mansoor Ijaz. 
According to Ijaz, Clinton and his national security team ignored several opportunities to capture 
Bin Laden while he was in Sudan.  Ijaz claims that he negotiated more than one of these 
offerings through back channels, meeting with officials in both the US and Sudan, including 
National Security Advisor Samuel “Sandy” Berger, the State Department’s Susan Rice, Sudan’s 
President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir, and the Sudanese Chief of Intelligence.  Ijaz’s reasoning 
for Bashir’s willingness to hand over Bin Laden, along with lengthy intelligence about the 
networks he constructed, was the suffering caused by sanctions against Sudan.59 Bashir wanted 
them lifted.   
Ijaz notes that two of the 9/11 hijackers were among those listed in the networks.  He 
then asserts, “The silence of the Clinton administration in responding to these offers was 
deafening.”60 According to Ijaz, Rice in particular, then working as Assistant Secretary of State 




on Bin Laden.  She lobbied for placing a ban on US government employees, including members 
of the CIA and FBI, from meeting with Sudanese officials.  Although Sudan was taken over by 
an Islamist regime in the late 1980s, by the mid-1990s, the Sudanese government implemented a 
more conciliatory approach to US relations, and wanted to re-establish a healthy diplomatic 
rapport.  Rice argued against any relaxation in the US stance towards Khartoum. 
 Ijaz maintains that the counterterrorism policies of Clinton and Berger “fueled the rise of 
Bin Laden from an ordinary man to a Hydra-like monster.”61 As Bashir began noticing enormous 
problems associated with his country’s hosting of the terror leader, the Sudanese sent intelligence 
officials to the US in February 1996.  Sudan offered to either arrest and extradite him to Saudi 
Arabia, or monitor his activities and associates.  Bashir feared Bin Laden would use his 
considerable influence to try to overthrow him.  Instead of accepting the Sudanese offer, the US 
put pressure on Sudan to expel him.  In May 1996, Bin Laden voluntarily left Sudan for 
Afghanistan.  Former CIA Director Tenet remains unaware of any Sudanese offer to extradite 
Bin Laden, but he does admit that the terrorist’s relocation at first made things more difficult.  
Afghanistan was in the midst of chaotic infighting, which would soon leave the country in the 
hands of the Taliban, “a brutal, backward band of fanatics.”62 Bin Laden found a home with 
radical cleric and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and heightened the level of his sinister activities.  
Tenet explains, “for the first time in history, we had something that was not ‘state-sponsored 
terrorism,’ but rather a state sponsored by a terrorist group.”63  
Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan with his second in command, Zawahiri, and other 
collaborators, including Wadih El-Hage, currently serving a life sentence in the US for his role in 
the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which were in the planning stages 




verification, with the exception of Tim Carney, who served as US Ambassador to Sudan in the 
mid-1990s, and allegedly worked with Ijaz on the multiple offers.  As noted, the CIA was 
unaware of any such deal presented by Sudanese officials.  But due to the secret level upon 
which the talks supposedly took place, along with the lack of any significant CIA relationship 
with Clinton prior to Tenet’s tenure, the allegations should not be completely dismissed.  In most 
government circles, Ijaz, though almost universally well-liked, is considered either a heroic 
whistle-blower, or “an attention-craving Walter Mitty type, prone to exaggerating his 
importance.”64 However, with so many foreign policy documents from the Clinton era still 
classified, and given Sandy Berger’s 2005 conviction for removing classified materials from the 
National Archives just prior to his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Ijaz’s account 
deserves further investigation.   
In February 1998, Bin Laden and Zawahiri issued a public “fatwa” in the name of a 
“World Islamic Front” to be published in an Arabic newspaper in London.65 The fatwa “called 
for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the ‘individual duty’ for every Muslim 
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”66 Months later, Bin Laden sat for an 
interview with ABC News reporter John Miller, in which he echoed many of the same themes, 
and issued similar threats.  One notable aspect of the interview is Bin Laden’s ridicule of the 
United Nations.  In an attempt to shame the organization for its treatment of Palestine, which is 
ironic in today’s climate, Bin Laden stated:   
The strange thing is that any act on their [the Palestinians] part to avenge 
themselves or to lift the injustice befalling them causes great agitation in the 
United Nations, which hastens to call for an emergency meeting only to convict 
the victim and to censure the wronged and the tyrannized, whose children have 






In his justification for Palestinian terror attacks, and anti-Israeli, anti-Western violence, Bin 
Laden showcased his intent.  Bin Laden points to the bombings in Riyadh, as well as the attack 
on the Khobar Towers, as a signal to governments (i.e. the US), which “willingly participate in 
the aggression against our countries and our lives and our sacrosanct symbols.”68  Nearly three 
months later, Bin Laden solidified his capabilities when Al Qaeda attacked the American 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  It was time to take him seriously. 
The most devastating attacks against Americans abroad in the period leading up to 9/11 
occurred in Africa.  In August 1998, Al Qaeda orchestrated the near-simultaneous truck 
bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  The blasts 
killed more than 200 people, mostly Africans, and injured more than 5,000 others. The attacks 
were carried out by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who had ties to Al Qaeda and received funds 
from Bin Laden.  Twelve Americans were killed in Nairobi, including two CIA agents.  The 
embassy attacks occurred on August 7, likely due to the eighth anniversary of American soldiers 
landing in Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Gulf War.  The following day, CIA Director Tenet 
held a meeting where he distributed intelligence to senior officials on an expected gathering of 
Al Qaeda leaders, including Bin Laden, at an Afghan camp to plan future attacks.69 The 
meeting’s attendees agreed on military air strikes, which would include the use of Tomahawk 
Cruise Missiles aimed at the terrorist congregation in Afghanistan.  Missiles would also target 
the al Shifa plant, a pharmaceutical facility in Khartoum, which was believed to contain nerve 
gas.   
With regard to any preventative action which may have been taken over the decade prior 




CIA and other intelligence agencies as far back as 1992.  Clinton admits that in 1996, under 
pressure from his administration and the CIA, Sudan expelled Bin Laden.  Clinton states: 
We asked Saudi Arabia to take him.  The Saudis didn’t want him back, but Bin 
Laden finally left Sudan in mid-1996…He moved to Afghanistan, where he found 
a warm welcome from Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, a militant Sunni sect 
that was bent on establishing a radical Muslim theocracy in Afghanistan.”70  
 
Clinton then describes the aftermath of the 1998 African embassy bombings.  Just one week after 
the attacks, both the CIA and FBI confirmed Al Qaeda’s responsibility.  He recalls receiving 
CIA intelligence reports from Tenet that Bin Laden and his senior leaders were planning to meet 
at one of the Afghani camps on August 20, which would give Americans the opportunity to 
retaliate.  
But the administration dithered over Pakistan, which would become a returning theme 
both before and after 9/11.  Because the ISI used some of the Al Qaeda training camps, the 
chance that Pakistanis could be included in the damage was high.  Clinton believed Pakistan 
would assume the attack came from India.  With India and Pakistan each in possession of nuclear 
weapons, he feared the worst.  Conversely, if the US military warned Pakistan of its planned 
strikes, certain sympathetic members of the ISI would undoubtedly warn the Taliban, and thus, 
Al Qaeda.71 Still, Clinton agreed to send the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joe 
Ralston, to inform the Pakistani military commander of impending US strikes.  Even though 
General Ralston was to do so minutes prior to the missiles crossing over Pakistani air space, the 
mission was risky.  It would only take minutes for Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda operatives to 
evacuate their locations.  But as stated by Clinton in the same breath, “My team was worried 
about one other thing:  my testimony before the grand jury in three days, on August 17.”72 Here, 




Paula Jones deposition, and whether or not he convinced Monica Lewinsky, who by this time 
had immunity from prosecution, to lie under oath.  
In response to the embassy bombings, Clinton reacted somewhat differently than he had 
towards past attacks.  In July of 1997, Clinton chose Tenet to take over as DCI for the CIA.  
Tenet, incredibly affable, built a strong working relationship with the president, which somewhat 
altered Clinton’s viewpoint of Al Qaeda and how to disrupt the network.  Therefore, in 
retaliation for the embassy attacks, Clinton launched Operation Infinite Reach, which served as 
the code name for the air strikes against Bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan and the suspected 
chemical weapons plant in Sudan.  The UN Security Council also passed Resolution 1189, which 
condemned the embassy bombings and included a call for “international cooperation between 
States in order to adopt practical and effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all 
forms of terrorism affecting the international community.”73    
On August 20, the US Navy launched the strikes from the Arabian Sea.  Most of the 
missiles hit their targets in Khost, Afghanistan, but no terrorists were killed.  The al Shifa plant 
in Sudan was destroyed, but no evidence of chemical weapons or harmful gases were found.  
Clinton was thus accused of orchestrating an attack against an aspirin factory in Sudan, and 
launching Tomahawk missiles into desert sand in Afghanistan.  Given the ineffectiveness of the 
retaliatory strikes, critics assumed Clinton approved the military response solely to draw 
attention away from his personal problems involving the nation’s most famous intern.  
Comparisons to a popular 1997 movie, Wag the Dog, in which a president fakes a war to distract 
the public from his involvement in a domestic scandal, spread wildly.  The timing was indeed 
suspicious, but the case for the strikes, made in the interest of national security, were sound, even 




Though Clinton’s motives were not entirely apolitical, he ordered the military action in 
the immediate aftermath of the embassy bombings.  What he did not do was rally the American 
public, sell a continued assault on the training camps in Afghanistan, and organize a prolonged 
attack on the sanctuary provided to Bin Laden by the Taliban.  Clinton does not address the 
charges of disinterest he and others in his administration are accused of displaying when it came 
to taking any serious military action beyond this point.  But many critics speculate that the 
accusations regarding his possible manipulation of military action to gain protective cover for the 
Lewinsky scandal hindered him from taking further aggressive measures against Taliban-
protected Al Qaeda strongholds after Operation Infinite Reach.   
In November 1998, the FBI was able to secure another indictment against Bin Laden.  
The Bureau charged him, his military commander, Muhammad Atef, and several others with the 
African embassy bombings.  Five months later, Bin Laden finally made it onto the FBI’s Top 
Ten Most Wanted List.  Freeh notes, “Arrest warrants were flying around the globe for him.”75 
But the FBI Director also admits that by the fall of 1998, “I had been Bill Clinton’s top cop for 
half a decade, and he hadn’t spoken to me in two years.”76 Even though Clinton retaliated with 
military air strikes, and the CIA took control of the hunt for Bin Laden, mostly as a result of 
more resources being moved to the CTC and Alec Station, the FBI still acted as the justice arm.  
When Freeh presented Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf with arrest warrants for Bin Laden, 
Musharraf laughed and told him, “You’re probably the only person on earth who could serve 
these warrants right now.”77 The Pakistani’s reaction to the American law enforcement officer 
was indicative of a wider problem.  Not only did the FBI not have the resources or power to 
successfully implement a global manhunt; Bin Laden was fighting a war.  A fanatic willing to 




Unsurprisingly, Musharraf refused to help.  Musharrah disingenuously informed Freeh 
that Taliban leader Mulluh Omar had given his personal assurances that Osama Bin Laden was 
innocent of the East Africa bombings and had abandoned terrorism.  It is no coincidence that Bin 
Laden was finally killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where he was safely guarded by Pakistani 
officials for years.  Freeh notes that with the protection provided by many senior officials in 
Pakistan, “Osama Bin Laden was snug as a bug in a rug.”78 So, why not put sanctions on 
Pakistan?  Why not threaten to withhold financial aid?  Freeh decries the situation as severely 
lacking with regards to presidential authority and US power: 
I had been the one who had gone to Pakistan in 2000 to ask for Pervez 
Musharraf’s help in capturing Osama bin Laden because, before September 11, 
2001, bin Laden was a law-enforcement issue…If our government had a different 
mind-set, the secretaries of state and defense would have been in Lahore with me, 
or instead of me.  Or perhaps Sandy Berger.  But that wasn’t the case.”79  
 
The Clinton Administration did not force Musharraf’s hand in any way.  The CIA also 
understood Pakistan’s role in protecting Bin Laden, and communicated this fact in the 
Presidential Daily Briefings.  But Clinton remained focused on the tenuous conflict between 
Pakistan and India, who each conducted nuclear weapons testing in 1998 and 1999.  He was 
unwilling to make any moves against Pakistan for this reason. 
The Al Qaeda attack that provided the intelligence community with the strongest 
evidence of a pending strike on the homeland was the bombing of the USS Cole in October 
2000.  A previously planned strike against the USS The Sullivans in January failed.  The 
terrorists placed too much weight on their small vessel, and could not carry out their plans. The 
attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, however, succeeded, killing seventeen American Navy 
sailors, and wounding 39 others.  Clinton immediately denounced the bombing as despicable and 




presidency, Clinton was determined to broker a peace deal between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, and he worried that any attempts at retaliation for the attack on the Cole could disrupt 
the negotiations between the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Barak.  Some even believe he did not want to do anything to harm Vice-President Al Gore’s 
chances in the 2000 election.80 However, Clinton had evidence of a sustained pattern of Al 
Qaeda attacks, and given his gift of effective communication and persuasion, he could have 
easily sold strong military action against the perpetrators of the Cole bombing, and those who 
protected them, to both the American public and the international community.  Once again, 
Clinton had the opportunity to disrupt the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and he balked.  The 
Camp David Summit in 2000 also ended in failure due to Arafat’s predictable entrenchment. 
Clinton had multiple chances to be proactive against Al Qaeda by targeting the 
organization’s numerous training camps.  Again, the most persuasive argument for Clinton’s lack 
of a consequential strategy for Al Qaeda was his unwillingness to follow the CIA into 
Afghanistan, and provide the Agency with sufficient military support.  Perhaps his historical 
reference to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan prevented him from taking action against the 
terrorist sanctuaries littering the barren country.  The CIA had concrete evidence that Bin Laden 
was being protected by the Taliban.  Its agents spent time building relationships with the 
Northern Alliance, who participated in the fight against the Soviets and also fought the Taliban 
for control of Afghanistan.  The CIA worked primarily with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of 
the Northern Alliance, who orchestrated meetings between the Americans and tribal leaders 
opposed to Taliban rule.  In an act that illuminates the effectiveness of the CIA alliance with 




assassinated the Northern Alliance leader.  Bin Laden ordered the murder to ensure his continued 
protection by the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Tenet’s description of the CIA’s focus on Afghanistan and the Agency’s work with assets 
on the ground in country can be found in numerous public speeches, recorded testimonies, and 
within his memoir, At the Center of the Storm.  According to the former CIA Director, when 
Clinton appointed him to the position of DCI, the CIA suffered from a severe lack of resources, 
particularly in the area of qualified personnel.  Global technological innovation marched forward 
at an incredible pace, and analysts were unable to keep up.   Tenet describes HUMINT as being 
in a state of total disarray, and therefore, notes that the CIA’s ability to “recruit, train, and sustain 
officers for our clandestine services” suffered greatly.81 He contends that the decline in funding 
after the Cold War hindered the Agency’s effectiveness at a time when a strengthened 
intelligence apparatus grew increasingly vital to the security of the nation and its interests.  For 
this reason, he set out to rebuild.  By 1999, one specific area of concentration in the fight against 
Al Qaeda in particular began to yield beneficial results.  Known as “The Plan,” the CIA’s CTC 
developed a strategy “to track—and then act against—Bin Ladin and his associates in terrorist 
sanctuaries” in Afghanistan.82   
The strategy was a good one, but it ran into several obstacles.  The US government had 
no official presence in the region, and challenging the Taliban regime was absent from any 
foreign policy initiatives or diplomatic maneuvering.  The strained relationship with Pakistan due 
to the country’s nuclear testing in 1998 and military coup in 1999 also played a huge role in 
handcuffing the Agency in Afghanistan.  Even so, the CIA was able to grow HUMINT sources 
by fifty percent between 1999 and 9/11.83 By the time of the attacks in New York and 




covered Afghanistan.  This build-up of sources was key to a greater understanding of the terrorist 
network, and most importantly, allowed the CIA to confirm the existence of numerous Al Qaeda 
facilities and training camps across the country.  Given these improvements, and the actionable 
intelligence they often yielded, aggressive, targeted strikes against these terrorist strongholds 
could have disrupted the planning and efficiency of those who were at war with the US, 
particularly after the bombing of the USS Cole.  It is impossible to say if enhanced military 
action against these camps would have prevented 9/11.  However, as presented under oath by 
Tenet, “The terrorist plotting, planning, recruiting, and training that Bin Laden and al-Qaida did 
in the late 1990s were aided immeasurably by the sanctuary the Taliban provided.”84 
Clinton had many obvious reasons for striking the terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan.  
He was well aware of most of them, but like everyone else, he was also ignorant of others, which 
would only become clear after September 11th.  The “muscle hijackers,” or the operatives 
responsible for storming the cockpits and controlling passengers on 9/11, were chosen by Bin 
Laden and other senior Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan during the summer of 2000.85 Under 
detention, KSM claimed the hijackers were mostly Saudi due to their overwhelming presence in 
the training camps.  Other interrogated detainees suggested the Saudis were chosen to send a 
message to Saudi Arabia about its relationship with the US.  The 9/11 Commission found that 
Saudi and Yemeni trainees in Afghanistan were the most willing to volunteer for suicide 
operations.86 After acquiring US visas in Saudi Arabia, the muscle hijackers trained in 
Afghanistan in late 2000 and into early 2001.87 Again, the president, along with the rest of the 
world, could not foresee the magnitude of savagery that these sanctuaries would ultimately 
produce.  But this acknowledgment does not mean Clinton is excused from recognizing that a 




supported Tenet, and eventually advocated for increased intelligence funding, he ultimately 
declined to take any significant offensive action in Afghanistan.  According to Henry Crumpton, 
who served as head of operations for the CTC during the Clinton Administration, “The most 
important, most immediate objective was Afghanistan.”88 But even after both the embassy 
bombings and the attack on the USS Cole, “AQ (Al Qaeda) in Afghanistan remained unscathed, 
untouched.”89   
Richard Clarke, who served as Clinton’s National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, said 
in a 2002 interview with PBS’s Frontline, that by the time of the 1998 African embassy attacks, 
“everyone in the Clinton Cabinet would have said that Al Qaeda is a serious threat.”90 But 
Clarke, often criticized as a Clinton apologist, states that had 9/11 not occurred, Americans 
would view any significant action taken against Bin Laden as an “overreaction.”91 He goes on to 
imagine a world without the tragic events of September 11, 2001.  Instead of the American 
public asking “How could they miss it?”, Clarke alleges it would instead wonder, “Why were 
they so preoccupied with bin Laden?”92 But 9/11 did happen.  It is therefore reasonable to 
analyze the lack of response to such attacks, especially given Clarke’s statement professing his 
own supposed “preoccupation” with Bin Laden.   
 Clarke was forced to admit his overstatement regarding the Clinton Administration’s 
activities against Bin Laden, which he describes as “massive.”93 When asked if the Lewinsky 
Scandal hindered attempts by the CIA, NSA, FBI, or other counterterrorism entities to take more 
aggressive steps, Clarke replied that Clinton never refused him.  But almost immediately, Clarke 
was asked, “But didn’t you push for military action after the Cole?”94 He suggested the attacks 




 Clarke’s only criticism of the Clinton Administration appears to be unintentional.  But 
what he reveals illuminates the most consequential action the president could have taken.  Clarke 
notes:   
I believe that, had we destroyed the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan earlier, 
that the conveyor belt that was producing terrorists sending them out around the 
world would have been destroyed.  So many, many trained and indoctrinated Al 
Qaeda terrorists, which now we have to hunt down country by country, many of 
them would not be trained and would not be indoctrinated, because there wouldn’t 
have been a safe place to do it if we had destroyed the camps earlier.95 
 
Clarke hesitates to describe this lack of action as a mistake by Clinton and his national security 
team.  He references Clinton’s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process at the time, as well as US-
led NATO actions in Kosovo.  But he still admits how vital the Afghan training camps were to 
the successful implementation of the 9/11 attacks.  When asked what was the one thing he 
wished he would have done, he answered:   
Blow up the camps and take out their sanctuary.  Eliminate their safe haven.  
They would have been a hell of a lot less capable of recruiting people. Their 
whole ‘Come to Afghanistan where you’ll be safe and you’ll be trained,’ well, 
that wouldn’t have worked if every time they got a camp together, it was blown 
up by the United States. That’s the one thing that we recommended that didn’t 
happen — the one thing in retrospect I wish had happened.96 
 
But these measures were never taken.  In an ironic twist, one day prior to September 11, 2001, 
Clinton attempted to justify his decision against taking military action in Afghanistan.  Speaking 
to a pre-9/11 audience of Australian businessmen, with a self-righteous justification for his 
decision-making, Clinton said, “I could have killed Bin Laden, but I would have to destroy a 
little town called Kandahar…and kill 300 innocent women and children.”97 Clinton, at this time 
out of office for months, claimed, “I nearly got him once.”98 These statements gained 
considerable attention just one day later.  They also garnered much scrutiny.  Clinton actually 




In a 48 Hours special featuring interviews with the twelve living CIA directors, as well as 
some agents and analysts, one specific account of Clinton’s unwillingness to take out Bin Laden 
is given.  In “The Spymasters:  CIA in the Crosshairs,” Tenet, along with legendary CIA 
operative and one-time director of the CTC, Cofer Black, describes an incident that occurred 
when the Agency was testing drones, then unarmed, over Afghanistan.  As noted, by this time, 
the CIA had built a significant presence in the chaotic tribal nation, and won over many villagers 
in their fight against the Taliban.  Agents developed assets on the ground, many who were 
members of the Northern Alliance, and worked with the CIA on several plans to capture Bin 
Laden as part of The Plan.  But many of these operations were discarded once they reached the 
highest levels of the government, primarily due to a fear that Bin Laden would be assassinated, 
or the civilians with whom he surrounded himself would become collateral damage.  In 1998, the 
group at Alec Station devised an operation designed to grab Bin Laden as he exited a compound 
in Kandahar, Afghanistan.  The proposed mission included US Special Forces, FBI agents, and 
Afghani local fighters.  FBI Director Freeh describes his frustration with the continued resistance 
to take advantage of the CIA’s developing network in Afghanistan: “The scheme worked its way 
up the chain of command until it was finally killed by the military, which owned the assets that 
were to have been used.”99  
On September 28, 2000, when the drone testing took place, Tenet states: “We saw a very 
tall man in white robes who we assumed…was bin Laden.”100 The CIA contacted its Afghani 
assets in the area, who confirmed his location, and the mission was set to proceed.  Black then 
sarcastically notes, “I mean—I love this.  This is such a Washington thing.  Our instructions 
were to capture him.  And that’s what we—attempted to do.”101 Black obviously preferred 




operated was never an option.  Because the Attorney General [Reno] made it abundantly clear 
that he could only be killed in the context of a capture operation.”102 Both Tenet and Black 
understood their Afghan allies were not playing by the same rules that confined them, but the 
CIA had to answer to the president of the United States.  Black adds, “The Clinton 
Administration spent eight years learning to appreciate this threat.  And only at the very end did 
they get it.”103 Tenet abided by the instructions given to him by the White House, and the action 
was scrapped.  Black then offers his assessment of future Al Qaeda preparations: “There was no 
doubt in my mind that the United States was going to be struck and struck hard.  Lots of 
Americans were going to die.”104 
This repeated course of solid intelligence gathering, mission preparation, and high-level 
government obstruction became the norm until 9/11.  After the September 11 attacks, Bush 
granted Tenet’s request to lead the invasion of Afghanistan in October.  The new president told 
the director he could have anything he needed.  With a solid network of Afghan allies, and 
backed by the military prowess of US Special Forces, the CIA led the large-scale operation that 
finally devastated Al Qaeda strongholds and training facilities in the war-torn country.  
Unfortunately, Bin Laden, with the aid of sympathetic Pakistanis, was able to escape across the 
border into Pakistan.  But his sanctuary was destroyed…at least temporarily.  Years later, the 
Taliban would regroup, and the war in Afghanistan heightened.  Members of the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are now known to utilize the tunnels and caves that once protected Bin 
Laden and his associates.  In the spring of 2017, the Trump Administration launched an effective 
attack on one of these underground systems, killing over 100 ISIS members in the process. 
Freeh describes his service within the Clinton Administration as incredibly frustrating 




increasingly destructive attacks.  He states, “I’d seen the evidence of the ongoing war with my 
own eyes…in East Africa, on the USS Cole…But until 9/11, we lacked the political leadership 
and more important the political will to do what had to be done.”105 The most glaring problems 
facing the Clinton White House, affecting both its willingness and ability to respond to this rising 
threat, and the attacks that foreshadowed something more ominous, were political calculations 
over the use of military action, and the plethora of scandals being juggled by the president’s staff 
during both of his terms.   Perhaps it is why investigative journalist Richard Miniter described 
Osama Bin Laden as “the unfinished business of the Clinton Adminstration.”106 Unfortunately, 
the deadly terrorist would inherit the same designation over the course of the George W. Bush 
presidency.  The extensive dedication and painstaking work of the nation’s intelligence agencies 
over the course of almost two decades, in concert with the impeccable training, bravery, and 
competence of the US Navy Seals, finally culminated in Bin Laden’s long-awaited demise 
during the Obama presidency. 
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Chapter 8.  EPILOGUE 
 
Americans are often given a false choice between the rigid foreign policy options of 
Realpolitik, a version of pragmatic political and diplomatic realism, or an idealistic concept of 
humanitarian intervention and multilateral cooperation. The choice is too often presented as one 
or the other.  Realpolitik is often viewed as the selfish pursuit of national interests, with little 
concern for principles or moral doctrine.  It is most notably associated with Henry Kissinger, 
who, as Nixon’s Secretary of State, opened relations with China during the Cold War despite the 
Asian nation’s adherence to communism.  Kissinger acted pragmatically, but many viewed his 
form of diplomacy as legitimizing an enemy state with an atrocious record of human rights 
abuses.    
Conversely, President Jimmy Carter concentrated on a more humanitarian approach to 
world affairs, and with the exception of the Camp David Accords, left a foreign policy legacy 
construed as weak and ineffective.  In the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Iranian Hostage Crisis, Carter used the carrot instead of the stick far too often, and America lost 
much of its credibility with regards to military strength and resolute foreign intervention.  
President Bill Clinton does not fit into either of these categories.  As noted within this 
study, Clinton initially pursued an “internationalist vision”1 for US foreign policy.  His goal was 
to blend “idealism and pragmatism, internationalism and protectionism, [and] use of force and 
reliance on multinational institutions.”2 As a result, he was criticized for attempting to be all 
things to all people.  The Clinton national security team during his first term put forth the ideas 
of democratic enlargement and aggressive multilateralism to serve as the foundation upon which 
to build a cohesive foreign policy.  The focus was always economics, both foreign and domestic.  




supplanted the need for attention elsewhere, as international conflicts spiraled out of control in 
various regions.  Due to the post-Cold War nature of these crises, the notion of spreading 
American ideals of free market democracy, trade, and human rights protections often proved 
inadequate, particularly when the US refrained from fully committing to the goals the 
administration itself proposed.   
For this reason, Clinton’s hopes of greater cooperation with the international community 
via the United Nations, as well as the pursuit of collective security among democratic nations, 
were not realized, particularly during his first term.  The problem was not the intent.  It was the 
execution.  Diplomacy should always be the first consideration when confronting foreign 
instability, but it often leads nowhere without the credible determination to use force if 
necessary.  Clinton shifted the burden of decision-making over foreign entanglements to the UN, 
and quickly learned of the organization’s shortcomings, especially when American military 
forces were involved.  Speaking of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, Clinton states:   
After Black Hawk Down, whenever I approved the deployment of forces, I knew 
much more about what the risks were, and made much clearer what operations 
had to be approved in Washington.  The lessons of Somalia were not lost on the 
military planners who plotted our course in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and 
other troubled spots of the post-Cold War world, where America was often asked 
to step in to stop hideous violence, and too often expected to do it without the loss 
of lives to ourselves, our adversaries, or innocent bystanders.  The challenge of 
dealing with complicated problems like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia inspired one 
of [National Security Advisor] Tony Lake’s best lines: ‘Sometimes I really miss 
the Cold War.’3 
 
Clinton admits the effort to seize Aideed was misguided; he should never have allowed it to 
replace the original mission of peacekeeping and protecting and providing humanitarian aid.  The 
decision to leave Somalia after the Battle of Mogadishu had a lasting legacy on future decisions 
over the use of military force, as well as on the emboldening of Al Qaeda.  The first signs of 




October 7, 1993, following the tragedy in Somalia, when he stated: “We have obligations 
elsewhere…It is not America’s job to ‘rebuild Somalia society.’”4 Here, Clinton repudiated his 
own administration’s faith in UN Security Resolutions, and rejected some of the policies 
proposed during his campaign. But Clinton did not only suffer from his inexperience.  He was a 
quick study.  Political calculations, as well as a tenure bogged down by numerous scandals, also 
inhibited the president’s attention to foreign affairs, thus hindering his ability to react effectively. 
In 1997, historian Richard Haas noted the difficulties in defining Clinton’s foreign policy.  
In his article, “Fatal Distraction,” Haas points to the inconsistencies derived from the Clinton 
Administration’s concept of democratic enlargement as a key to maintaining global order.  
National Security Advisor Tony Lake put forth this element in a 1993 speech, which proposed 
that the “successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of…enlargement of the 
world’s free community of market democracies.”5 The idea behind using economic, political, 
and social progress as a tool to lure unstable regions into compliance on the world’s stage lacked 
a basic understanding of why certain foreign entanglements erupt.  As stated by Haas, “Enlarging 
the community of democracies might look good on paper,”6 but it is far too idealistic and 
ineffective when faced with actors whose motives are far more complicated.  It did not serve the 
administration well when dealing with urgent crises, such as those in Bosnia, Rwanda, or 
Somalia, all of which grew out of historic ethnic turmoil.  The Clinton team suffered from their 
inability to separate “theory and practice,”7 until events caused them to give up the theory 
entirely.  The national security apparatus under Clinton was forced to act in a “whack-a-mole” 
fashion, consistently trying to pound out one problem as another quickly arose.     
One of the main problems with Clinton’s approach is one mimicked by many other 




in controversy.  Proactive intervention is even more contentious.  Often, the US steps into a 
conflict under a cloud of domestic suspicion, which is the unfortunate byproduct of the legacy of 
Vietnam, and now, Iraq.  Clinton was not going to sacrifice his vast agenda for problem-solving 
at home to the chaos of foreign affairs, especially without an obvious national security interest to 
consider.  So, he did not take the steps to block escalation where he could.  Clinton often acted to 
subdue international acts of violence just enough to keep it off of the front pages.  In Bosnia, “lift 
and strike,” if pressed vigorously, might have precipitated a political settlement and avoided the 
mass murder that engulfed the Balkan region.  In Somalia, there was nothing intrinsically wrong 
in nation-building; some sort of political solution was implied in the original intervention.  
However, it was arrogant to believe that nation-building could be accomplished within a few 
months in a land as ravished and divided as Somalia. Returning the legitimate president to power 
in Haiti was also a worthy objective, but it required a consistent follow-up from Washington, 
which was never organized once the troop landings redeemed Clintons reputation.8   
The military’s mission in Somalia evolved from one of humanitarian intervention to one 
of nation-building.  The same can be said of Haiti.  Both failed.  Somalia slipped even further 
into chaos, and the attempts at securing democracy in Haiti, largely abandoned, have only 
exacerbated the country’s problems in terms of poverty, illiteracy, disease, and violence.  
Rwanda’s problems spread out to neighboring countries, the most notable being the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire.  The flood of refugees from the genocidal region caused 
another outbreak of similar violence and brutality in the Congo, with famine and the spread of 
disease complicating its political and social balance.   
Ironically, for an administration whose key participants viewed US military intervention 




frequency of deployments, as well as their almost overlapping missions, caused great distress 
among soldiers and military leaders alike.  Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson notes with irony 
that he and his fellow soldiers “were involved in more operations during the supposed ‘peace 
dividend’ and ‘down-sizing’ of the military under President Clinton than during the Cold War 
years of military buildup and improvement under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.” 9  
With the possible exception of Bosnia, which is viewed as a tepid foreign policy success 
due to late entry, the powerful American military felt disillusioned.  They were not being utilized 
correctly.  Whether one is speaking of timing, or defining the objective of a particular mission, 
US forces often felt they either did not arrive early enough, or they were not allowed to make a 
real difference.  Timing mattered in Bosnia.  The US-led NATO force achieved its military goals 
with precision, but only after the Clinton Administration and its European allies allowed 
hundreds of thousands to perish while each attempting to pass the buck to the other.   
Rwanda provides an upsetting illustration of sending in American troops when nothing of 
note is left to do.  According to scholar Michael Hughes, “The problem of political will remains 
one of the most important challenges impeding significant, early action and the prevention of 
genocide and crimes against humanity.”10 Haiti also gives an example of an unclear, or 
unreachable, objective. The overwhelming force sent to remove the ruling military junta and 
restore President Aristide ended up serving as yet another peacekeeping mission.  Democracy in 
some form was restored for a time, but corruption, violence, and poverty still plague the country.  
Once critic suggests that in trying to find his way through Bosnia and Somalia, Clinton, whose 
interest “lagged at the water’s edge,” became a “slave to public and congressional opinion when 




In a rather prophetic article written just three days prior to the Battle of Mogadishu, 
George Kennan, the man behind the Cold-War era containment policy, wrote an editorial in The 
New York Times.  Speaking of US intervention in Somalia, Kennan notes: 
The fact is that this dreadful situation cannot possibly be put to rights other than 
by the establishment of a governing power for the entire territory, and a very 
ruthless, determined one at that.  It could not be a democratic one, because the 
very prerequisites for a democratic political system do not exist among the people 
in question.  Our action hold no promise of correcting this situation.12  
 
Kennan’s thoughts on Somalia raise an interesting question regarding the use of American 
military power, and even its support of humanitarian missions that fail due to a lack of any stable 
institutions in a particular region.  When one examines US presence in places such as Yemen, 
Libya, or Sudan, these questions should be considered.   
It is not realistic to close American doors to all, and remove US power, both physical and 
financial, from institutions that intervene in places under intense strife.  However, the 
fundamental problem confronting American leaders is when and where to do so, and how.  Of 
course, national security interests continue to outweigh humanitarian ones.  For this reason, US 
forces remain on the ground, though in lesser numbers, across the Middle East in an attempt to 
fight terrorism abroad rather than at home.  But the entire region has devolved further into chaos.  
After the Arab Spring, where revolutions against leaders throughout nations such as 
Libya, Egypt, and Syria took place, President Barack Obama sang the praises of what he deemed 
to be a unified people’s peaceful removal of autocracy in favor of democracy.  However, these 
uprisings ultimately led to the ousting of a long-term US ally in Egypt, and ushered in political 
and social instability across the region.  Hosni Mubarak had his problems, and his militaristic 
regime had an imperfect record on human rights.  But prior to his forced abdication, Egypt was 




Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammad Morsi, the promise of democracy and freedom turned into 
nothing more than an attempt to install a theocracy, such as that which exists in Iran.  Morsi was 
forcibly removed by a military coup shortly after his real motives became clear, and General 
Abdel Fattah el Sisi took his place.  Stability has returned, and US relations with Egypt have 
improved.  However, Libya and Syria are in complete disarray.  Syria has been mired in civil war 
for almost six years, and hundreds of thousands of people are either dead or existing as refugees. 
Libya is being overrun by Islamic extremists.  The UN has little effective presence in the region, 
and Americans, for the most part, have stood by and watched the carnage unfold in the wake of 
the country’s retreat from Iraq.  Crises in the Middle East are again demanding an answer to the 
question of intervention, whether due to humanitarian concerns, military objectives, or both.  
Africa, too, demands international attention.  With terror groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria 
and Al Shabaab in Somalia, kidnapping and enslaving locals, and disease, famine, and violence 
devastating regions across the continent, the global community is looking for leadership.  If and 
how America responds has yet to be determined. 
When Richard Holbrooke visited Bosnia as a board member of the International Rescue 
Committee, America’s largest nongovernmental relief organization, he recorded images of the 
ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbs, “filming house upon house that had been blown up by 
the Serb soldiers and militia.”13 He recoiled when watching Muslims exchanging deeds to their 
homes for safe passage out of Bosnia.  He was disgusted by tales from refugees who described 
the disappearance of thousands of Muslim men.  In an article for Newsweek, upon his return, 
Holbrooke asked “What would the West be doing now if the religious convictions of combatants 
were reversed, and a Muslim force was now trying to destroy two million beleaguered Christians 




The weak international response to the systematic execution and displacement of millions 
at the hands of the Islamic State shows what occurs with an absence of US leadership, even when 
international humanitarian aid is deployed.  Since their rise in 2011, ISIS has brutally tortured, 
raped, and killed tens of thousands of Christians, Yazidis, and moderate Muslims in a campaign 
to terrorize regions in Iraq and Syria into submission.  The Obama Administration offered some 
verbal denunciations, but mostly stayed out of the situation, with the exception of very limited 
air strikes.  ISIS members were able to carry out their swift takeover by hijacking millions of 
dollars’ worth of US military equipment from Iraqi soldiers, who abandoned their posts when 
faced with defending their homes and people.  The terrorists were also able to travel without 
harassment along long, lone roads, from city to city, free to pursue their bloodthirsty aims.  They 
continue to terrorize the few Christians who remain in these regions, subjecting them to such 
brutal acts as burning them alive in cages and crucifixion. They have done the same to Iraq’s 
Yazidi Kurds, who have experienced unbelievable persecution.15 Thousands of Yazidi women 
and young girls have been kidnapped by ISIS members and forced into sex slavery.  
It remains to be seen whether future American leaders can accomplish what President 
Clinton could not, and find the middle ground between realism and idealism in foreign policy.  It 
will be up to the United States to put a halt to these gross violations of human rights.  But, after 
Iraq, do Americans have the will?  Do they have the resolve?  The American public has almost 
resigned itself to the realization that the US is “damned if we do, damned if we don’t.”  For this 
reason, several countries in the Middle East, and many rogue states in Africa, are almost 
uninhabitable.  Countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria are in chaos.  Most 
lack any sort of central authority, and if they do, as in Syria, it is backed up by an adversary, 




smart and well-defined military action is the only way to stop the primary aggressors currently 
wreaking havoc on the world stage.  It will take cunning and persuasive American leadership to 
do it.  
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